SHAYS’ REBELLION: LEGEND AND REALITY

 

1.     Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Phila-dephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), p. 26.387Appendix B

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3.     SHAYS’ REBELLION: LEGEND AND REALITY

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5.     The 1786/7 rebellion in Massachusetts known as Shays’ Rebellion is generally believed to be the event that moved George Washington off the sidelines regarding Madison’s proposed convention in Phila-delphia. He had resisted Madison’s repeated requests that he attend the convention. Washington was told by two trusted informants in Massachusetts that this was a widespread revolt of the lower classes. These rebels were undermining public order in their quest to overturn property rights. Washington believed these reports. He decided that it was time for a change in the fundamental laws of the United States.  What I did not know in 1989, and no historian knew, was that the Shays’ Rebellion was an armed resistance movement of about 4,000

property-owning men in western Massachusetts. Contrary to reports from the anti-Shays faction in 1787, and contrary to most textbook accounts ever since, it was not a revolt of impoverished, indebted rural radicals. It included men of all economic classes. Many of them were veterans of the American Revolution, including Daniel Shays, who served from the battle of Bunker (Breed’s) Hill onward, and was a distinguished officer who worked his way up from the ranks to captain.  Lafayette awarded him a sword for his valor.1 These men revolted against a group of speculators who had recently gained control of the governor’s office. For over two centuries, Americans did not know the truth. Then,in one of those fluke events that every historian dreams about, Professor Leonard Richards of the University of Massachusetts (Amherst)

 

 

 

Conspiracy in Philadelphia 2. Ibid., Preface. 3. Ibid., pp. 74–75. 4. Ibid., p. 75.388

 

stumbled onto a fact that no previous historian had bothered to investigate. After the defeat of the rebels, the state required each of them to sign a loyalty oath. Unlike previous political rebellions, there were archival records of those who had participated. These records were right under Prof. Richards’ nose, yet it took several months for him to learn that they were actually in his own university’s library: on microfilm.2 He then made a detailed investigation of the participants: the towns they lived in, their family connections, their debt position in 1786, and their political offices, if any. What he learned enabled him to re-write the story of Shays’ Rebellion. It was not a revolt of indebted farmers. It was a tax revolt.

 

Taxes and Special Interests During the Revolution, the Continental Congress had issued irredeemable paper currency to pay for the war, the infamous Continentals, as in “not worth a Continental.” These notes quickly fell to zero value. States issued IOU’s to pay militia members. Notes issued in April, 1778, in Massachusetts quickly fell to 25 percent of their face value. By 1781, they were at two percent of face value.3 Other states followed suit. Virginia’s notes fell to one-thousandth of facevalue.4 Soldiers in the field sold these notes in order to keep their families solvent. The political question after independence was attained in 1783 revolved around the redemption price. At what percent of face value would states repay note-holders?

 

 

Shays’ Rebellion: Legend and Reality 5. Idem. 6. Ibid., p. 81. 7. Ibid., p. 83.389

 

Unlike all other states, Massachusetts’ legislature passed a law to redeem the notes at face value. The legislature was dominated by Boston’s mercantile interests. While it is not possible to trace the ownership of all of the debt after the war, what little can be traced indicates that 80 percent of the speculators lived in or near Boston, and almost 40 percent of the notes were held by 35 men. Most had bought these notes at tremendous discounts.5 Then, to add insult to injury, interest on these notes was retroactively made payable in silver.6 To pay off these speculators, taxes were raised. The main ones were the poll tax and the property tax, beginning in 1785. Prof. Richards describes the nature of this tax burden:  Every farmer knew that he was going to have to pay for every son sixteen years or older, every horse he owned, every cow, every barn, every acre in tillage. Everyone also knew that the tax bite was going to be regressive. Only about 10 percent of the taxes were to come from import duties and excises, which fell mainly on people who were most able to pay. The other 90 percent was direct taxes on property, with land bearing a disproportionate share, and polls. The latter was especially regressive, since it mattered not a whit if a male sixteen years of age or older had any property or not. Rich or poor, he was going to have to pay the same amount, and altogether polls were going to pay at least one-third of all taxes.7But would these taxes actually be collected? After the Revolution, the most popular politician in Massachusetts was John Hancock, the exsmuggler/merchant whose signature is so large on the Declaration of Independence. He was among the richest men in the state. He was

