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Fluoride is a poison. Fluoride was poison yesterday. Fluoride is poison today. Fluoride will be poison tomorrow. When in doubt, get it out.


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Thursday, May 25, 2017

Ch. 5. General Groves's Solution: the fluoride deception by Christopher Bryson from archive.org


Ch. 5. General Groves's Solution: the fluoride deception by Christopher Bryson from archive.org
General Groves's Solution   Dr. Harold Hodge and   the University of Rochester     The Manhattan Project had seen the danger from fluoride early. Before the  war private industry had contained the legal dangers from factory  pollution by forming the Air Hygiene Foundation at the Mellon Institute.  Also fearing lawsuits, in 1943 General Groves established the Manhattan  Projects Medical Section at the University of Rochester to strengthen the  governments interests, placing Dr. Harold C. Hodge in charge of a secret  unit studying fluoride and the other chemicals being used to make the  atomic bomb.   FROM His CORNER office window in the medical school at Strong Memorial  Hospital that
summer of 1943 Dr. Harold Hodge could see construction  workers placing the finishing touches on a half million-dollar building at  the University of Rochester known as the Manhattan Annex.' The heavily  guarded structure, funded by the U.S. Army, would be home to the  Manhattan Project's Medical Section. Orders had been placed for hundreds  of experimental animals: Puerto Rican monkeys, dogs, mice, rabbits, and  guinea pigs.' And an umbilical cord-like tunnel linking the military annex  with the university hospital was urgently being readied. https://www.blogger.com/null

  As the new Annex foundations were put down, so too was the keystone  laid for the postwar practice of toxicology in the United States — and for the  future career of the thirty-nine-year-old bioc hemist, Dr. Harold Hodge.  The Annex would soon house the largest     66     CHAPTER FIVE     medical laboratory in the nation, with a staff of several hundred scientists  testing the toxicity of the chemicals being used to build the atomic bomb.   Military pilots flew the exotic new compounds directly from the bomb  factories to Hodges team at Rochester. "Harold would actually meet the  pilots under [cover of] dark to get the material to test, said toxicologist  Judith MacGregor, who befriended Hodge at Rochester, where she was a  graduate student in the 1960s, and who was mesmerized by her mentors  tales. It was unbelievable.   That spring of 1943, Hodge had been placed in charge of the bomb  programs Division of Pharmacology and Toxicology and given control of  a secret biomedical research unit known as Program F to study fluoride  toxicity.' The Manhattan Project had a whole section working on uranium  and a whole section working on fluoride, explained Jack Hein, who  worked with Hodge at Rochester during the early cold war as a young  graduate student and remembers the scale of the fluoride studies. The  toxicology studies were very comprehensive. They were looking for toxic  effects on the bone, the blood, and the nervous system. . . . Without the  Manhattan Project and the atomic bomb, we wouldnt know anywhere near  as much as we do about the physiological effects of fluoride, Hein added . 4  His research suddenly blossomed into an immense program, noted Paul  Morrow, a uranium expert who also joined Hodge at Rochester in 1947 and  who worked on some of the earliest experiments.   Hodge's war work germinated into a career as the nation's leading  expert on fluoride. Over more than half a century the tall, black-haired  researcher published several books and some three hundred scientific  papers. He was chairman of the National Research Councils Committee on  Toxicology and first president of the Society of Toxicology. And a  generation of Hodges Rochester colleagues and students — men such as  Herbert Stokinger, Paul Morrow, and Helmuth Schrenk — went on to  occupy leading positions in government agencies and universities after the  war.' He was unarguably the dean of American toxicology, stated a  former colleague and Rochester alumni, Ernest Newbrun, now a professor  emeritus at the University of California at San Francisco."   To several generations of colleagues, the soft-spoken scientist with the  slicked-back hair was a gentleman scholar and tutor, advising     GENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION     67     them to play it straight, and regularly, in his early seventies, trounc  ing graduate students at squash.' But Harold Hodge — grandfather,  soft-spoken friend, and dean of American toxicology — shouldered  dark secrets for much of his professional life.   That summer of 1943, as Dr. Hodge stood at his office window, he  confronted a terrible dilemma. Speed was essential in beating the  Germans to full-scale production of the atomic bomb.' The fate of tens  of thousands of American workers lay in his hands. His laboratory's  evaluation of the toxicity of chemicals needed for the bomb, such as  fluorine, beryllium, and trichloroethylene, would fix work conditions  for the women and men inside the Manhattan Projects bomb factories,  help determine how quickly the plants could achieve full  production — and whether employers would be successfully sued for  damages if those workers claimed injury from chemical exposure.'  