In the
middle of a raging Covid-19 pandemic, Argentina has decided to
accelerate the lithium mining sector. This intensification is occurring
as a part of the larger expansion of Argentinean extractivism wherein
the country has decided to triple its mining exports to over US$10.7bn per year in the next decade.
For this, apart from copper, the government also mapped 15 new lithium projects. Preparations for managing and augmenting the developing lithium sector have commenced with the establishment of an association named Calbafina, tasked with organizationally buttressing the lithium sector.
The current
economic expansion of the Argentinean lithium sector is occurring for
two reasons.
Firstly, despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the demand for
lithium is set to increase
and while “There has been a slowdown in capital commitments…the outlook
for growth in lithium demand suggests it has merely been delayed but
not derailed, and Argentina will play a key role in supplying global
requirements.” EV sales are forecasted
to grow from 2 million in 2019 to 26 million by 2030 and Orocobre, an
Australian company operating in Salar de Olaroz, Argentina, says
that the European demand for EVs will increase markedly and the
lithium-ion battery manufacturing capacity will grow five-fold by 2029.
Secondly,
Argentina is the most attractive destination for lithium investors and
presents a suitable investment climate for mining projects. For the
lithium bourgeoisie, the main outlet for surplus-seeking investible
capital is the “Lithium Triangle” which has 70%
of the world’s lithium brine deposits. This region is constituted by
northern Chile, northern Argentina and Southern Bolivia. Chile and
Bolivia are, therefore, the main competitors for Argentina. In
comparison to Argentina, both these countries are either afflicted by
the under-dose of free market fundamentalism or are experiencing
cataclysmic political events.
In Chile, the
deficiency of proper trade liberalization is the major impediment
preventing the country from becoming the leading lithium destination.
Through Decree Law 2,886 of 1979 and Organic Law of Mining Concessions
of 1983, Chile instituted
several regulatory reforms in the lithium sector: lithium was declared
as a strategic resource because of its use in nuclear fission; the
prior authorization of the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission was made a
vital component of lithium mining procedures and private miners were
required to either partner with the state or obtain a special permit
called Special Lithium Operation Contracts (CEOL) to mine on their own.
In contrast to
Chile, Argentina has a non-interventionist regulatory regime extremely
favorable towards the extractive capitalists. In the 1990s, for example,
amendments
were made to the Mining Code which financially supported the rampage of
extractive capital through the granting of import duty benefits for
mining equipments, total tax burden stability for 30 years and income
tax benefits for mining companies. These mining reforms were further
sweetened by the former president Mauricio Macri
who “signed a new mining deal to harmonize taxes and regulations in 20
provinces with the aim of attracting mining investment…Macri removed
currency and capital controls and reversed taxes that were introduced by
the former presidents. After signing the new mining deal, approximately
40 foreign companies showed interest in Argentina’s mining industry.
More than half of those companies are interested in lithium”. In
addition to actively implemented policies, Argentina’s mining governance
structure imperceptibly supports extractive capital through
unaccountably amorphous laws. The National Argentinean environment law,
for instance, states
that any activity capable of modifying the environment “in a
significant form” must be subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA). A large legal lacuna present in the text pertains to the absence
of any clear-cut definition of what constitutes as a “significant
modification”, thus allowing mining operations to unrestrainedly exploit
a resource-rich region.
Bolivia’s
lithium scenario is worse than Chile since here political instability
and resource nationalism have combined to produce a highly unsteady
situation of socio-cultural dissonance. Before the 2019 coup, Evo Morales governed Bolivia as a socialist president and used
the resource revenue of the country to domestically redistribute wealth
and reduce inequality. As a part of this redistributive project,
Morales did not expose the large lithium reserves of Bolivia to
predatory transnational corporations and instead, opted
to utilize lithium as a modality for industrializing the country. In
response to the socialist-protectionist policies of Evo Morales, a “Lithium Coup”
occurred in 2019 whose aim was the radical re-configuration of lithium
as a mere physical input for transnational corporations. Ever since the
coup took place, Bolivia is experiencing
increased political instability as pro-Morales protestors are being
violently repressed and killed by the right-wing genocidal government of
Jeanine Anez. Due to the current combination of political perilousness
and strong sentiments of resource nationalism, Bolivia is a country
least likely to attract lithium investors in the near future.
Political stability in Argentina is guaranteed
by the present-day government of Alberto Fernandez which, like the
administration of Nestor Kirchner, “envisions a new political party of
the center-left based on a return to the national-popular politics of
the earlier Peronist era, but with less corruption and repression.”
