Ch. 5. General Groves's Solution: the fluoride deception by Christopher
Bryson from archive.org
General Groves's Solution
Dr. Harold Hodge and the University of Rochester The Manhattan Project had seen the danger
from fluoride early. Before the war
private industry had contained the legal dangers from factory pollution by forming the Air Hygiene
Foundation at the Mellon Institute. Also
fearing lawsuits, in 1943 General Groves established the Manhattan Projects Medical Section at the University of
Rochester to strengthen the governments
interests, placing Dr. Harold C. Hodge in charge of a secret unit studying fluoride and the other
chemicals being used to make the atomic
bomb. FROM His CORNER office window in
the medical school at Strong Memorial
Hospital that summer of 1943 Dr. Harold Hodge could see
construction workers placing the
finishing touches on a half million-dollar building at the University of Rochester known as the
Manhattan Annex.' The heavily guarded
structure, funded by the U.S. Army, would be home to the Manhattan Project's Medical Section. Orders
had been placed for hundreds of
experimental animals: Puerto Rican monkeys, dogs, mice, rabbits, and guinea pigs.' And an umbilical cord-like
tunnel linking the military annex with
the university hospital was urgently being readied. https://www.blogger.com/null
As the
new Annex foundations were put down, so too was the keystone laid for the postwar practice of toxicology
in the United States — and for the
future career of the thirty-nine-year-old bioc hemist, Dr. Harold
Hodge. The Annex would soon house the
largest 66 CHAPTER FIVE medical laboratory in the nation, with a
staff of several hundred scientists
testing the toxicity of the chemicals being used to build the atomic
bomb. Military pilots flew the exotic
new compounds directly from the bomb
factories to Hodges team at Rochester. "Harold would actually meet
the pilots under [cover of] dark to get
the material to test, said toxicologist
Judith MacGregor, who befriended Hodge at Rochester, where she was
a graduate student in the 1960s, and who
was mesmerized by her mentors tales. It
was unbelievable. That spring of 1943,
Hodge had been placed in charge of the bomb
programs Division of Pharmacology and Toxicology and given control
of a secret biomedical research unit
known as Program F to study fluoride
toxicity.' The Manhattan Project had a whole section working on
uranium and a whole section working on
fluoride, explained Jack Hein, who
worked with Hodge at Rochester during the early cold war as a young graduate student and remembers the scale of
the fluoride studies. The toxicology
studies were very comprehensive. They were looking for toxic effects on the bone, the blood, and the
nervous system. . . . Without the
Manhattan Project and the atomic bomb, we wouldnt know anywhere
near as much as we do about the physiological
effects of fluoride, Hein added . 4 His
research suddenly blossomed into an immense program, noted Paul Morrow, a uranium expert who also joined
Hodge at Rochester in 1947 and who
worked on some of the earliest experiments.
Hodge's war work germinated into a career as the nation's leading expert on fluoride. Over more than half a
century the tall, black-haired
researcher published several books and some three hundred
scientific papers. He was chairman of
the National Research Councils Committee on
Toxicology and first president of the Society of Toxicology. And a generation of Hodges Rochester colleagues and
students — men such as Herbert
Stokinger, Paul Morrow, and Helmuth Schrenk — went on to occupy leading positions in government agencies
and universities after the war.' He was
unarguably the dean of American toxicology, stated a former colleague and Rochester alumni, Ernest
Newbrun, now a professor emeritus at the
University of California at San Francisco." To several generations of colleagues, the
soft-spoken scientist with the
slicked-back hair was a gentleman scholar and tutor, advising GENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION 67
them to play it straight, and regularly, in his early seventies, trounc ing graduate students at squash.' But Harold
Hodge — grandfather, soft-spoken friend,
and dean of American toxicology — shouldered
dark secrets for much of his professional life. That summer of 1943, as Dr. Hodge stood at
his office window, he confronted a
terrible dilemma. Speed was essential in beating the Germans to full-scale production of the
atomic bomb.' The fate of tens of
thousands of American workers lay in his hands. His laboratory's evaluation of the toxicity of chemicals
needed for the bomb, such as fluorine,
beryllium, and trichloroethylene, would fix work conditions for the women and men inside the Manhattan
Projects bomb factories, help determine
how quickly the plants could achieve full
production — and whether employers would be successfully sued for damages if those workers claimed injury from
chemical exposure.' The questions were
many and the answers few, wrote Hodge. There
was no time to wait for months, or even weeks, while the accepted laboratory tests established the
toxico-logical facts. Production had to
proceed with no delays." 10
People working in the atomic energy production plants were going to be chronically exposed, said Jack Hein. We
didnt know too much about the toxicity
of fluoride, other than the early studies saying a little too much in the water causes damage to teeth,
he added." General Leslie Groves
understood the dangers of such pell-mell
production. He feared that personal injury lawsuits would be an Achilles heel for the entire nuclear program.
