Ch. 5. General Groves's Solution: the fluoride deception by Christopher
Bryson from archive.org
General
Groves's Solution Dr. Harold
Hodge and the University of
Rochester The
Manhattan Project had seen the danger from fluoride early. Before the war private industry had contained the
legal dangers from factory
pollution by forming the Air Hygiene Foundation at the Mellon
Institute. Also fearing lawsuits,
in 1943 General Groves established the Manhattan Projects Medical Section at the University of Rochester to
strengthen the governments
interests, placing Dr. Harold C. Hodge in charge of a secret unit studying fluoride and the other
chemicals being used to make the
atomic bomb. FROM His
CORNER office window in the medical school at Strong Memorial Hospital that summer of 1943 Dr. Harold
Hodge could see construction
workers placing the finishing touches on a half million-dollar building
at the University of Rochester
known as the Manhattan Annex.' The heavily guarded structure, funded by the U.S. Army, would be home to
the Manhattan Project's Medical
Section. Orders had been placed for hundreds of experimental animals: Puerto Rican monkeys, dogs, mice,
rabbits, and guinea pigs.' And an
umbilical cord-like tunnel linking the military annex with the university hospital was urgently being readied. https://www.blogger.com/null
As the new Annex foundations were put
down, so too was the keystone laid
for the postwar practice of toxicology in the United States — and for the future career of the
thirty-nine-year-old bioc hemist, Dr. Harold Hodge. The Annex would soon house the largest 66 CHAPTER FIVE medical laboratory in
the nation, with a staff of several hundred scientists testing the toxicity of the chemicals
being used to build the atomic bomb. Military pilots flew the exotic new compounds directly
from the bomb factories to Hodges
team at Rochester. "Harold would actually meet the pilots under [cover of] dark to get the
material to test, said toxicologist
Judith MacGregor, who befriended Hodge at Rochester, where she was
a graduate student in the 1960s,
and who was mesmerized by her mentors
tales. It was unbelievable.
That spring of 1943, Hodge had been placed in charge of the bomb programs Division of Pharmacology and
Toxicology and given control of a
secret biomedical research unit known as Program F to study fluoride toxicity.' The Manhattan Project had a
whole section working on uranium
and a whole section working on fluoride, explained Jack Hein, who worked with Hodge at Rochester during
the early cold war as a young
graduate student and remembers the scale of the fluoride studies.
The toxicology studies were very
comprehensive. They were looking for toxic effects on the bone, the blood, and the nervous system. . .
. Without the Manhattan Project
and the atomic bomb, we wouldnt know anywhere near as much as we do about the physiological effects of
fluoride, Hein added . 4 His
research suddenly blossomed into an immense program, noted Paul Morrow, a uranium expert who also
joined Hodge at Rochester in 1947 and
who worked on some of the earliest experiments. Hodge's war work germinated into
a career as the nation's leading
expert on fluoride. Over more than half a century the tall,
black-haired researcher published
several books and some three hundred scientific papers. He was chairman of the National Research Councils
Committee on Toxicology and first
president of the Society of Toxicology. And a generation of Hodges Rochester colleagues and students — men
such as Herbert Stokinger, Paul
Morrow, and Helmuth Schrenk — went on to
occupy leading positions in government agencies and universities after
the war.' He was unarguably the
dean of American toxicology, stated a
former colleague and Rochester alumni, Ernest Newbrun, now a
professor emeritus at the
University of California at San Francisco." To several generations of colleagues, the soft-spoken
scientist with the slicked-back
hair was a gentleman scholar and tutor, advising GENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION 67 them to play it
straight, and regularly, in his early seventies, trounc ing graduate students at squash.' But
Harold Hodge — grandfather,
soft-spoken friend, and dean of American toxicology — shouldered dark secrets for much of his
professional life. That
summer of 1943, as Dr. Hodge stood at his office window, he confronted a terrible dilemma. Speed
was essential in beating the
Germans to full-scale production of the atomic bomb.' The fate of
tens of thousands of American
workers lay in his hands. His laboratory's evaluation of the toxicity of chemicals needed for the bomb,
such as fluorine, beryllium, and
trichloroethylene, would fix work conditions for the women and men inside the Manhattan Projects bomb
factories, help determine how
quickly the plants could achieve full
production — and whether employers would be successfully sued for damages if those workers claimed injury
from chemical exposure.' The
questions were many and the answers few, wrote Hodge. There was no time to wait for months, or even
weeks, while the accepted
laboratory tests established the toxico-logical facts. Production had
to proceed with no delays."