 

 

Conspiracy in Philadelphia 8. Ibid., p. 85. 9. Idem. 10. Ibid., p. 87. 11. Idem. 12. Ibid., p. 88. 13. Ibid., p. 6.390

 

lenient to all poor debtors who owed him money personally. He let them pay him in depreciated paper money. The rich had to pay in silver. He was elected governor in 1780 and served for five years. He also was elected in 1787 and served until his death in 1793. He did not serve in 1785–87, the crucial period. He declined to run in 1785 because of gout.8 Gout normally affects the big toe. It can accurately be said that the great turning point in post-Revolutionary America was John Hancock’s big toe. Hancock had understood that the soldiers had been forced to sell their promissory notes for a small fraction of their face value. He was accused by opponents of refusing to collect taxes. When he left office, he was replaced by James Bowdoin, a holder of at least £3,290 in depreciated notes.9 He did not receive enough votes to command a majority, so the legislature had to choose. The senate insisted on him,and the house capitulated.10 Under his leadership, the political faction whose members had bought up these notes gained power. The gov-ernment passed new taxes and insisted on collecting taxes that were in arrears.11 That tax burden was now higher by several times what they had been under Great Britain.12Western counties had petitioned the government for relief for several years, but their petitions had been ignored.13 In July, 1786, a revolt began. It soon became an armed political revolt by towns, not

 

 

Shays’ Rebellion: Legend and Reality 14. Ibid., ch. 1. 15. Ibid., p. 8. 16. Ibid., p. 62. 17. Ibid., p. 58. 18. Ibid., pp. 62, 116. 19. Ibid., p. 89. 20. Ibid., ch. 5.391

 

by individuals.14 The rebels met as a convention to draw up a list of 21 grievances.15 This was not a mob. Daniel Shays became the head of this revolt after it had begun.  Until Richards’ book appeared, the standard account of Shays’Rebellion emphasized the theme of farmers in the state’s western counties as being heavily in debt to merchants in Boston. This account never had much evidence to support it. Boston merchants traded little with western towns, which were close to self-supporting.16 Also, western towns in Connecticut did not revolt.17 If the decisive political issue was debt, why not? There is no evidence of any debt-revolt relationship in the western counties,18 two-thirds of which had not revolted.19 The revolt’s leaders were often from the higher classes. Most of the insurgents were not heavily in debt. Kinship ties, town by town, accounted for recruiting far more than debt did.20

 

The Winter of 1787

 

The State of Massachusetts petitioned Congress to send in Federal troops, but the U.S. Army at that time had approximately 700 men.

 

 

Conspiracy in Philadelphia 21. Ibid., p. 15. 22. Ibid., p. 16. 23. Ibid., p. 11. 24. Ibid., p. 18. 25. Ibid., pp. 18–19. 26. Ibid., p. 16.392

 

Congress responded by promising to add another 1,340 men, but Massachusetts was supposed to raise 660 of these. Congress then made up a phony war story to justify sending troops to quell a tax revolt. There was a pending Indian war, Congress said. Few believed this ruse.21 The U.S. Army raised a total of 100 recruits.22 Meanwhile, militia members in Massachusetts were joining the rebels.23 Boston’s militia responded to the legislature’s call; western counties ignored it. Especially revealing were Revolutionary War veterans. Of 637veterans in the militia in Northampton, only 23 volunteered for duty.24The two senior officers from Northampton who responded had between them a total of 14 days of service in the War. All of the rebel captains had at least three years’ experience.25 Baron von Steuben,who had served under Washington, identified the problem in an article that he signed “Belisarius.” Massachusetts had 92,000 militiamen on its rolls. Why did the state need military support from Congress? He provided the correct answer: Massachusetts’ government was not representative of the opinions of the people.26 The rebellion was defeated in battles and skirmishes in the winter and early spring of 1787. The commander of the state’s militia was General Benjamin Lincoln, who had served under Washington during the American Revolution. Lincoln’s force of 4,400 men had not been authorized by the legislature, so 153 private citizens, mostly Bostonians, provided the funds to pay the troops. None of the contributors

Shays’ Rebellion: Legend and Reality 27. Ibid., p. 24. 28. Ibid., p. 25. 29. Ibid., p. 120.