Leading insurers, such as Aetna and
Travelers, were providing health coverage for workers in the new bomb factories. 12 Successful claims for
fluoride injury or for neighborhood
pollution might hemorrhage compensation payments, create a public-relations disaster, risk
jeopardizing the embryonic nuclear
industry — and threaten the United States' unprecedented new military power. 13 The army moved quickly to protect itself.
Its first weapon was secrecy. The second
weapon was seizing control of basic science. In
particular the crucial toxicity studies on bomb program chemicals performed at the University of Rochester were
sculpted and shaped to defend the
Manhattan Project from lawsuits.' Those marching orders — conscripting science and law for
military service — were drummed home in
a July 30, 1945, memorandum titled Purpose
68 CHAPTER FIVE and Limitations of the Biological and
Health Physics Research Pro -gram,
written by the head of the Medical Section, Colonel Stafford
Warren. According to Warren, The
Manhattan District, as a unit of the U.S. Army ... has been given a directive to conduct certain
operations which will be useful in
winning the war. As such, medico-legal aspects were accorded a clear priority for scientists, he added,
including the necessary biological
research to strengthen the Governments interests. 15 Scientists soon delivered courtroom
ammunition. "Much of the data
already collected is proving valuable from a medical legal point of
view," noted a February 1946 memo
to General Groves's deputy, Brigadier
General K. C. Nichols. "It is anticipated that further research
will also serve in this manner,"
the memo added. 16 Colonel Warren had
chosen his top fluoride expert carefully. The son of an Illinois schoolteacher, Harold Hodge was a
biochemist whose specialty was the study
of bones and teeth. He had arrived at the University of Rochester in 1931, where he was one of an
elite cadre of men selected by the
Rockefeller Foundation as dental research fellows. The Rockefeller Foundation was then funding basic research at
selected dental schools in a bid to lift
the standards of dental care in the United States. Hodge was also a pharmacologist and toxicologist who by 1937
had forged close links with corporate
America.' By the summer of 1943 some of those corporations and institutions were taking a lead role in
developing America's first nuclear
weapon. Eastman Kodak, a Rochester company where Hodge had investigated chemical poisoning before the
war, was now a leading industrial
contractor at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 16 Rockefeller interests were also using fluoride to refine uranium at an
undisclosed site in New Jersey and
funding their own biomedical research at the University of Rochester."" Harold Hodge's role as gatekeeper at the
wartime crossroads of law and medical
science was spelled out in a 1944 letter introducing the Rochester scientist to the DuPont company. The letter,
stamped confidential, again lays out a
fundamental scientific bias in the Manhattan Districts medical program — a bias against workers and
communities, and in favor of corporate
legal interests. The Medical Section
has been charged with the responsibility of
obtaining toxicological data which will insure the Districts being GENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION 69
in a favorable position in case litigation develops from exposure
to the materials, Colonel Stafford
Warren told Dr. John Foulger of DuPonts
Haskell Laboratory in a letter dated August 12, 1944. Harold Hodge was to insure that information
about the toxicity of certain fluoride
compounds was coordinated between the
government and its contractors, Warren explained. It would be desirable, he told Foulger, to have the work
on the toxicity of fluorocarbons being
done in your laboratory parallel the
