Chapter 3
LENIN AND GERMAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE BOLSHEVIK
REVOLUTION
It was not until the Bolsheviks had received from us a steady flow of funds through various channels and under varying labels that they were in a position to be able to build up their main organ Pravda, to conduct energetic propaganda and appreciably to extend the originally narrow base of their party.
Von Kühlmann,
minister of foreign affairs, to the kaiser, December 3, 1917
In April 1917 Lenin and a party of 32 Russian revolutionaries, mostly Bolsheviks, journeyed by train from Switzerland across Germany through Sweden to Petrograd, Russia. They were on their way to join Leon Trotsky to "complete the revolution." Their trans-Germany transit was approved, facilitated, and financed by the German General Staff. Lenin's transit to Russia was part of a plan approved by the German Supreme Command, apparently not immediately known to the kaiser, to aid in the disintegration of the Russian army and so eliminate Russia from World War I. The possibility that the Bolsheviks might be turned against Germany and Europe did not occur to the German General Staff. Major General Hoffman has written, "We neither knew nor foresaw the danger to humanity from the consequences of this journey of the Bolsheviks to Russia."1
At the highest
level the German political officer who approved Lenin's journey to Russia was
Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, a descendant of the Frankfurt banking
family Bethmann, which achieved great prosperity in the nineteenth century.
Bethmann-Hollweg was appointed chancellor in 1909 and in November 1913 became
the subject of the first vote of censure ever passed by the German Reichstag on
a chancellor. It was Bethmann-Hollweg who in 1914 told the world that the
German guarantee to Belgium was a mere "scrap of paper." Yet on other
war matters — such as the use of unrestricted submarine warfare —
Bethmann-Hollweg was ambivalent; in January 1917 he told the kaiser, "I
can give Your Majesty neither my assent to the unrestricted submarine warfare
nor my refusal." By 1917 Bethmann-Hollweg had lost the Reichstag's support
and resigned — but not before approving transit of Bolshevik revolutionaries to
Russia. The transit instructions from Bethmann-Hollweg went through the state
secretary Arthur Zimmermann — who was immediately under Bethmann-Hollweg and
who handled day-to-day operational details with the German ministers in both
Bern and Copenhagen — to the German minister to Bern in early April 1917. The
kaiser himself was not aware of the revolutionary movement until after Lenin
had passed into Russia.
While Lenin
himself did not know the precise source of the assistance, he certainly knew
that the German government was providing some funding. There were, however,
intermediate links between the German foreign ministry and Lenin, as the
following shows:
LENIN'S TRANSFER TO RUSSIA IN APRIL 1917
|
||
Final decision
|
|
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG
(Chancellor) |
Intermediary I
|
|
ARTHUR ZIMMERMANN
(State Secretary) |
Intermediary II
|
|
BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU
(German Minister in Copenhagen) |
Intermediary III
|
|
ALEXANDER ISRAEL HELPHAND
(alias PARVUS) |
Intermediary IV
|
|
JACOB FURSTENBERG (alias GANETSKY)
LENIN, in Switzerland |
From Berlin
Zimmermann and Bethmann-Hollweg communicated with the German minister in
Copenhagen, Brockdorff-Rantzau. In turn, Brockdorff-Rantzau was in touch with
Alexander Israel Helphand (more commonly known by his alias, Parvus), who was
located in Copenhagen.2 Parvus was the connection to Jacob
Furstenberg, a Pole descended from a wealthy family but better known by his
alias, Ganetsky. And Jacob Furstenberg was the immediate link to Lenin.
Although
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was the final authority for Lenin's transfer, and
although Lenin was probably aware of the German origins of the assistance,
Lenin cannot be termed a German agent. The German Foreign Ministry assessed
Lenin's probable actions in Russia as being consistent with their own
objectives in the dissolution of the existing power structure in Russia. Yet
both parties also had hidden objectives: Germany wanted priority access to the
postwar markets in Russia, and Lenin intended to establish a Marxist
dictatorship.
The idea of
using Russian revolutionaries in this way can be traced back to 1915. On August
14 of that year, Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote the German state undersecretary about
a conversation with Helphand (Parvus), and made a strong recommendation to
employ Helphand, "an extraordinarily
important man whose unusual powers I feel we must employ for duration of the war .... "3 Included in the report was a warning: "It might perhaps be risky to want
to use the powers ranged behind Helphand, but it would certainly be an
admission of our own weakness if we were to refuse their services out of fear
of not being able to direct them."4
Brockdorff-Rantzau's
ideas of directing or controlling the revolutionaries parallel, as we shall
see, those of the Wall Street financiers. It was J.P. Morgan and the American
International Corporation that attempted to control both domestic and foreign
revolutionaries in the United States for their own purposes.