Through left-leaning changes in foreign policy, a redistributive agenda comprising of wealth tax and subsidization
of basic necessities such as food, Alberto Fernandez is likely to
temporarily stabilize the Argentinean political territory. With this
stabilization, lithium mining in the country will encounter
de-intensified socio-ecological conflicts as the Fernandez government
carefully pursues redistributive policies, de-radicalizes incipient
anti-neoliberal protests through economic sops and uses the state
apparatus to defuse class struggle. While the people affected by lithium
operations are inevitably going to protest, they won’t be able to
establish intra-subaltern solidarity as a generalized atmosphere of
class collaborationism is installed and the multi-faceted section of the
oppressed people is unable to institute macro-unity.
As the opening
of the Argentinean lithium largesse to transnational corporations takes
place, it is imperative that we recognize the unprecedented ecological
damage, cultural loss and economic uncertainty which lithium mining
brings to the indigenous people living in various resource-rich regions.
In Argentina, lithium resources are found
in numerous salt lakes located in three northern provinces: Catamarca,
Salta and Jujuy. Within these provinces, Salar del Hombre Muerto,
Cauchari, Olaroz and Salar del Rincon are the major producers of
lithium. In the last few years, lithium production has been steadily
increasing and from 2.5 thousand tons in 2013, Argentine lithium
production has increased to 6,400 metric tons in 2019 and according to the Ministry of Mining, “investments in lithium extraction grew by 928% between 2015 and 2018.” The breakneck speed
of lithium extraction in Argentina is indicated by the fact that
“Between the mid-2000s and 2011, Salta’s government issued permits to 15
companies to extract lithium from brines in 13 salt flats. Salta’s fast
and easy permitting process enabled a brine grab as officials
prioritized attracting foreign investment”.
While
Argentinean lithium output is increasing contemporaneously with the
expansion of electric mobility in the Global North, deliberately
obscured indigenous communities living in that country are being
dispossessed and defrauded of their entire existence. The Olaroz lithium
mining project, for example, operated by
Sales de Jujuy, a joint venture of the Australian mining company
Orocobre, the Japanese Toyota Tsusho Corporation, and Jujuy’s
state-owned mining enterprise Jujuy Energía y Minería Sociedad del
Estado (JEMSE), was marred
by myriad informational irregularities: there were serious delays in
the availability of information prior to indigenous assemblies; the
mining companies used a highly technical jargon to communicate with the
indigenous people and those who asked any questions about the presented
reports were answered in a similarly incomprehensible manner; all the
reports used by the indigenous people, from environmental issues to
economic benefits, were wholly provided by the mining corporations,
suggesting a serious lack of informational independence. As a result of
this complete absence of informational independence, an individual
affected by the mining operations of the company said
that “I don’t know if what we get is what corresponds to us according
to our rights over the land, how could one know that?” In another
instance, a person said
that “Regarding the water issue we only have the version from the
company and nothing else…So, lately we have been looking for some
professionals that could help us that are not related to the companies
nor to the government – it is difficult, but well, we are looking”.
In the consultation
process involving Minera Exar, another company which has been
commercially mining the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat, “The provincial
government did not supervise dialogue between international companies
and local communities. Nor did it comply with the requirement to provide
basic information to help understand the environmental impacts of
lithium mining in the area. This has negatively affected the
communities’ ability to evaluate the project in question and/or to
control their activities”.
Through the
use of fraudulent procedural tactics, mining companies not only
illegally steal indigenous land but also subvert a whole way of living.
The environmental damage generated due to lithium mining causes
traditional indigenous lives to get culturally cracked and economically
destabilized. The depletion of water in the Argentinean salt deserts is
one such example of lithium-caused environmental damage existentially
eroding the indigenous people.
Marcelo
Sticco, a hydrologist working for the University of Buenos Aires, while
talking about the region where Kolla (a general name for Quechua and
Aymara people) live, says (translated from Spanish) that
“The problem is that salt water and fresh water are in a fragile natural balance in this region. Due to the lithium production, the natural water level drops. And this causes the salt water to mix with the fresh water. This contamination is irreversible and the region is irrevocably losing its drinking water reserves.”
As per data provided by Provincial and National Mining Offices in Argentina, “no less than 5 and up to 50 m3 of fresh water are needed per ton of final battery grade Li2CO3 that is produced.” Furthermore, for the production of 17,500 tons of lithium carbonate per year, 240l/sec of salt brine is extracted.