10 People working in the
atomic energy production plants were going to be chronically exposed, said Jack Hein. We didnt know too
much about the toxicity of
fluoride, other than the early studies saying a little too much in the water causes damage to
teeth, he added."
General Leslie Groves understood the dangers of such pell-mell production. He feared that personal
injury lawsuits would be an
Achilles heel for the entire nuclear program. Leading insurers, such
as Aetna and Travelers, were
providing health coverage for workers in the new bomb factories. 12 Successful claims for fluoride injury
or for neighborhood pollution
might hemorrhage compensation payments,
create a public-relations disaster, risk jeopardizing the embryonic nuclear industry — and threaten the
United States' unprecedented new
military power. 13
The army moved quickly to protect itself. Its first weapon was secrecy. The second weapon was seizing
control of basic science. In
particular the crucial toxicity studies on bomb program chemicals performed at the University of
Rochester were sculpted and shaped
to defend the Manhattan Project from lawsuits.' Those marching orders — conscripting science and law
for military service — were
drummed home in a July 30, 1945, memorandum titled Purpose 68 CHAPTER FIVE and Limitations of the
Biological and Health Physics Research Pro -gram, written by the head of the Medical Section, Colonel Stafford
Warren. According to Warren, The
Manhattan District, as a unit of the U.S. Army ... has been given a directive to conduct certain operations
which will be useful in winning
the war. As such, medico-legal aspects were accorded a clear priority for scientists, he added, including the
necessary biological research to
strengthen the Governments interests. 15 Scientists soon delivered courtroom ammunition.
"Much of the data already
collected is proving valuable from a medical legal point of view," noted a February 1946 memo to General
Groves's deputy, Brigadier General
K. C. Nichols. "It is anticipated that further research will also
serve in this manner," the
memo added. 16 Colonel
Warren had chosen his top fluoride expert carefully. The son of an Illinois schoolteacher, Harold Hodge
was a biochemist whose specialty
was the study of bones and teeth. He had arrived at the University
of Rochester in 1931, where he was
one of an elite cadre of men selected by
the Rockefeller Foundation as dental research fellows. The Rockefeller Foundation was then funding basic
research at selected dental schools in a
bid to lift the standards of dental care in the United States. Hodge was
also a pharmacologist and
toxicologist who by 1937 had forged close links with corporate America.' By the summer of 1943 some of those
corporations and institutions were
taking a lead role in developing America's first nuclear weapon. Eastman Kodak, a Rochester company where
Hodge had investigated chemical
poisoning before the war, was now a leading industrial contractor at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 16
Rockefeller interests were also
using fluoride to refine uranium at an undisclosed site in New Jersey and funding their own biomedical
research at the University of
Rochester.""
Harold Hodge's role as gatekeeper at the wartime crossroads of law
and medical science was spelled
out in a 1944 letter introducing the Rochester scientist to the DuPont company. The letter, stamped
confidential, again lays out a
fundamental scientific bias in the Manhattan Districts medical program — a bias against workers and
communities, and in favor of corporate
legal interests. The Medical
Section has been charged with the responsibility of obtaining toxicological data which will insure the Districts
being GENERAL
GROVES S SOLUTION
69 in a
favorable position in case litigation develops from exposure to the materials, Colonel Stafford Warren
told Dr. John Foulger of DuPonts
Haskell Laboratory in a letter dated August 12, 1944. Harold Hodge was to insure that information about the
toxicity of certain fluoride
compounds was coordinated between the
government and its contractors, Warren explained. It would be desirable, he told Foulger, to have the
work on the toxicity of
fluorocarbons being done in your laboratory parallel the investigations being made on similar
compounds elsewhere. For that
reason it would be appreciated if Dr. Harold Hodge of the
University of Rochester could
visit your laboratory in the near future and an exchange of ideas be effected." 20 Harold Hodge, Devil's
Island, and the Peach Crop Cases
21 Harold Hodge s diligence
in defending the war industry can be seen
in a 1946 court challenge from farmers living near a DuPont
fluoride plant in New Jersey.
