.
"To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government;
to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the
legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened),
against domestic violence."
In
a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican
members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to
defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial
innovations. The more
intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the
members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to
insist
that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be
substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else
could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution?
Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to
a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the
confederate republic of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free
cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that
it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece
was undone," he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat
among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate
force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share
of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be
of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations
in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves.
These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general
government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a
harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments
may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of
enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To
the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should
interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course,
bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a guaranty
of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of
the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican
forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal
Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican
forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the
latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange
republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is
presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.
A
protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing
it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each State, not
only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises
of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern
confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be
insensible to the policy of this article.
Protection
against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked,
that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one
government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league
informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by
the most democratic, as the other cantons. A recent and well-known event among
ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature.
At
first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory, to suppose,
either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the
force, to subvert a government; and consequently, that the federal
interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But
theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the
lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence,
be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a
majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of
the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not
the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides,
there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with
the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one
without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will
rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear
some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the
violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than
that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and
obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally
prevent the necessity of exerting it.
Is
it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican
governments? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary
resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from
foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May
not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side,
against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and
collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to
imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules
which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of
an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of citizens
may become a majority of persons, by the accession of alien residents,
of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the
State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an
unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the
calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the
tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and
give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate
themselves.
In
cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires
could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State
to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the
local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of
friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its infirmities could be
enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally effectual could be
established for the universal peace of mankind!
Should
it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the
States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a
constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be
without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the
compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the
federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no
possible constitution can provide a cure.
Among
the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu, an
important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the
States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part,
they are reforme
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