 

393 served in Lincoln’s army.27 One impoverished Harvard graduate did serve, Royall Tyler, and soon wrote a play about the rebellion. It became the first American play, and it made his reputation.28Shays and other leaders escaped across the northern border into New Hampshire, and from there went west into Vermont. Vermont’s governor refused to extradite any of them, despite protests from the Massachusetts government. Shays and several other rebel leaders were staying at a farm next door to the governor.29

 

Motivating George Washington

 

Without the participation of George Washington at the Constitutional Convention, there would not have been a Constitution. The nationalists, who were preparing to overturn the country’s legal order were convinced of this. So are most historians of the Constitutional Convention. Washington had resisted offers from Madison and others to attend the Convention. He wanted to stay out of public life. Shays’ Rebellion provided the motivational hook for the nationalists to persuade him to reverse his position and attend. Two men were crucial in motivating Washington. One was General Lincoln, who wrote to him repeatedly as the rebellion accelerated.  He lamented the rebellion and painted it in terms of a social revolu-tion by the poorer classes, who had tried to imitate their betters by going into debt and adopting “a luxuriant mode of living,” and who were now having to pay off their debts, which were owed to “the

 

 

Conspiracy in Philadelphia 30. Lincoln to Washington (Dec. 4, 1786), in The Papers of George Washington,Confederation Series, edited by W. W. Abbot and Dorothy Twohig, 4 vols. (Charlottesville:University of Virginia Press, 1995), IV, p. 418. 31. Knox to Washington (Oct. 23, 1786), Ibid., IV, p. 299

 

394. industrious,” who were now in a position “to reap the fruits of their industry. . . .”30 The other was Henry Knox, who had also served asa general under Washington, and who was a former Bostonian. Knox’s letter of October 23, 1786, was as persuasive to Washington as it was misleading. This letter undermined Washington’s firm resolve to remain a private citizen, although he did not consent to attend the Convention until the following spring. Knox wrote that he had been east of Boston on business, and had hurried back because of “the commotions.” He immediately launched into a critique of the present political structure under the Articles of Confederation. Our political machine constituted of thirteen independent sovereignties, have been constantly operating against each other, and against the federal head, ever since the peace – The powers of Congress are utterly inadequate to preserve the balance between the respective States, and oblige them to do those things which are essential for their own welfare, and for the general good. The human mind inthe local legislatures seems to be exerted, to prevent the federal constitution from having any beneficial effects. The machine works inversely to the public good in all its parts. Not only is State, against State, and all against the federal head, but the States within them-selves possess the name only without having the essential concomitant of government, the power of preserving the peace; the protection of the liberty and property of the citizens.31So far, none of this has anything to do with Shays’ Rebellion. It is clear that Knox was a nationalist. He was offering a general critique of the Confederation. He then offered what seems to be substantiating

 

 

Shays’ Rebellion: Legend and Reality 32. Ibid., IV, p. 300

 

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specific evidence. But his account was neither accurate nor relevant.  The State of Massachusetts was in a position to suppress the rebel-lion, assuming that the militia would respond to the call. The fact was, the handful of speculators close to the governor could not persuade the legislature to fund the counter-attack, nor could local officers persuade militia members to respond to the call to arms. This was a grass-roots rebellion, as surely as the American war for independence had been, and with far better cause. None of this impressed Knox, who continued in the same paragraph: On the very first impression of Faction and licentiousness the fine theoretic government of Massachusetts has given way, and its laws arrested and trampled under foot. Men at a distance, who have admired our systems of government, unfounded in nature, are apt to accuse the rulers, and say that taxes have been assessed too high and collected too rigidly – This is a deception equal to any that has hitherto been entertained. It is indeed a fact, that high taxes are the ostensible cause of the commotions, but that they are the real cause is as far remote from truth as light from darkness. The people who are the insurgents have never paid any, or but very little taxes – But they see the weakness of government; They feel at once their own poverty, compared with the opulent, and their own force, and they are determined to make use of the latter, in order to remedy the former.32That the western farmers had not paid high taxes prior to 1786 was true. Hancock had refused to collect them. But Bowdoin, as a holder of Massachusetts notes, was ready to enforce the law. He had the support of his cronies, who also held the state’s notes, but not of the Massachusetts legislature, which never did vote to fund Lincoln’s