Although not mentioned in any history of the Manhattan Project, the lawsuits were regarded by the
military as the most serious legal
threat to the U.S. nuclear program, requiring the direct intervention of General Leslie Groves. A closing
chapter in the Manhattan Project,
the aggressive use of secrecy, science, and public relations by Groves and Hodge, and at least a half dozen
federal agencies battling the
farmers, is an opening scene in the story of how fluoride was handled by our government following World War
II. The gently rolling
alluvial soil along the shore of the Delaware estuary in Southern New Jersey is some of the most bountiful
farm- land in the United States.
Its historic harvest of fruit and vegetables won New Jersey the accolade of The Garden State. The
orchards downwind of the DuPont
plant in Gloucester and Salem counties
were especially famous for their high-quality produce; their peaches went directly to the Waldorf
Astoria Hotel in New York.
Campbell's Soup bought up their tomatoes. But in the summer of 1943 the farmers began to report that
their orchards were blighted and
that "something is burning up the peach crops around here." Poultry died after an all-night
thunderstorm, they reported. Fields
were sometimes strewn with dead cattle, residents recalled, while 70 CHAPTER FIVE workers who ate the
produce they had picked vomited all night and into the next day. I remember our horses looked
sick and were too stiff to work,
Mildred Giordano, who was a teenager at the time, told reporter
Joel Griffiths. Some cows were so
crippled that they could not stand up, and grazed by crawling on their bellies. The injuries were
confirmed in taped interviews,
shortly before he died, with the chemical consultant Philip Sadtler of Sadtler Laboratories in
Philadelphia. On behalf of the farmers'
crusading attorney, Counselor William C. Gotshalk of Camden, New Jersey, Sadtler had measured blood
fluoride levels in laborers as high as
310 parts per million. (Blood fluoride is normally well below i part per
mil- lion. These levels are
potentially lethal doses) 22
Some of the farm workers were pretty weak, Sadtler noted. The New Jersey farmers organized a Fluorine
Committee. They patriotically waited
until the war was over, then sued DuPont and the Manhattan Project
for fluoride damage. Thirteen
claimants asked for a total of $430,000 in compensation.
Little wonder the farmers reported health problems. Conditions on
the other side of the DuPont fence
were extraordinarily dangerous. More than a thousand women and men were employed on Manhattan Project
contracts at the Chamber Works
during the war, secretly manufacturing elemental fluorine, uranium hexafluoride, and several exotic new
fluorocarbons. 23 Chemical
exposures were frequent, making the DuPont employees perhaps the most endangered and fearful of the
wartime fluoride workers. By the
end of January 1944 at least two DuPont laboratory workers had been killed and several scientists injured.
Work conditions at the secret
fluoride-producing East and Blue Areas of the Chamber Works were especially dreadful, with "gross violations
of safety," inspectors noted. 24 One unit was especially notorious, the government
reported. "The plant
frequently caught on fire, and the activators often burned out so
the employees were frequently
exposed to rather large amounts of fluorine compounds," Captain Mears of the Manhattan Project
noted in October 1945.
"Medical hazards were attributed to fluorine in a gaseous state, silver fluorides in a powdered state and
liquid 2144 [code for
fluorocarbon]. 25 Injured
workers paraded into the DuPont hospital. Doctors often reported "a fibrotic condition of
both lungs" on X-rays; serious GENERAL GROVESS SOLUTION 71 chemical burns were
seen very frequently. The mounting injury
toll was blamed on fluoride. 20 In February 1945 doctors at the East
and Blue Areas reported
seventy-nine sub-par or so-called chronic cases. Sixteen of those workers had their condition detected in the
last two months." A Manhattan Project medical
investigator, Captain Richard C.
Bernstein, warned his boss, Colonel Warren, that workers now feared assignment to the DuPont fluoride
processing areas as "an exile to
Devil's Island." 28 Another report warned of brewing labor unrest.