A subsequent
document5 outlined the terms demanded by Lenin, of
which the most interesting was point number seven, which allowed "Russian
troops to move into India"; this suggested that Lenin intended to continue
the tsarist expansionist program. Zeman also records the role of Max Warburg in
establishing a Russian publishing house and adverts to an agreement dated
August 12, 1916, in which the German industrialist Stinnes agreed to contribute
two million rubles for financing a publishing house in Russia.6
Consequently,
on April 16, 1917, a trainload of thirty-two, including Lenin, his wife
Nadezhda Krupskaya, Grigori Zinoviev, Sokolnikov, and Karl Radek, left the
Central Station in Bern en route to Stockholm. When the party reached the
Russian frontier only Fritz Plattan and Radek were denied entrance into Russia.
The remainder of the party was allowed to enter. Several months later they were
followed by almost 200 Mensheviks, including Martov and Axelrod.
It is worth
noting that Trotsky, at that time in New York, also had funds traceable to
German sources. Further, Von Kuhlmann alludes to Lenin's inability to broaden
the base of his Bolshevik party until the Germans supplied funds. Trotsky was a
Menshevik who turned Bolshevik only in 1917. This suggests that German funds
were perhaps related to Trotsky's change of party label.
In early 1918
Edgar Sisson, the Petrograd representative of the U.S. Committee on Public
Information, bought a batch of Russian documents purporting to prove that
Trotsky, Lenin, and the other Bolshevik revolutionaries were not only in the
pay of, but also agents of, the German government.
These
documents, later dubbed the "Sisson Documents," were shipped to the
United States in great haste and secrecy. In Washington, D.C. they were
submitted to the National Board for Historical Service for authentication. Two
prominent historians, J. Franklin Jameson and Samuel N. Harper, testified to
their genuineness. These historians divided the Sisson papers into three groups.
Regarding Group I, they concluded:
We have
subjected them with great care to all the applicable tests to which historical
students are accustomed and . . . upon the basis of these investigations, we
have no hesitation in declaring that we see no reason to doubt the genuineness
or authenticity of these fifty-three documents.7
The historians
were less confident about material in Group II. This group was not rejected as.
outright forgeries, but it was suggested that they were copies of original
documents. Although the historians made "no confident declaration" on
Group III, they were not prepared to reject the documents as outright
forgeries.
The Sisson
Documents were published by the Committee on Public Information, whose chairman
was George Creel, a former contributor to the pro-Bolshevik Masses. The American press in general
accepted the documents as authentic. The notable exception was the New York Evening Post, at that time owned
by Thomas W. Lamont, a partner in the Morgan firm. When only a few installments
had been published, the Post challenged
the authenticity of all the documents.8
We now know
that the Sisson Documents were almost all forgeries: only one or two of the
minor German circulars were genuine. Even casual examination of the German
letterhead suggests that the forgers were unusually careless forgers perhaps
working for the gullible American market. The German text was strewn with terms
verging on the ridiculous: for example, Bureau
instead of the German word Büro;
Central for the German Zentral; etc.
That the
documents are forgeries is the conclusion of an exhaustive study by George
Kennan9 and of studies made in the 1920s by the
British government. Some documents were based on authentic information and, as
Kennan observes, those who forged them certainly had access to some unusually
good information. For example, Documents 1, 54, 61, and 67 mention that the Nya
Banken in Stockholm served as the conduit for Bolshevik funds from Germany.
This conduit has been confirmed in more reliable sources. Documents 54, 63, and
64 mention Furstenberg as the banker-intermediary between the Germans and the
Bolshevists; Furstenberg's name appears elsewhere in authentic documents.
Sisson's Document 54 mentions Olof Aschberg, and Olof Aschberg by his own
statements was the "Bolshevik Banker." Aschberg in 1917 was the
director of Nya Banken. Other documents in the Sisson series list names and
institutions, such as the German Naptha-Industrial Bank, the Disconto
Gesellschaft, and Max Warburg, the Hamburg banker, but hard supportive evidence
is more elusive. In general, the Sisson Documents, while themselves outright
forgeries, are nonetheless based partly on generally authentic information.
