Private Attorney
General Cracks
Title 28 of the
United States Code
by
Paul Andrew Mitchell,
B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law,
Federal Witness
and Private Attorney
General
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE November 26, 2001 A.D.
Sacramento. Paul
Andrew Mitchell, the Private Attorney General at the Supreme Law Firm and
Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library on the
Internet, today announced major developments in his ongoing project to decode Title 28 –- the set of
American laws that govern the federal court system.
In a brief but
direct application of this knowledge, written for a trainee in federal
litigation, Mitchell demonstrated how the federal courts lacked original
jurisdiction in the anti-trust case
against the Microsoft Corporation.
That case was
allegedly brought by the “United States of America” (or “USA”), but attorneys
for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have no powers of attorney to
represent the “USA”, as such. Willful
misrepresentation is a violation of the McDade Act at 28 U.S.C. 530B,
which requires DOJ attorneys to obey State Bar disciplinary guidelines:
The federal government recently reversed its policy
in the case against the Microsoft Corporation, and is now pushing equitable
settlements across the board.
The term “USA” is mentioned only once in Title 28 –-
at section 1746 –-
and there it is clearly distinguished from the “United States” –- the
proper legal term that is used for the federal government throughout Title 28:
Mitchell’s
findings have consequences that reach far beyond the anti-trust case against
Microsoft. It is now painfully apparent
that DOJ are pretending to represent the “USA” in all civil and criminal
cases, intentionally to avoid exercising the judicial power of the
United States.
Under Article III in the U.S.
Constitution, this power must be exercised in constitutional courts that
guarantee cherished fundamental Rights, like the Right to due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Article III courts must be
convened to hear Controversies to which the United States is a Party (singular).
To make matters
worse, the U.S. Supreme Court has also erred by ruling that the term “Party” as
used in Article III means “Plaintiff” but not “Defendant”. See Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. 553 (1933). In Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, the term “Party”
embraces both plaintiffs and defendants.
By substituting
the “USA” as Plaintiffs (plural), DOJ have perpetrated a fraud by switching to legislative
courts where fundamental Rights are not guarantees, but merely privileges
granted (or denied) at the discretion of arbitrary judges, sitting on
legislative tribunals. Mitchell
describes these courts as operating in legislative mode as opposed to
constitutional mode.
Glaring proof of
this fraud can be seen at section 132 of Title
28. In this section, Congress attempted
to broadcast into all 50 States a territorial tribunal –- the United
States District Court (“USDC”).
Congress did this under another pretense, namely, that those States
could be treated as if they were all federal Territories:
More than a century ago,
the U.S. Supreme Court invented a false doctrine by which the U.S. Constitution
did not extend into U.S. Territories and Possessions. Mitchell later refuted this doctrine, after discovering two Acts
of Congress that expressly extended the U.S. Constitution into the District of
Columbia in 1871 A.D., and then into all federal Territories in 1873 A.D. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; and 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891,
respectively.
In the year 1992
A.D., Paul Mitchell authored a popular classic book entitled The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal
Revenue. The Federal Zone is
now in its eleventh edition.
In that book, he
proved that federal municipal law governs U.S. Territories like Puerto Rico,
Guam and the Virgin Islands, but federal municipal law does not extend
into any of the 50 States of the Union.
The income tax statutes in the Internal Revenue Code are
federal municipal law.
Because they are
not yet States of the Union, Congress is the state legislature for all
Territories, Possessions, and Enclaves like military bases –- an area now
collectively called the federal zone.
In the year 1995 A.D., Justice Kennedy used the term “federal zone” as a household word
in his concurring opinion in U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
Section 132 of
Title 28 is even more deceptive for creating the false notion that the
Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”)
was abolished, but nothing could be further from the truth. A careful reading of section 132 reveals
that the DCUS is not even mentioned in that statute.
The DCUS was never
expressly abolished by any Act of Congress, and it is still mentioned in
numerous other places throughout Title 28. Congress knows how to abolish a court when it wants to do
so. The Ninth Circuit has also ruled
that repeals by implication are not favored.
Thus, for the DCUS to be abolished, a clear Act of Congress would be
required to effect that result. Whatever
Congress creates, Congress must destroy.