"Fear of the physical
consequences was becoming prevalent in the Areas, wrote Manhattan Project investigator First Lieutenant
Birchard M. Brundage in February
1945. "This fear was being used by certain agitators to cause trouble in the personnel," he
added. 29 The farmers lawsuits electrified
the Manhattan Project. There had
been no disclosure of the diabolical work conditions at DuPont. Now,
a public lawsuit pointed a finger
directly at the Chamber Works and
fluoride. A once secret November 1945 memo measures the government's concern: "The most
serious claim to neighboring
properties of any operations of the [Manhattan Engineering] District
is the litigation known as the
"peach crop cases.' These are cases claiming damages to the fruit crop and to the peach trees themselves
in and around the operation of the
Chambers Works of the DuPont Company
at Kearney, New Jersey. This damage is alleg edly caused by the release into the atmosphere, both
unintentional and necessary as a
result of the process [sic] of hydrogen fluoride. The claims against
the District approximate $430,000.
Part of the loss would be due to the
private contractor and part to the operation of the contractor on
behalf of the District." 30 The military sprang into action.
Dr. Hodge was dispatched to New
Jersey to marshal the medical response to the farmers' rebellion. Although DuPont's smokestack fluoride
had long been spilled into the
environment and a great volume of new fluoride compounds were being made inside the wartime plant, he
quickly reported back to Colonel
Stafford Warren at Oak Ridge that the mottled teeth seen in the school near the DuPont plant could be
attributed to natural fluoride in
the ground water. 31 Such natural fluoride in the water supply
meant that the dental markings
could not be used as unequivocal proof of
industrial poisoning. The situation was 72 CHAPTER FIVE complicated by the existence of mottled
enamel as a result of fluoride in the
drinking water, Hodge told Warren. Dr. Hodge had an idea for calming the citizen panic.
His prescrip tion gives an early
meaning to the term spin doctor — and provides a clue that the promotion by the U.S. government of
a role for fluoride in tooth health
has a powerful national-security appeal. Would there be any use in
making attempts to counteract the local
fear of fluoride on the part of residents of Salem and Gloucester counties through lectures on F
toxicology and perhaps the
usefulness of F in tooth health? Hodge inquired of Colonel Warren. 32 Such lectures, of course,
were indeed given, not only to New
Jersey citizens, but to the rest of the nation throughout the cold
war. A good cop-bad cop
assault was launched against the farmers. Almost immediately their spokesperson, Willard B. Kille, a market
gardener, received an
extraordinary invitation: to dine with none other than General Leslie R. Groves, then known as the man
who built the atomic bomb, at his
office at the War Department on March 26, 1946. 33 Although Kille had been diagnosed with fluoride poisoning
by his doctor, he departed the
luncheon convinced of the governments good faith. The next day he
wrote to thank the general,
wishing the other farmers could have been present, he said, so they too could come away with the feeling that
their interests in this particular
matter were being safeguarded by men of the very highest type whose integrity they could not
question." Behind
closed doors however, General Groves had mobilized the full resources of the federal government and
the Manhattan Project to defeat
Kille s farmers and their Fluorine Committee. The documentary trail detailing the government's battle
against the farmers begins with a March 1, 1946, memo to top Manhattan Project doctor Colonel Stafford
Warren, outlining the medical
problem in New Jersey. There seem to be four distinct (though related) problems, Colonel Warren was
told. 1. A question of
injury of the peach crop in 1944.
2. A report of extraordinary fluoride content of veg- etables grown in this area. 3. A report of abnormally high
fluoride content in the
blood of human individuals residing in this area. GENERAL GROVES S
SOLUTION 73 4. A report raising
the question of serious poisoning of
horses and cattle in this area.
Under the personal direction of General Groves, secret meetings were convened in Washington, with
compulsory attendance by scores of
scientists and officials from the U.S. War Department, the Manhattan Project, the Food and Drug
Administration, the Agriculture
and Justice departments, the U.S. Armys Chemical Warfare Service and Edgewood Arsenal, the Bureau of
Standards, and DuPont lawyers.''
These agencies are making scientific investigations to obtain evidence which may be used to
protect the interest of the
Government at the trial of the suits brought by owners of peach orchards in . . . New Jersey,"
stated Lieutenant Colonel Cooper B.