One puzzling
aspect in the light of the story in this book is that the documents came to
Edgar Sisson from Alexander Gumberg (alias Berg, real name Michael Gruzenberg),
the Bolshevik agent in Scandinavia and later a confidential assistant to Chase
National Bank and Floyd Odium of Atlas Corporation. The Bolshevists, on the
other hand, stridently repudiated the Sisson material. So did John Reed, the
American representative on the executive of the Third International and whose
paycheck came from Metropolitan magazine,
which was owned by J.P. Morgan interests.10 So did Thomas Lamont, the Morgan partner
who owned the New York Evening Post. There
are several possible explanations. Probably the connections between the Morgan
interests in New York and such agents as John Reed and Alexander Gumberg were
highly flexible. This could have been
a Gumberg maneuver to discredit Sisson and Creel by planting forged documents;
or perhaps Gumberg was working in his own interest.
The Sisson
Documents "prove" exclusive German involvement with the Bolsheviks.
They also have been used to "prove" a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy
theory along the lines of that of the Protocols of Zion. In 1918 the U.S.
government wanted to unite American opinion behind an unpopular war with
Germany, and the Sisson Documents dramatically "proved" the exclusive
complicity of Germany with the Bolshevists. The documents also provided a smoke
screen against public knowledge of the events to be described in this book.
A review of
documents in the State Department Decimal File suggests that the State
Department and Ambassador Francis in Petrograd were quite well informed about
the intentions and progress of the Bolshevik movement. In the summer of 1917,
for example, the State Department wanted to stop the departure from the U.S. of
"injurious persons" (that is, returning Russian revolutionaries) but
was unable to do so because they were using new Russian and American passports.
The preparations for the Bolshevik Revolution itself were well known at least
six weeks before it came about. One report in the State Department files
states, in regard to the Kerensky forces, that it was "doubtful whether
government . . . [can] suppress outbreak." Disintegration of the Kerensky
government was reported throughout September and October as were Bolshevik
preparations for a coup. The British government warned British residents in
Russia to leave at least six weeks before the Bolshevik phase of the
revolution.
The first full
report of the events of early November reached Washington on December 9, 1917.
This report described the low-key nature of the revolution itself, mentioned
that General William V. Judson had made an unauthorized visit to Trotsky, and
pointed out the presence of Germans in Smolny — the Soviet headquarters.
On November 28,
1917, President Woodrow Wilson ordered no interference with the Bolshevik
Revolution. This instruction was apparently in response to a request by Ambassador
Francis for an Allied conference, to which Britain had already agreed. The
State Department argued that such a conference was impractical. There were
discussions in Paris between the Allies and Colonel Edward M. House, who
reported these to Woodrow Wilson as "long and frequent discussions on
Russia." Regarding such a conference, House stated that England was
"passively willing," France "indifferently
against," and Italy "actively so." Woodrow Wilson, shortly
thereafter, approved a cable authored by Secretary of State Robert Lansing,
which provided financial assistance for the Kaledin movement (December 12,
1917). There were also rumors filtering into Washington that "monarchists
working with the Bolsheviks and same supported by various occurrences and circumstances";
that the Smolny government was absolutely under control of the German General
Staff; and rumors elsewhere that "many or most of them [that is,
Bolshevists] are from America."
In December,
General Judson again visited Trotsky; this was looked upon as a step towards
recognition by the U.S., although a report dated February 5, 1918, from
Ambassador Francis to Washington, recommended against recognition. A memorandum
originating with Basil Miles in Washington argued that "we should deal with
all authorities in Russia including Bolsheviks." And on February 15, 1918,
the State Department cabled Ambassador Francis in Petrograd, stating that the
"department desires you gradually to keep in somewhat closer and informal
touch with the Bolshevik authorities using such channels as will avoid any
official recognition."
The next day
Secretary of State Lansing conveyed the following to the French ambassador J.
J. Jusserand in Washington: "It is
considered inadvisable to take any action which will antagonize at this time
any of the various elements of the people which now control the power in Russia
.... "12
On February 20,
Ambassador Francis cabled Washington to report the approaching end of the
Bolshevik government. Two weeks later, on March 7, 1918, Arthur Bullard
reported to Colonel House that German money was subsidizing the Bolsheviks and
that this subsidy was more substantial than previously thought. Arthur Bullard
(of the U.S. Committee on Public Information) argued: "we ought to be ready to help any honest national government.
