Institutinal Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs by Donald W. Light , Joel Lexchin, and jonathan J. Darrow

Drugs

Donald W. Light, Joel Lexchin, Jonathan J. Darrow

First Published October 1, 2013 Meeting Report

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References

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