Rhodes of the Manhattan Project in a memo dated August 27, 1945, and cc'd to General Groves.' The memo
stated: SUBJECT:
Investigation of Crop Damage at Lower Penns Neck, New Jersey T o : The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Pentagon Building, Washington
D.C. At the request of the
Secretary of War the Department of Agriculture has agreed to cooperate in investigating complaints of crop damage attributed ... to fumes
from a plant operated in
connection with the Manhattan Project. Signed L. R. Groves, Major General U.S.A. 36 "The Department of Justice
is cooperating in the defense of these
suits," General Groves subsequently wrote in a February 28, 1946, memo to the Chairman of the U.S. Senate
Special Committee on Atomic
Energy. 37 General Groves,
of course, was one of the most powerful men in postwar Washington, and the full resources of the
military-industrial state were now
turned upon the New Jersey farmers. The farmers' expert witness, scientist Philip Sadder, was singled out by
the military. A handwritten note
in General Groves's files in the National
Archives demands to know: Col. Rhodes, Who is Sadtler ? 38 74 CHAPTER FIVE Groves learned that
the Sadtler family name was one of the most distinguished and respected in American chemistry. The firm
of Samuel P. Sadtler and Son was
established in 1891 and routinely consulted for top industrial corporations, including Coca-Cola and John D.
Rockefeller.' ' Philip Sadtler s
grandfather, Samuel P. Sadtler, had been a founding member of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
while his father, Samuel S.
Sadtler, was one of the first editors of the venerable science publication Chemical Abstracts. (Today
Philip Sadtler s Standard Spectra
are a diagnostic tool used in laboratories around the world.) But back then, in New Jersey,
counterespionage agents followed him
and accused him of "dealing with the enemy," stated Sadtler. 40
He recalled one confrontation with
two U.S. Army captains that ended in a South Jersey orchard when Gotshalk, the farmers lawyer, asked the
military officials, Since when are
the farmers of the United States the enemy? Why was there such a national-security emergency over
a few lawsuits by New Jersey
farmers? In 1946 the United States had begun full-scale production of atomic bombs. No other
nation had yet tested a nuclear
weapon, and the A-bomb was seen as crucial for U.S. leadership of
the postwar world. The New Jersey
fluoride law -suits were a serious
roadblock to that strategy. In the case of fluoride, If the farmers won,
it would open the door to further
suits, which might impede the bomb
programs ability to use fluoride, remarked Jacqueline Kittrell, a Tennessee public-interest lawyer
specializing in nuclear cases, who
examined the declassified fluoride documents. (Kittrell has represented plaintiffs in several human
radiation experiment cases.) She
added, The reports of human injury were especially threatening,
because of the potential for
enormous settlements — not to mention
the PR problem. " 41
Indeed, DuPont was particularly concerned about the possible psychologic reaction to the New Jersey
pollution incident, according to a
secret 1946 Manhattan Project memo. Facing a threat from the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) to
embargo the regions produce because of
"high fluoride content," DuPont dispatched its lawyers to the
FDA offices in Washington, where
an agitated meet ing ensued. According to a memo sent the following day to General Groves, DuPont s lawyer
argued that in view of the pending
suits GENERAL
GROVES S SOLUTION
75 any
action by the Food and Drag Administration . . . would have a serious effect on the DuPont Company
and would create a bad public
relations situation."
After the meeting adjourned, Manhattan Project Captain John Davies approached the FDA s Food Division
chief and impressed upon Dr. White
the substantial interest which the Government had in claims which
might arise as a result of action
which might be taken by the Food and Drug
Administration. 42 There was no embargo. Instead, new tests for fluoride
in the New Jersey area would be
conducted — not by the Department of
Agriculture but by the Chemical Warfare Service — because work done
by the Chemical Warfare Service
would carry the greatest weight as evidence if .. . lawsuits are started by the complainants. The memo
was signed by General Groves.
43 The farmers kept fighting.
On February 2, 1946, Willard Kille wrote to the influential Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman of the
Special Committee on Atomic
Energy, on behalf of the Fluorine Committee, telling him about the peach trees and poisoning. General
Groves quickly interceded,
informing the Senator, I do not believe it would be of any value to your committee to have Mr.