But men or money or equipment sent to the present rulers of Russia will be used
against Russians at least as much as against Germans."13
This was
followed by another message from Bullard to Colonel House: "I strongly
advise against giving material help to the present Russian government. Sinister
elements in Soviets seem to be gaining control."
But there were
influential counterforces at work. As early as November 28, 1917, Colonel House
cabled President Woodrow Wilson from Paris that it was "exceedingly
important" that U.S. newspaper comments advocating that "Russia
should be treated as an enemy" be "suppressed." Then next month
William Franklin Sands, executive secretary of the Morgan-controlled American
International Corporation and a friend of the previously mentioned Basil Miles,
submitted a memorandum that described Lenin and Trotsky as appealing to the
masses and that urged the U.S. to recognize Russia. Even American socialist
Walling complained to the Department of State about the pro-Soviet attitude of
George Creel (of the U.S. Committee on Public Information), Herbert Swope, and
William Boyce Thompson (of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
On December 17,
1917, there appeared in a Moscow newspaper an attack on Red Cross colonel
Raymond Robins and Thompson, alleging a link between the Russian Revolution and
American bankers:
Why are they so
interested in enlightenment? Why was the money given the socialist
revolutionaries and not to the constitutional democrats? One would suppose the
latter nearer and dearer to hearts of bankers.
The article
goes on to argue that this was because American capital viewed Russia as a
future market and thus wanted to get a firm foothold. The money was given to
the revolutionaries because
the backward
working men and peasants trust the social revolutionaries. At the time when the
money was passed the social revolutionaries were in power and it was supposed
they would remain in control in Russia for some time.
Another report,
dated December 12, 1917, and relating to Raymond Robins, details
"negotiation with a group of American bankers of the American Red Cross
Mission"; the "negotiation" related to a payment of two million
dollars. On January 22, 1918, Robert L Owen, chairman of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency and linked to Wall Street interests, sent a
letter to Woodrow Wilson recommending de facto recognition of Russia,
permission for a shipload of goods urgently needed in Russia, the appointment
of representatives to Russia to offset German influence, and the establishment
of a career-service group in Russia.
This approach
was consistently aided by Raymond Robins in Russia. For example, on February
15, 1918, a cable from Robins in Petrograd to Davison in the Red Cross in
Washington (and to be forwarded to William Boyce Thompson) argued that support
be given to the Bolshevik authority for as long as possible, and that the new
revolutionary Russia will turn to the United States as it has "broken with
the German imperialism." According to Robins, the Bolsheviks wanted United
States assistance and cooperation together with railroad reorganization,
because "by generous assistance and technical advice in reorganizing
commerce and industry America may entirely exclude German commerce during
balance of war."
In brief, the
tug-of-war in Washington reflected a struggle between, on one side, old-line
diplomats (such as Ambassador Francis) and lower-level departmental officials,
and, on the other, financiers like Robins, Thompson, and Sands with allies such
as Lansing and Miles in the State Department and Senator Owen in the Congress.
Footnotes:
1Max Hoffman, War Diaries and Other Papers (London: M.
Secker, 1929), 2:177.
2Z. A. B. Zeman
and W. B. Scharlau, The Merchant of
Revolution.. The Life of A1exander Israel Helphand (Parvus), 1867-1924 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
3Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia,
1915-1918. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry (London:
Oxford University Press, 1958), p. ????5.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., p. 6, doc.
6, reporting a conversation with the Fstonian intermediary Keskula.
6Ibid., p. 92, n.
3.
7U.S., Committee
on Public Information, The
German-Bolshevik Conspiracy, War Information Series, no. 20, October 1918.
8New York
Evening Post, September 16-18, 21; October 4, 1918. It is also interesting, but
not conclusive of anything, that the Bolsheviks also stoutly questioned the
authenticity of the documents.
9George F.
Kennan, "The Sisson Documents," Journal of Modern History 27-28
(1955-56): 130-154.
10John
Reed, The Sisson Documents (New York: Liberator Publishing, n.d.).
11This
part is based on section 861.00 o[ the U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, also
available as National Archives rolls 10 and 11 of microcopy 316.
12U.S.
State Dept. Decimal File, 861.00/1117a. The same message was conveyed to the
Italian ambassador.
13See
Arthur Bullard papers at Princeton University.
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