 

Conspiracy in Philadelphia 33. Idem.

 

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troops. Knox did not convey any of this information to Washington. Instead, he turned the revolt into a revolt against property. It was in fact a revolt against the confiscation of property by a tiny group of speculators in government debt. But Knox painted the movement as an organized, inter-state conspiracy of communists against property.  Their creed is “That the property of the United States has been protected from the confiscations of Britain by the joint exertions of all, and therefore ought to be the common property of all. And he that attempts opposition to this creed is an enemy to equity and justice, and ought to be swept from the face of the earth.” In a word they are determined to annihilate all debts public and private and have agrarian Laws which are easily effected by the means of unfunded paper money which shall be a tender in all cases whatever. The numbers of these people may amount in massachusetts, to about one fifth part of several populous counties, and to them may be collected, people of similar sentiments, from the States of RhodeIsland, Connecticut and New Hampshire so as to constitute a body of 12 or 15000 desperate & unprincipled men – They are chieffly of the Young and active part of the community, more easily collected than perhaps Kept together afterwards – But they will probably commit overt acts of treason which will compell them to embody for their own safety – once embodied they will be constrained to submit to discipline for the same reason.33None of this was true. The men were led by adults, and these adults were leaders in their respective towns. There was no connection to Rhode Island, which had debased its currency, or any other colony. They were fighting a system of oppressive taxation that was being imposed in the name of paying off investors who had bought

Shays’ Rebellion: Legend and Reality 34. Ibid., IV, pp. 300–1.397the depreciated notes of the Revolutionary War era from the soldiers who made that political rebellion successful. Rebels were fighting against the transformation, mostly at their expense, of the unfunded paper money of the war era into post-war currency, with interest payable in silver. They had been stiffed by the politicians during the war, who paid them with unfunded promises to pay. Now they were being stiffed by the politicians again – speculators who had taken advantage of them when they were on the battlefield. But Knox ignored all of this. He had a political agenda, and Washington’s presence at the Convention was the linchpin, the sine qua non, of the nationalists’ political agenda. Knox proceeded with the grand deception of the grand old man:  Having proceeded to this length for which they are now ripe, we shall have a formidable rebellion against reason, the principles of all government, and the very name of liberty. This dreadful situation has alarmed every man of principle and property in New England – They start as from a dream, and ask what can have been the Cause of our delusion? What is to afford us security against the violence of law-less men? Our government must be braced, changed, or altered to secure our lives and property. We imagined that the mildness of our  government and the virtue of the people were so correspondent, that we were not as other nations requiring brutal force to support thelaws.34Hence, it was time to brace, change, or alter the national government, so as to supply the required brutal force. But we find that we are men, actual men, possessing all the turbulent passions belonging to that animal and that we must have a govern-

 

 

Conspiracy in Philadelphia 35. Ibid., IV, p. 301.

 