Another stunning
application of this knowledge came recently, when a federal criminal defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit
to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC. An interlocutory order is one that occurs before
final judgment is reached at sentencing after a jury verdict.
In response to
Mitchell’s pleadings, the Ninth Circuit cited a case which ruled that final
judgment in a criminal case means the sentence. That citation was U.S. v. Powell, 24
F.3d. 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1994).
Then, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction.
Under Mitchell’s
expert guidance, the defendant proved that the Ninth Circuit has no
appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the legislative
USDC. However, the Ninth Circuit does
have appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the constitutional
DCUS. The proof is found at 28 U.S.C.
1292(a)(1):
Mitchell then persuaded
the defendant to request a published opinion holding that statutes granting appellate
jurisdiction must be strictly construed also.
It is already well decided that statutes granting original
jurisdiction must be strictly construed.
Such a holding is a logical extension of existing federal case law.
Clearly, these findings expose the USDC in all 50
States as a summary tribunal that compels criminal defendants to endure
lengthy trials, conviction and sentencing before any U.S. Court of
Appeals can take jurisdiction under the Final Judgments Act at 28 U.S.C. 1291:
In closely related
developments, the main culprit has now been identified as the Act of June 25,
1948, in which Congress radically re-organized the entire federal court
system. This is the Act of Congress
that broadcasted the USDC from the federal Territories into all 50 States of
the Union. This Act has now been
formally challenged for being deliberately vague, and therefore
unconstitutional.
By attempting to
re-define the DCUS retroactively, this Act also violates the ex post facto prohibition at
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3,
in the U.S. Constitution. This
prohibition strictly bars Congress from enacting laws that have any retroactive
effect. Without a clear amending
statute, Congress cannot later re-define the term “District Court of the United
States” in statutes that predate June 25, 1948 A.D.
For example, the
Sherman Antitrust Act was first enacted in the year 1890 A.D., and that
Act granted original jurisdiction to the DCUS.
Subsequently, the Act of June 25, 1948, did not change or otherwise
amend that grant of original jurisdiction to the DCUS. Therefore, cases enforcing the Sherman
Antitrust Act must be brought by the “United States” (not the
“USA”) in an Article III federal court proceeding in constitutional
mode. Identical results obtain from
many other federal laws, like the Securities and Exchange Acts.
Other sections of Title 28 have already been
challenged properly in court for violating the U.S. Constitution. In 1996 A.D., in the case of a
subpoena issued by a federal grand jury,
Mitchell was allowed to prove that the
federal Jury Selection and Service Act is also unconstitutional. That Act expressly discriminates against
Citizens of the 50 States –- the only class of Citizens contemplated
when Article III was being drafted, circa 1787 A.D. For definitive authority on this crucial
point, see Pannill v. Roanoke,
252 F. 910, 914.
There are now
two (2) classes of citizens under American laws that have never been repealed ‑‑
State Citizens and federal citizens ‑‑ but only State Citizens are
qualified to be federal lawmakers. See
the Qualifications Clauses in
the U.S. Constitution; the “United
States” in those provisions means “States united”.
Moreover, those
Citizens who are qualified to make federal laws cannot vote or serve on
any juries, State or federal. And,
those who can vote and serve on juries are not qualified to make
federal laws.
This seriously twisted situation is due, in part, to
the Act of June 25, 1948, and related Congressional efforts to foist a legislative
democracy upon all 50 States. These
efforts violate the Guarantee
Clause in the U.S. Constitution.
The federal government is required by that Clause to guarantee a
Republican Form of Government to the 50 States of the Union.
Paul Andrew
Mitchell can be reached at email address:
He is currently
available for speaking engagements on this, and related topics in American
constitutional law, the focus of his extensive judicial activism.
# # #
Perhaps you would like to feature this on your blog(s)
ReplyDeleteBlowing Whistles At Hurricanes
http://tekgnosis.typepad.com/tekgnosis/2014/05/blowing-whistles-at-hurricanes-from-44202086-modeleski-mitchell-paul-unit-set-d-c-given-name-also-a-.html