The questions were many and the answers few, wrote Hodge. There  was no time to wait for months, or even weeks, while the accepted  laboratory tests established the toxico-logical facts. Production had to  proceed with no delays." 10   People working in the atomic energy production plants were going  to be chronically exposed, said Jack Hein. We didnt know too much  about the toxicity of fluoride, other than the early studies saying a little  too much in the water causes damage to teeth, he added."   General Leslie Groves understood the dangers of such pell-mell  production. He feared that personal injury lawsuits would be an  Achilles heel for the entire nuclear program. Leading insurers, such as  Aetna and Travelers, were providing health coverage for workers in the  new bomb factories. 12 Successful claims for fluoride injury or for  neighborhood pollution might hemorrhage compensation payments,  create a public-relations disaster, risk jeopardizing the embryonic  nuclear industry — and threaten the United States' unprecedented new  military power. 13   The army moved quickly to protect itself. Its first weapon was  secrecy. The second weapon was seizing control of basic science. In  particular the crucial toxicity studies on bomb program chemicals  performed at the University of Rochester were sculpted and shaped  to defend the Manhattan Project from lawsuits.' Those marching  orders — conscripting science and law for military service — were  drummed home in a July 30, 1945, memorandum titled Purpose     68     CHAPTER FIVE     and Limitations of the Biological and Health Physics Research Pro -gram,  written by the head of the Medical Section, Colonel Stafford Warren.  According to Warren, The Manhattan District, as a unit of the U.S. Army ...  has been given a directive to conduct certain operations which will be  useful in winning the war. As such, medico-legal aspects were accorded  a clear priority for scientists, he added, including the necessary biological  research to strengthen the Governments interests. 15   Scientists soon delivered courtroom ammunition. "Much of the data  already collected is proving valuable from a medical legal point of view,"  noted a February 1946 memo to General Groves's deputy, Brigadier  General K. C. Nichols. "It is anticipated that further research will also serve  in this manner," the memo added. 16   Colonel Warren had chosen his top fluoride expert carefully. The son of  an Illinois schoolteacher, Harold Hodge was a biochemist whose specialty  was the study of bones and teeth. He had arrived at the University of  Rochester in 1931, where he was one of an elite cadre of men selected by  the Rockefeller Foundation as dental research fellows. The Rockefeller  Foundation was then funding basic research at selected dental schools in a  bid to lift the standards of dental care in the United States. Hodge was also  a pharmacologist and toxicologist who by 1937 had forged close links with  corporate America.' By the summer of 1943 some of those corporations  and institutions were taking a lead role in developing America's first  nuclear weapon. Eastman Kodak, a Rochester company where Hodge had  investigated chemical poisoning before the war, was now a leading  industrial contractor at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 16 Rockefeller interests were  also using fluoride to refine uranium at an undisclosed site in New Jersey  and funding their own biomedical research at the University of  Rochester.""   Harold Hodge's role as gatekeeper at the wartime crossroads of law and  medical science was spelled out in a 1944 letter introducing the Rochester  scientist to the DuPont company. The letter, stamped confidential, again  lays out a fundamental scientific bias in the Manhattan Districts medical  program — a bias against workers and communities, and in favor of  corporate legal interests.   The Medical Section has been charged with the responsibility of  obtaining toxicological data which will insure the Districts being     GENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION     69     in a favorable position in case litigation develops from exposure to  the materials, Colonel Stafford Warren told Dr. John Foulger of  DuPonts Haskell Laboratory in a letter dated August 12, 1944.  Harold Hodge was to insure that information about the toxicity of  certain fluoride compounds was coordinated between the  government and its contractors, Warren explained. It would be  desirable, he told Foulger, to have the work on the toxicity of  fluorocarbons being done in your laboratory parallel the  investigations being made on similar compounds elsewhere. For that  reason it would be appreciated if Dr. Harold Hodge of the University  of Rochester could visit your laboratory in the near future and an  exchange of ideas be effected." 