investigations being made on similar compounds elsewhere. For that reason it would be appreciated if Dr. Harold
Hodge of the University of Rochester
could visit your laboratory in the near future and an exchange of ideas be effected." 20 Harold Hodge, Devil's Island, and the Peach Crop Cases 21 Harold Hodge s diligence in defending the
war industry can be seen in a 1946 court
challenge from farmers living near a DuPont fluoride plant in New Jersey. Although not mentioned
in any history of the Manhattan Project,
the lawsuits were regarded by the military as the most serious legal threat to the U.S. nuclear
program, requiring the direct
intervention of General Leslie Groves. A closing chapter in the Manhattan Project, the aggressive use of
secrecy, science, and public relations
by Groves and Hodge, and at least a half dozen federal agencies battling the farmers, is an opening
scene in the story of how fluoride was
handled by our government following World War II. The gently rolling alluvial soil along the
shore of the Delaware estuary in
Southern New Jersey is some of the most bountiful farm- land in the United States. Its historic
harvest of fruit and vegetables won New
Jersey the accolade of The Garden State. The orchards downwind of the DuPont plant in Gloucester
and Salem counties were especially famous
for their high-quality produce; their
peaches went directly to the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. Campbell's Soup bought up their tomatoes. But
in the summer of 1943 the farmers began
to report that their orchards were blighted
and that "something is burning up the peach crops around
here." Poultry died after an
all-night thunderstorm, they reported. Fields
were sometimes strewn with dead cattle, residents recalled, while 70
CHAPTER FIVE workers who ate
the produce they had picked vomited all night and into the next day. I remember our horses looked sick
and were too stiff to work, Mildred
Giordano, who was a teenager at the time, told reporter Joel Griffiths. Some cows were so crippled that
they could not stand up, and grazed by
crawling on their bellies. The injuries were confirmed in taped interviews, shortly before he died, with the
chemical consultant Philip Sadtler of
Sadtler Laboratories in Philadelphia. On behalf of the farmers' crusading attorney, Counselor William C.
Gotshalk of Camden, New Jersey, Sadtler
had measured blood fluoride levels in laborers as high as 310 parts per million. (Blood fluoride is
normally well below i part per mil-
lion. These levels are potentially lethal doses) 22 Some of the farm workers were pretty weak,
Sadtler noted. The New Jersey farmers
organized a Fluorine Committee. They patriotically waited until the war was over, then sued DuPont and
the Manhattan Project for fluoride
damage. Thirteen claimants asked for a total of $430,000 in compensation. Little wonder the farmers reported health
problems. Conditions on the other side
of the DuPont fence were extraordinarily dangerous. More than a thousand women and men were employed on
Manhattan Project contracts at the
Chamber Works during the war, secretly manufacturing elemental fluorine, uranium hexafluoride, and several
exotic new fluorocarbons. 23 Chemical
exposures were frequent, making the DuPont employees perhaps the most endangered and fearful of the
wartime fluoride workers. By the end of
January 1944 at least two DuPont laboratory workers had been killed and several scientists injured. Work
conditions at the secret
fluoride-producing East and Blue Areas of the Chamber Works were especially dreadful, with "gross violations
of safety," inspectors noted. 24
One unit was especially notorious, the government reported. "The
plant frequently caught on fire, and the
activators often burned out so the
employees were frequently exposed to rather large amounts of fluorine compounds," Captain Mears of the
Manhattan Project noted in October 1945.