With the
large-scale disturbance of regional hydrological dynamics due to lithium
mining, wetlands and lagoons, which rely mainly on subterranean waters,
slowly disappear. These wetlands and lagoons are indispensable for the existence of flora and fauna and therefore, contribute
to the sustenance of locally rooted agro-pastoral practices. But when
lithium mining seriously subverts the fragile water balance of
Argentina’s salt deserts, indigenous people lose their ability to engage
in their traditional occupations. Apart from water scarcity, lithium
mining in Argentina is also producing
chemical wastes and “most of this waste is merely accumulated at the
verge of the salar [salt flat], except for the Mg-Ca residues which are
sometimes used to consolidate precarious roads within the mining
facility. Briefly, total dissolved solids in brine are very high. When
brine is evaporated, all salts other than lithium carbonate end up as
waste.” According to a report
produced by the Friends of the Earth Europe, “toxic chemicals are
needed to process lithium. The release of such chemicals through
leaching, spills or air emissions can harm communities, ecosystems and
food production. Moreover, lithium extraction inevitably harms the soil
and also causes air contamination.” Due to this chemical pollution,
cattle are dying and since the initiation of lithium mining in Kolla regions, there have been the rapid deaths and deformed births of Llamas.
Lithium mines in Argentina
Despite the
environmental catastrophe brought about by lithium mining, Carlos
Oehler, president of the Jujuy Energy and Mining State Society, says
that lithium is “an opportunity for development. And the people who
only emphasise the environmental impact do so out of ignorance,”.
Contrary to the Oehler’s disingenuous claims, Verónica Chávez, a member
of a local cooperative engaged in traditional salt harvesting, asserts that
“Lithium is food for today and hunger for tomorrow,”. This statement
pithily encapsulates the fleeting economic benefits of mining and
expresses the long-term ecological damage which lithium mining inflicts
on the indigenous people. Like any other extractive activities, lithium mining
too “is a temporary activity that tends to generate an economy that is
mainly dependent on the sector. This dependence is a danger for the
development of the regions attached to the mining operations because,
although during the production of the mine they may experience an
economic boom, they will not be able to replicate this when the mining
activity concludes.” Moreover, the massive environmental vandalism done
by lithium extraction does not in any justify the meager “development”
which indigenous people receive.
Lithium
projects in Argentina have not been completely frictionless and
unantagonistic and various indigenous communities have been resisting
the onslaught of the “global green economy”. In the town of Susques
(located in the Jujuy province), which is situated within the area of
influence of the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flat, the approximately 2500
people living there have been protesting for many years. In Susques,
local communities and a peasant organization called Apacheta Collective claimthat
Sales de Jujuy and Minera Exar (the companies operating in the
Olaroz-Cauchari salt plains) coerced them into accepting the mining
projects, consulted less than 20 people and thus, failed to meet the
requirement of getting approval from more than 50% of the population.
The Apacheta Collective, in particular, has been militant in its
opposition to transnational extractive capital and has been combatively
organizing to resist mining operations. As a natural result of its class
combativeness, the Apacheta Collective has been facing threats and harassments and in 2012, one of its members had to be hospitalized after being brutally beaten for political activism.
The etymology of the word “Apacheta” beautifully illustrates that an alternative world to capitalism is possible. According
to Carlos Guzman, representative of Apacheta collective, “An Apacheta
is a pile of stones, placed on strategic locations, for example at the
beginning of a road. An Apacheta grows, very slowly, but with a lot of
meaning. When I start a journey and I see an Apacheta next to the road, I
stop, place a stone on it, and wish that I will arrive safely at my
destination. Everyone who will pass by will do the same. That is the
same idea as our group. That is the meaning of our name. We start with
just a couple of people, but we will grow. Very slowly, but with a lot
of meaning.”
The Apacheta
Collective, throughout its existence as a counter-hegemonic force, has
maintained that the lithium mining companies recklessly ransack the
environment and according to the head of Apacheta Collective, “we are suffering a drought”. True to the statements of Apacheta Collective, it is estimated
that in the Olaroz-Cauchari extraction site, “more water was being lost
through water evaporation ponds than was naturally replenishing into
the system.”
Along with a
strong anti-imperialist position, the Apacheta Collective also possesses
an alternative imagination of world that is radically different from
the “development” which lithium companies provide indigenous people
with. Gonzalo, a member of Apacheta Collective, argues
that “They [the companies] always say that we don’t want progress, that
we don’t want development. For them, development is building roads,
destructing nature, making money. For us, that is not development. It is
not sustainable. Our grandparents, their grandparents and so on, have
always taken care of Pachamama [mother earth], of nature, their lama’s,
their sheep. We want to do the same. We use their wool to make our own
clothes, we use their meat for our own consumption and what is left, we
sell, or we trade. I want to transmit my animals to my children, so they
can do the same. That is sustainable. But what will happen to us when
there is no water left?”