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ment proper and adequate for him.35Knox was writing a direct-response sales letter, which turned out to be the second most influential sales letter in American history, second only to Washington’s letter to Congress on September 17,1787. Every direct-response letter needs a powerful close, what is called the “act now” offer. Knox called on Washington to join with the besieged men of property in Massachusetts – speculators in government bonds – to turn back these rural communists of the lower sort. The nationalists were ready to defend the true interests of society.  What about you, George? Will you wimp out at this crucial juncture?  Knox was a master of the close.  The people of Massachusetts for instance, are far more advanced in this doctrine, and the men of reflection, & principle, are determined to endeavor to establish a government which shall have the power to protect them in their lawful pursuits, and which will be efficient in all cases of internal commotions or foreign invasions – They mean that liberty be the basis, a liberty resulting from the equal and firm administration of laws. They wish for a general government of unity as they see the local legislatures, must naturally and necessarily tend to retard and frustrate all general government. We have arrived at that point of time in which we are forced to see our national humiliation, and that a progression in this line, cannot be productive of happiness either public or private – something is wanting and something must be done or we shall be involved in allthe horror of faction and civil war without a prospect of its termination – Every tried friend to the liberties of his country is bound to reflect, and to step forward to prevent the dreadful consequences which will result from a government of events – Unless this is done,

 

 

Shays’ Rebellion: Legend and Reality 36. Idem. 37. Ibid., IV, p. 460. 38. Ibid., IV, p. 461. 39. Ibid., IV, pp. 481–82.

 

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we shall be liable to be ruled by an Arbitrary and Capricious armed tyranny, whose word and will must be law.36He followed up with a similar letter on December 17. “A Govern-ment without any existing means of coercion, are at a loss to combat, or avert a danger now & so pressing.”37 “It is probable that about one fifth part of the people of New-England whose habits and mannersare similar are liable to be infected by the principles of the Insurgents, and of consequence to act in the same manner.”38 His letter elicited this response from Washington on December 26.I feel, my dear Genl Knox, infinitely more than I can express to you, for the disorders which have arisen in these states. . . . [N]otwith-standing the boasted virtue of America, we are far gone in everything ignoble & bad. . . . In this, as in most other matter[s], we are too slow. When this spirit first dawned, probably it migh[t] easily have been checked; but it is scarcely within reach of human ken, at this moment, to say when – where – or how it will end. There are combustibles in every State, which a spark may set fire to.39He then inquired regarding Madison’s proposed Convention in Philadelphia. He relied on Knox as an accurate source of intelligence regarding public opinion.. . . By a late act, it seems very desirous of a General Convention to revise and amend the foederal Constitution. . . . What are the prevail-

 

 

Conspiracy in Philadelphia 40. Ibid., IV, 482. 41. Knox to Washington, December 21: ibid., IV, p. 470.

 

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ing sentiments of the one now proposed to be held at Philadelphia, in May next? & how will it be attended? You are the fountain of intelligence, and where the wisdom of the Nation, it is to be pre-sumed, has concentered; consequently better able (as I have had abundant experience of your intelligence, confidence, & candour) to solve these questions.40Knox had the answer ready to go. He sent it five days before Washington asked his opinion. The letters probably crossed en route to each other. “The commotions of Massachusetts have wrought prodigious changes in the minds of men in that State respecting the Powers of Government everybody says they must be strengthened, and that unless this shall be effected there is no Security for liberty orProperty.”41 Next, having been asked, Knox sent a long letter to Washington on January 14 that presented the case for the Convention.  He said that some people regard the proposed Convention as “an irregular assembly, unauthorized by the Confederation, which points out the mode by which any alterations should be made.” Others think that the Convention should be attended by people appointed by state conventions. Madison used this system of state conventions to legitimize the Convention after the fact: state conventions to vote the new Constitution up or down. “There are others who are of the opinion that Congress ought to take up the defects of the present system, point them out to the respective Legislatures, and recommend certain alter-ations.” He then told Washington that if he would attend, eastern states would send delegates. He said that he thought the people would accept the changes if they were recommended by a “respectable a setof men as could be sent to the convention. . . .” Furthermore, “were

 

 

Shays’ Rebellion: Legend and Reality 42. Ibid., IV, pp. 520–21. 43. Washington to Jay, 18 May 1786. Ibid., IV, p. 56. 44. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion, pp. 129–32.