"Medical hazards were attributed to fluorine in a gaseous state, silver fluorides in a powdered state and liquid 2144 [code for fluorocarbon]. 25 Injured workers paraded into the DuPont
hospital. Doctors often reported "a
fibrotic condition of both lungs" on X-rays; serious GENERAL GROVESS SOLUTION 71
chemical burns were seen very frequently. The mounting injury toll was blamed on fluoride. 20 In February
1945 doctors at the East and Blue Areas
reported seventy-nine sub-par or so-called chronic cases. Sixteen of those workers had their condition
detected in the last two
months." A Manhattan
Project medical investigator, Captain Richard C. Bernstein, warned his boss, Colonel Warren,
that workers now feared assignment to
the DuPont fluoride processing areas as "an exile to Devil's Island." 28 Another report
warned of brewing labor unrest. "Fear
of the physical consequences was becoming prevalent in the Areas, wrote Manhattan Project investigator First
Lieutenant Birchard M. Brundage in
February 1945. "This fear was being used by certain agitators to cause trouble in the
personnel," he added. 29 The farmers lawsuits electrified the
Manhattan Project. There had been no
disclosure of the diabolical work conditions at DuPont. Now, a public lawsuit pointed a finger directly at
the Chamber Works and fluoride. A once
secret November 1945 memo measures the
government's concern: "The most serious claim to neighboring properties of any operations of the
[Manhattan Engineering] District is the
litigation known as the "peach crop cases.' These are cases claiming damages to the fruit crop and to the peach
trees themselves in and around the
operation of the Chambers Works of the DuPont Company at Kearney, New Jersey. This damage is alleg
edly caused by the release into the
atmosphere, both unintentional and necessary as a result of the process [sic] of hydrogen
fluoride. The claims against the
District approximate $430,000. Part of the loss would be due to the private contractor and part to the operation
of the contractor on behalf of the
District." 30 The military sprang
into action. Dr. Hodge was dispatched to New
Jersey to marshal the medical response to the farmers' rebellion. Although DuPont's smokestack fluoride had
long been spilled into the environment
and a great volume of new fluoride compounds were being made inside the wartime plant, he
quickly reported back to Colonel
Stafford Warren at Oak Ridge that the mottled teeth seen in the school near the DuPont plant could be
attributed to natural fluoride in the
ground water. 31 Such natural fluoride in the water supply meant that the dental markings could not be used as
unequivocal proof of industrial
poisoning. The situation was 72 CHAPTER FIVE complicated by the existence of mottled
enamel as a result of fluoride in the
drinking water, Hodge told Warren.
Dr. Hodge had an idea for calming the citizen panic. His prescrip tion gives an early meaning to the term spin
doctor — and provides a clue that the
promotion by the U.S. government of a role for fluoride in tooth health has a powerful national-security appeal.
Would there be any use in making
attempts to counteract the local fear of fluoride on the part of
residents of Salem and Gloucester
counties through lectures on F toxicology and
perhaps the usefulness of F in tooth health? Hodge inquired of
Colonel Warren. 32 Such lectures, of
course, were indeed given, not only to New
Jersey citizens, but to the rest of the nation throughout the cold
war. A good cop-bad cop assault was
launched against the farmers. Almost
immediately their spokesperson, Willard B. Kille, a market
gardener, received an extraordinary
invitation: to dine with none other than General Leslie R. Groves, then known as the man who
built the atomic bomb, at his office at
the War Department on March 26, 1946. 33 Although Kille had been diagnosed with fluoride poisoning by his
doctor, he departed the luncheon
convinced of the governments good faith. The next day he wrote to thank the general, wishing the other
farmers could have been present, he
said, so they too could come away with the feeling that their interests
in this particular matter were being
safeguarded by men of the very highest
type whose integrity they could not question." Behind closed doors however, General Groves
had mobilized the full resources of the
federal government and the Manhattan Project to defeat Kille s farmers and their Fluorine Committee.
The documentary trail detailing the
government's battle against the farmers begins with a March 1, 1946, memo to top Manhattan Project doctor
Colonel Stafford Warren, outlining the
medical problem in New Jersey. There seem to be four distinct (though related) problems, Colonel
Warren was told. 1. A question of
injury of the peach crop in 1944. 2. A
report of extraordinary fluoride content of veg- etables grown in this area. 3. A report of abnormally high fluoride
content in the blood of human
individuals residing in this area.
GENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION
73 4. A report raising the
question of serious poisoning of horses
and cattle in this area. Under the
personal direction of General Groves, secret meetings were convened in Washington, with compulsory
attendance by scores of scientists and
officials from the U.S. War Department, the
Manhattan Project, the Food and Drug Administration, the
Agriculture and Justice departments, the
U.S. Armys Chemical Warfare Service and
Edgewood Arsenal, the Bureau of Standards, and DuPont lawyers.'' These agencies are making
scientific investigations to obtain
evidence which may be used to protect the interest of the Government at the trial of the suits brought
by owners of peach orchards in . . . New
Jersey," stated Lieutenant Colonel Cooper B. Rhodes of the Manhattan Project in a memo
dated August 27, 1945, and cc'd to
General Groves.' The memo stated:
SUBJECT: Investigation of Crop Damage at Lower Penns Neck, New Jersey T o : The Commanding
General, Army Service Forces, Pentagon Building, Washington D.C. At the
request of the Secretary of War the
Department of Agriculture has agreed to
cooperate in investigating complaints of
crop damage attributed ... to fumes from a plant operated in connection with the Manhattan
Project. Signed L. R. Groves, Major
General U.S.A. 36 "The Department
of Justice is cooperating in the defense of these suits," General Groves subsequently
wrote in a February 28, 1946, memo to
the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy. 37 General Groves, of course, was one of the
most powerful men in postwar Washington,
and the full resources of the military-industrial state were now turned upon the New Jersey
farmers. The farmers' expert witness,
scientist Philip Sadder, was singled out by the
military. A handwritten note in General Groves's files in the National Archives demands to know: Col. Rhodes, Who is
Sadtler ? 38 74 CHAPTER FIVE Groves learned that the Sadtler family
name was one of the most distinguished
and respected in American chemistry. The firm of Samuel P. Sadtler and Son was established in 1891 and routinely
consulted for top industrial
corporations, including Coca-Cola and John D. Rockefeller.' ' Philip Sadtler s grandfather, Samuel P.