20   Harold Hodge, Devil's Island,  and the Peach Crop Cases 21   Harold Hodge s diligence in defending the war industry can be seen  in a 1946 court challenge from farmers living near a DuPont fluoride  plant in New Jersey. Although not mentioned in any history of the  Manhattan Project, the lawsuits were regarded by the military as the  most serious legal threat to the U.S. nuclear program, requiring the  direct intervention of General Leslie Groves. A closing chapter in the  Manhattan Project, the aggressive use of secrecy, science, and public  relations by Groves and Hodge, and at least a half dozen federal  agencies battling the farmers, is an opening scene in the story of how  fluoride was handled by our government following World War II.   The gently rolling alluvial soil along the shore of the Delaware  estuary in Southern New Jersey is some of the most bountiful farm-  land in the United States. Its historic harvest of fruit and vegetables  won New Jersey the accolade of The Garden State. The orchards  downwind of the DuPont plant in Gloucester and Salem counties  were especially famous for their high-quality produce; their  peaches went directly to the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York.  Campbell's Soup bought up their tomatoes. But in the summer of  1943 the farmers began to report that their orchards were blighted  and that "something is burning up the peach crops around here."   Poultry died after an all-night thunderstorm, they reported. Fields  were sometimes strewn with dead cattle, residents recalled, while     70     CHAPTER FIVE     workers who ate the produce they had picked vomited all night and into the  next day. I remember our horses looked sick and were too stiff to work,  Mildred Giordano, who was a teenager at the time, told reporter Joel  Griffiths. Some cows were so crippled that they could not stand up, and  grazed by crawling on their bellies. The injuries were confirmed in taped  interviews, shortly before he died, with the chemical consultant Philip  Sadtler of Sadtler Laboratories in Philadelphia. On behalf of the farmers'  crusading attorney, Counselor William C. Gotshalk of Camden, New  Jersey, Sadtler had measured blood fluoride levels in laborers as high as  310 parts per million. (Blood fluoride is normally well below i part per mil-  lion. These levels are potentially lethal doses) 22   Some of the farm workers were pretty weak, Sadtler noted. The New  Jersey farmers organized a Fluorine Committee. They patriotically waited  until the war was over, then sued DuPont and the Manhattan Project for  fluoride damage. Thirteen claimants asked for a total of $430,000 in  compensation.   Little wonder the farmers reported health problems. Conditions on the  other side of the DuPont fence were extraordinarily dangerous. More than a  thousand women and men were employed on Manhattan Project contracts  at the Chamber Works during the war, secretly manufacturing elemental  fluorine, uranium hexafluoride, and several exotic new fluorocarbons. 23  Chemical exposures were frequent, making the DuPont employees perhaps  the most endangered and fearful of the wartime fluoride workers. By the  end of January 1944 at least two DuPont laboratory workers had been  killed and several scientists injured. Work conditions at the secret  fluoride-producing East and Blue Areas of the Chamber Works were  especially dreadful, with "gross violations of safety," inspectors noted. 24   One unit was especially notorious, the government reported. "The plant  frequently caught on fire, and the activators often burned out so the  employees were frequently exposed to rather large amounts of fluorine  compounds," Captain Mears of the Manhattan Project noted in October  1945. "Medical hazards were attributed to fluorine in a gaseous state, silver  fluorides in a powdered state and liquid  2144 [code for fluorocarbon]. 25   Injured workers paraded into the DuPont hospital. Doctors often  reported "a fibrotic condition of both lungs" on X-rays; serious     GENERAL GROVESS SOLUTION     71     chemical burns were seen very frequently. The mounting injury  toll was blamed on fluoride. 20 In February 1945 doctors at the East and  Blue Areas reported seventy-nine sub-par or so-called chronic cases.  Sixteen of those workers had their condition detected in the last two  months."   A Manhattan Project medical investigator, Captain Richard C.  Bernstein, warned his boss, Colonel Warren, that workers now feared  assignment to the DuPont fluoride processing areas as "an exile to  Devil's Island." 28 Another report warned of brewing labor unrest. "Fear  of the physical consequences was becoming prevalent in the Areas,  wrote Manhattan Project investigator First Lieutenant Birchard M.  Brundage in February 1945. "This fear was being used by certain  agitators to cause trouble in the personnel," he added.   