Kille appear before it. Groves assured
Senator McMahon that I am keeping in close personal touch with the matter from day to day in order that I
may be personally certain that while
the government's interests are protected no advantage is taken of
any injured farmer. 44 The New Jersey farmers were
ultimately pacified with token financial
settlements, according to interviews with descendants still living the
area. 45 Joseph Clemente says that
his father told him the family had been "paid off" by DuPont after the cattle died suddenly during
the war. The Clemente farm lay
just across the road from the Chamber Works. His grandfather had been a wartime manager inside the
Chamber Works and his family owned a
construction firm that had helped to build the plant; accordingly, his
father accepted DuPont s cash
settlement. It wouldnt have been very good if my family had caused a lot of stink about the episode, Clemente
said. All we knew is that
DuPont released some chemical that burned up all the peach trees around here, a second resident, Angelo 76 CHAPTER FIVE Giordano, whose
father James was one of the original plaintiffs, told the medical writer Joel Griffiths, who
visited the orchard country in 1997.
The trees were no good after that, so we had to give up on the peaches. Their horses and cows also acted sick and walked
stiffly, recalled his sister
Mildred. "Could any of that have been the fluoride?" she asked. According to veterinary toxicologists,
various symptoms she went on to
detail are cardinal signs of fluoride toxicity. The Giordano family has
been plagued by bone and joint
problems, too, Mildred added. Recalling the settlement received by the Giordano family, Angelo told
Griffiths that "my father
said he got about $200. The
New Jersey farmers were blocked in their legal challenge by the government's refusal to reveal the key
piece of information that would
have settled the case — the amount of fluoride DuPont had vented into
the atmosphere during the war.
"Disclosure ... would be injurious to the military security of the United States, wrote Manhattan
Project Major C. A. Taney
Jr." Gotshalk, the
farmers' attorney, was outraged at the stonewalling. He called it a callous disregard for the
rights of people and accused the
Manhattan Project of using the sovereign power of the government to escape the consequences of what
undoubtedly was done."
47 Gotshalk was right. A
once-secret memorandum sent to General
Groves in Washington — which Gotshalk and the farmers never saw — reveals that the wartime DuPont
plant was belching out mass
quantities of hydrogen fluoride: at least 30,000 pounds, and perhaps
as much as 165,000 pounds, was
expelled over the adjacent farmland each
month. 48 The scale
of the pollution was explained to General Groves. DuPont was then producing 1,500,000 pounds of
HF each month for its commercial
Freon-producing [Kinetics] plant, according to his deputy Major C. A. Taney. "Assuming that
the losses were only 1 percent at
Kinetics, the amount vented to the atmosphere would be about equal to the average loss from the Government
facilities at the Chamber Works during
the worst months of 1944," Major Taney wrote. But the pollution
might be much worse, he added, in
which case the lion's share of the blame would be attributable to DuPont's commercial operations. "If
the losses at Kinetics ran as rGENERAL GROVES S
SOLUTION 77 high as 10 percent,
which is possible, the fumes produced at the Chamber Works would obviously be caused to the greatest
extent by DuPonts own operations
and not by the Government facilities, the memo stated.
The memo to Groves is probably the smoking gun tying DuPont to the reported injuries. The emissions data
would certainly have been crucial
courtroom ammunition for the plaintiffs, according to the scientist Kathleen M. Thiessen, an expert on risk
analysis and on the health effects
of hydrogen fluoride" She notes that the amount of fluoride spilled
over the orchards and farms in
1944 from the Chamber Works — at least 30,000 pounds monthly — is consistent with the injuries reported
within a ten-kilometer radius
around the DuPont plant. The air concentrations could easily have been high enough to cause vegetation
damage, and if they are high
enough to cause vegetation damage they are high enough to cause damage to livestock eating that
pasture," the scientist estimated. Could the fluoride have hurt the local citizens
too? It is going to depend
on where they lived and how much of that local produce [they ate], Thiessen explained. The reports of high
blood fluoride levels in local
citizens, and of badly contaminated local produce, were again consistent with human fluoride
injury, she added. Denied
the government data, the farmers settled their lawsuit, and their case has long since been forgotten.
But the Garden State peach growers
unknowingly left their imprint on history. Their complaints of sickness reverberated through the
corridors of power in Washington and
triggered Harold Hodge's intensive secret bomb-program research on the health effects of fluoride. "Because of complaints that
animals and humans have been injured
by hydrogen fluoride fumes in [the New Jersey] area," reads a 1945
memo to General Groves from a
deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Cooper B. Rhodes, although there are no pending suits involving such claims,
the University of Rochester is
conducting experiments to determine the toxic effect of fluoride." 50 6 How the Manhattan Project Sold Us Fluoride
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