Sadtler, had been a founding member of
the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, while his father, Samuel S. Sadtler, was one of the first
editors of the venerable science
publication Chemical Abstracts. (Today Philip Sadtler s Standard
Spectra are a diagnostic tool used in
laboratories around the world.) But
back then, in New Jersey, counterespionage agents followed him and accused him of "dealing with the
enemy," stated Sadtler. 40 He recalled
one confrontation with two U.S. Army captains that ended in a South Jersey orchard when Gotshalk, the farmers
lawyer, asked the military officials,
Since when are the farmers of the United States the enemy? Why was there such a national-security
emergency over a few lawsuits by New
Jersey farmers? In 1946 the United States had begun full-scale production of atomic bombs. No other nation
had yet tested a nuclear weapon, and the
A-bomb was seen as crucial for U.S. leadership of the postwar world. The New Jersey fluoride law
-suits were a serious roadblock to that
strategy. In the case of fluoride, If the farmers won, it would open the door to further suits, which
might impede the bomb programs ability
to use fluoride, remarked Jacqueline Kittrell, a Tennessee public-interest lawyer specializing
in nuclear cases, who examined the
declassified fluoride documents. (Kittrell has
represented plaintiffs in several human radiation experiment cases.)
She added, The reports of human injury were
especially threatening, because of the
potential for enormous settlements — not to mention the PR problem. " 41 Indeed, DuPont was particularly concerned
about the possible psychologic reaction
to the New Jersey pollution incident, according to a secret 1946 Manhattan Project memo. Facing a
threat from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to embargo the regions produce because of "high fluoride content," DuPont
dispatched its lawyers to the FDA offices
in Washington, where an agitated meet ing ensued. According to a
memo sent the following day to General
Groves, DuPont s lawyer argued that in
view of the pending suits GENERAL
GROVES S SOLUTION 75 any action by the Food and Drag
Administration . . . would have a
serious effect on the DuPont Company and would create a bad public relations situation." After the meeting adjourned, Manhattan
Project Captain John Davies approached
the FDA s Food Division chief and impressed upon Dr. White the substantial interest which the Government
had in claims which might arise as a
result of action which might be taken by the Food and Drug Administration. 42 There was no embargo.
Instead, new tests for fluoride in the
New Jersey area would be conducted — not by the Department of Agriculture but by the Chemical Warfare
Service — because work done by the
Chemical Warfare Service would carry the greatest weight as evidence if .. . lawsuits are started by the complainants.
The memo was signed by General Groves.
