In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and
composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to
possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial
innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater
interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the
greater right to
insist that the forms of government under which the compact was
entered into should be
substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else
could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution?
Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a
federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the
confederate republic of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free
cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that
it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece
was undone," he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat
among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate
force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of
influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of
such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in
the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These
questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government
should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless
superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be
produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising
leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second
question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by
virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue
the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a guaranty
of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of
the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing
republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal
Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican
forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the
latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange
republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is
presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.
A protection against invasion is due from every society
to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to
secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or
vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of
ancient and modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union
ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article.
Protection against domestic violence is added with equal
propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which,
properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this
object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently
claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other cantons.
A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for
emergencies of a like nature.
At first view, it might seem not to square with the
republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or
that a minority will have the force, to subvert a government; and consequently,
that the federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be
improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be
qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for
purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a
small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and
if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local
magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State
authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are
so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given
to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a
State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in
them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better
that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power,
than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and
obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent
the necessity of exerting it.
Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the
same side in republican governments? May not the minor party possess such a
superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of
secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal
to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on
the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a
prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical
than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by
the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the
event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of citizens
may become a majority of persons, by the accession of alien residents,
of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the
State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy
species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of
regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous
scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a
superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves.
In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice
lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to
arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate
States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would
unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its
infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally
effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind!
Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an
insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the
entire force, though not a constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a
case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately
not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient
recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a
calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure.
Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated
by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection
happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses
creep into one part, they are reforme
No comments:
Post a Comment