The Salinas
Grandes salt plain, the fourth biggest in the world, in the Jujuy and
Salta province, is another region where indigenous communities have
carved a bottom-up politics of mobilization. In 2010,
“Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc communities filed a collective
injunction against the states of Jujuy and Salta and against the
national government demanding respect for their right to consent to
lithium exploitation.” In Kachi Yupi (Footprints in the Salt), the
consultation protocol made by the indigenous communities affected by the
lithium mining operations and one of the first of its kind, the
indigenous people write
that “nobody told us anything about how this new exploitation might
affect our communities and our territory, the salt flats, the
watersheds, the pastures, our livestock…our customs and beliefs. In
synthesis: our whole life.”
The indigenous people affected by lithium operations in Salinas Grandes, formed
by 33 indigenous communities such as Tres Pozos, Pozo Colorado, San
Miguel del Colorado and Inti Killa de Tres Morros, soon established the
Table of Original Peoples of the Salinas Grandes Basin and Guayatayoc
Lagoon (La Mesa de Pueblos Originarios de la Cuenca de Salinas Grandes y
Laguna de Guayatayoc). After filing a lawsuit before the Argentine
Supreme Court of Justice in 2010 against the granting of extraction
permits without prior consultation, La Mesa’s case was taken forward
by the NGO Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (Fundación
Ambiente y Recursos Naturales) in the form of Amicus Curiae briefs. When
the case was dismissed in 2012, La Mesa, with the help of lawyers, took the case to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.
Like the
Olaroz-Cauchari salt plain, Salinas Grandes too is being destroyed by
lithium extractivism and these socio-ecological problems have also been
emphasized by the former Special Rapporteur to the Secretary General of
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples James Anaya who said
that “it is feared that the proposed extraction of lithium will reduce
the water level in this arid region, where water is needed to raise
sheep, goats and llamas and is also essential to salt production and
harvesting, an important activity within the traditional economy in the
area.” A lawyer, while talking about prospecting companies in Salinas
Grandes, said
that “They [the companies] drilled the aquifer. And they committed a
double wrong. They contaminated the aquifer from where [the communities]
obtain water for animal husbandry and orchards. And, worse, the fresh
water that rose to that part of the salt bank ruined the salt, so it
cannot be cut and sold anymore.” In this way, ancestral occupational
arrangements are being slowly undermined and in their place, an
unsustainable model of development is being installed.
As the process
of lithium intensification progresses in Argentina, the indigenous
communities are slated to get embroiled in the subhuman suppression of
transnational extractive capital. Even before the economic expansion of
lithium mining, M. Mutuma Ruteree, UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, had said
that indigenous people in Argentina are “largely invisible in society
and are excluded from the country’s senate, congress and judiciary”.
Now, when the tentacles of lithium mining are being extended into the
far-flung regions of Argentina, it is inevitable that indigenous people
will be further dehumanized and existentially eviscerated. In order to
present a creative counter-offensive against the “Lithium Leviathan”, we
need to stop what has been labeled the “imperial mode of living”.
Markus Wissen and Ulrich Brand, in their book “The Limits to Capitalist
Nature”, write
that the “Exclusive access to resources, guaranteed by contract or
through open violence, and the externalization of the socio-ecological
costs that using these resources entails, are the conditio sine qua non
of the global North’s mode of living, which we therefore call
‘imperial’.” In the current conjuncture, we need to stop the engine of
this “imperial mode of living” which is celebrating “electric freedom”
in the Global North at the cost of the subjugation of indigenous
communities in Argentina.
*
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Yanis Iqbal is a student and freelance writer based in Aligarh, India and can be contacted at yanisiqbal@gmail.com. His
articles have been published by numerous magazines and websites such as
Monthly Review Online, ZNet, Institute of Latin American Studies, Green
Social Thought, Weekly Worker, People’s World, LA Progressive, News and
Letters Weekly, Economic and Political Weekly, Arena, Eurasia Review,
Coventry University Press, Culture Matters, Dissident Voice,
Countercurrents, Counterview, Hampton Institute, Ecuador Today, People’s
Review, Eleventh Column, Karvaan India, Clarion India, OpEd News, The
Iraq File and Portside.
The original source of this article is Global Research
Copyright © Yanis Iqbal, Global Research, 2020
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