43 The farmers kept fighting. On
February 2, 1946, Willard Kille wrote to
the influential Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, on behalf of the
Fluorine Committee, telling him about
the peach trees and poisoning. General Groves quickly interceded, informing the Senator, I do not
believe it would be of any value to your
committee to have Mr. Kille appear before it. Groves assured Senator McMahon that I am keeping in close
personal touch with the matter from day
to day in order that I may be personally certain that while the government's interests are protected no
advantage is taken of any injured
farmer. 44 The New Jersey farmers were
ultimately pacified with token financial
settlements, according to interviews with descendants still living the
area. 45 Joseph Clemente says that his
father told him the family had been "paid
off" by DuPont after the cattle died suddenly during the war. The
Clemente farm lay just across the road
from the Chamber Works. His grandfather had
been a wartime manager inside the Chamber Works and his family owned
a construction firm that had helped to
build the plant; accordingly, his father
accepted DuPont s cash settlement. It wouldnt have been very good if
my family had caused a lot of stink
about the episode, Clemente said. All
we knew is that DuPont released some chemical that burned up all the peach trees around here, a second
resident, Angelo 76 CHAPTER FIVE Giordano, whose father James was one of
the original plaintiffs, told the medical
writer Joel Griffiths, who visited the orchard country in 1997. The trees were no good after that, so we had
to give up on the peaches. Their horses and cows also acted sick and
walked stiffly, recalled his sister
Mildred. "Could any of that have been the fluoride?" she asked. According to veterinary toxicologists,
various symptoms she went on to detail
are cardinal signs of fluoride toxicity. The Giordano family has been plagued by bone and joint problems, too,
Mildred added. Recalling the settlement
received by the Giordano family, Angelo told Griffiths that "my father said he got about $200. The New Jersey farmers were blocked in their
legal challenge by the government's
refusal to reveal the key piece of information that would have settled the case — the amount of
fluoride DuPont had vented into the
atmosphere during the war. "Disclosure ... would be injurious to
the military security of the United
States, wrote Manhattan Project Major C.
A. Taney Jr." Gotshalk, the
farmers' attorney, was outraged at the stonewalling. He called it a callous disregard for the rights
of people and accused the Manhattan
Project of using the sovereign power of the government to escape the consequences of what
undoubtedly was done." 47 Gotshalk was right. A once-secret memorandum
sent to General Groves in Washington —
which Gotshalk and the farmers never saw
— reveals that the wartime DuPont plant was belching out mass quantities of hydrogen fluoride: at least
30,000 pounds, and perhaps as much as
165,000 pounds, was expelled over the adjacent farmland each month. 48
The scale of the pollution was explained to General Groves. DuPont was then producing 1,500,000 pounds of HF
each month for its commercial
Freon-producing [Kinetics] plant, according to his deputy Major C. A. Taney. "Assuming that the
losses were only 1 percent at Kinetics,
the amount vented to the atmosphere would be about equal to the average loss from the Government facilities
at the Chamber Works during the worst
months of 1944," Major Taney wrote. But the pollution might be much worse, he added, in which case the
lion's share of the blame would be
attributable to DuPont's commercial operations. "If the losses at Kinetics ran as rGENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION 77
high as 10 percent, which is possible, the fumes produced at the Chamber Works would obviously be caused to
the greatest extent by DuPonts own
operations and not by the Government facilities, the memo stated.
The memo to Groves is probably the smoking gun tying DuPont to the reported injuries. The emissions data would
certainly have been crucial courtroom
ammunition for the plaintiffs, according to the scientist Kathleen M. Thiessen, an expert on risk
analysis and on the health effects of
hydrogen fluoride" She notes that the amount of fluoride spilled over
the orchards and farms in 1944 from the
Chamber Works — at least 30,000 pounds
monthly — is consistent with the injuries reported within a ten-kilometer radius around the DuPont plant.
The air concentrations could easily have
been high enough to cause vegetation damage, and if they are high enough to cause vegetation damage
they are high enough to cause damage to
livestock eating that pasture," the scientist estimated. Could the fluoride have hurt the local
citizens too? It is going to depend on
where they lived and how much of that local
produce [they ate], Thiessen explained. The reports of high blood
fluoride levels in local citizens, and
of badly contaminated local produce, were
again consistent with human fluoride injury, she added. Denied the government data, the farmers
settled their lawsuit, and their case
has long since been forgotten. But the Garden State peach growers unknowingly left their imprint on
history. Their complaints of sickness
reverberated through the corridors of power in Washington and triggered Harold Hodge's intensive secret
bomb-program research on the health
effects of fluoride. "Because of
complaints that animals and humans have been injured by hydrogen fluoride fumes in [the New
Jersey] area," reads a 1945 memo to
General Groves from a deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Cooper B. Rhodes, although there are no pending suits involving
such claims, the University of Rochester
is conducting experiments to determine the toxic effect of fluoride." 50 6
How the Manhattan Project Sold Us
Fluoride
No comments:
Post a Comment