 

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strong events to arise between this and the time of the meeting, enforcing the necessity of a vigorous government, it would be a preparation which might be embraced by the convention to propose atonce an efficient system.”42 How convenient that, as he was writing this letter, just such a strong event was taking place in Massachusetts.  In a series of letters to Washington, the nationalists put pressure on him to attend. In his replies, he made it clear that he was on the side of law and order, and that he was becoming pessimistic regarding the future of the country. He resisted making a commitment to attend, but eventually he consented. He was already a nationalist, as his letters reveal from 1783 on. He had written to John Jay the previous spring, “That it is necessary to revise, and amend the articles of Confederation, I entertain no doubt; but what may be the consequences of such an attempt is doubtful.   Yet, something must be done, or the fabrick must fall. It certainly istottering!”43 The gun was already loaded. The misinformation passed on to him about Shays’ Rebellion was the trigger. Eventually, Washington pulled it.44 He attended the Convention and even agreed to keep Madison’s secret notes of the debates, which were not made public until every participant had died.

 

Conclusion

 

Shays’ Rebellion was used effectively by the nationalists to scare voters into accepting both the legitimacy of the Convention and the

 

 

Conspiracy in Philadelphia 45. Ibid., p. 127. 46. Ibid., p. 139. 47. Ibid., p. 144. 48. Ibid., p. 89.402

 

legality of the Constitution. “Within months, Shays’s Rebellion gave the nationalists the edge they needed. It provided the spark on which to advance the nationalist cause and play on the fears of others.”45 In the post-Convention debates over ratification, Antifederalists were labeled “Shaysites.”46 With respect to Massachusetts, the accusation was inaccurate. Two-thirds of the towns opposed ratification.47 Yet only one-third had joined the rebellion.48Had John Hancock not been struck by gout in 1785, he would have run for governor. He would have won, just as he did in 1787, the year that the rebellion was put down. Because Governor Bowdoin’s faction gained control of law enforcement in 1785–87, the rebellion had taken place. The rebellion in Massachusetts was what forced Washington’s hand. He decided to support Madison’s plan for the meeting in Philadelphia of leading politicians, who would then create a new form of civil government, therefore replacing the Articles of Confederation.  He decided to attend the Convention, contrary to his previous statements. His presence at the Convention and his promotional letter to Congress that accompanied the proposed Constitution were crucial to the success of the nationalists’ plans to overturn the existing national government. Thus, the fate of the proposed United States Constitution had turned on John Hancock’s big toe.  This sequence of events reminds me of a truth suggested by the sociologist-historian, Robert Nisbet, in 1968. He was writing of academic techniques of scientific forecasting.

 

 

Shays’ Rebellion: Legend and Reality 49. Robert A. Nisbet, “The Year 2000 and All That,” Commentary (June 1968), p. 66

 

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What the future-predictors, the change analysts, and trend-tenders say in effect is that with the aid of institute resources, computers, linear programming, etc. they will deal with the kinds of change that are not the consequence of the Random Event, the Genius, the Maniac, and the Prophet. To which I can only say: there really aren’t any; not worth looking at anyhow.49

1.     Philip Schaff, Church and State in the United States; or the American Idea of Religious Liberty and Its Practical Effects (New York: Arno Press, [1888] 1972), p. 49.But some Protestant confessions of faith, framed in the Reformation period, when church and state were closely interwoven, ascribe to the civilmagistrate ecclesiastical powers and duties which are Erastian or caesaro-papal in principle and entirely inconsistent with the freedom and self-government of the church. Hence changes in the political articles of these confessions became necessary.  The Presbyterian Church took the lead in this progress even long before the American Revolution. . . . After the revolutionary war, the United Synod of Philadelphia and New York met at Philadelphia, May 28, 1787 (at the same time and in the same place as the Convention which framed the Federal Constitution), and proposed important alterations in the Westminster Confession, chapters XX. (Closing paragraph), XXIII. 3, and XXXI. 1,2, so as to eliminate the principle of state-churchism and religious persecution, and to proclaim religious liberty and legal equality of all Christian denominations. These alterations were formally adopted by the Joint Synod at Philadelphia, May 28, 1788, and have been faithfully adhered to by thelarge body of the Presbyterian Church in America. It is worthy of note thatthe Scripture passages quoted by the Old Confession in favor of state-churchism and the ecclesiastical power of the civil magistrate are all takenfrom the Old Testament.

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3.     Philip Schaff (1888)1