29   The farmers lawsuits electrified the Manhattan Project. There had  been no disclosure of the diabolical work conditions at DuPont. Now, a  public lawsuit pointed a finger directly at the Chamber Works and  fluoride. A once secret November 1945 memo measures the  government's concern: "The most serious claim to neighboring  properties of any operations of the [Manhattan Engineering] District is  the litigation known as the "peach crop cases.' These are cases claiming  damages to the fruit crop and to the peach trees themselves in and  around the operation of the Chambers Works of the DuPont Company  at Kearney, New Jersey. This damage is alleg edly caused by the  release into the atmosphere, both unintentional and necessary as a  result of the process [sic] of hydrogen fluoride. The claims against the  District approximate $430,000. Part of the loss would be due to the  private contractor and part to the operation of the contractor on behalf  of the District." 30   The military sprang into action. Dr. Hodge was dispatched to New  Jersey to marshal the medical response to the farmers' rebellion.  Although DuPont's smokestack fluoride had long been spilled into the  environment and a great volume of new fluoride compounds were  being made inside the wartime plant, he quickly reported back to  Colonel Stafford Warren at Oak Ridge that the mottled teeth seen in the  school near the DuPont plant could be attributed to natural fluoride in  the ground water. 31 Such natural fluoride in the water supply meant  that the dental markings could not be used as unequivocal proof of  industrial poisoning. The situation was     72     CHAPTER FIVE     complicated by the existence of mottled enamel as a result of fluoride in the  drinking water, Hodge told Warren.   Dr. Hodge had an idea for calming the citizen panic. His prescrip tion  gives an early meaning to the term spin doctor — and provides a clue that  the promotion by the U.S. government of a role for fluoride in tooth health  has a powerful national-security appeal. Would there be any use in making  attempts to counteract the local fear of fluoride on the part of residents of  Salem and Gloucester counties through lectures on F toxicology and  perhaps the usefulness of F in tooth health? Hodge inquired of Colonel  Warren. 32 Such lectures, of course, were indeed given, not only to New  Jersey citizens, but to the rest of the nation throughout the cold war.   A good cop-bad cop assault was launched against the farmers. Almost  immediately their spokesperson, Willard B. Kille, a market gardener,  received an extraordinary invitation: to dine with none other than General  Leslie R. Groves, then known as the man who built the atomic bomb, at  his office at the War Department on March 26, 1946. 33 Although Kille had  been diagnosed with fluoride poisoning by his doctor, he departed the  luncheon convinced of the governments good faith. The next day he wrote  to thank the general, wishing the other farmers could have been present, he  said, so they too could come away with the feeling that their interests in  this particular matter were being safeguarded by men of the very highest  type whose integrity they could not question."   Behind closed doors however, General Groves had mobilized the full  resources of the federal government and the Manhattan Project to defeat  Kille s farmers and their Fluorine Committee. The documentary trail  detailing the government's battle against the farmers begins with a March 1,  1946, memo to top Manhattan Project doctor Colonel Stafford Warren,  outlining the medical problem in New Jersey. There seem to be four  distinct (though related) problems, Colonel Warren was told.   1. A question of injury of the peach crop in 1944.   2. A report of extraordinary fluoride content of veg-   etables grown in this area.   3. A report of abnormally high fluoride content in the   blood of human individuals residing in this area.     GENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION     73     4. A report raising the question of serious poisoning of  horses and cattle in this area.   Under the personal direction of General Groves, secret meetings  were convened in Washington, with compulsory attendance by scores  of scientists and officials from the U.S. War Department, the  Manhattan Project, the Food and Drug Administration, the Agriculture  and Justice departments, the U.S. Armys Chemical Warfare Service  and Edgewood Arsenal, the Bureau of Standards, and DuPont  lawyers.'' These agencies are making scientific investigations to  obtain evidence which may be used to protect the interest of the  Government at the trial of the suits brought by owners of peach  orchards in . . . New Jersey," stated Lieutenant Colonel Cooper B.  Rhodes of the Manhattan Project in a memo dated August 27, 1945,  and cc'd to General Groves.' The memo stated:   SUBJECT: Investigation of Crop Damage at Lower Penns   Neck, New Jersey T o : The Commanding General,  Army Service Forces,   Pentagon Building, Washington D.C. At the request  of the Secretary of War the Department of Agriculture  has agreed to cooperate in investigating complaints of  crop damage attributed ... to fumes from a plant operated  in connection with the Manhattan Project.   Signed L. R. Groves, Major General U.S.A. 36   "The Department of Justice is cooperating in the defense of these  suits," General Groves subsequently wrote in a February 28, 1946,  memo to the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Special Committee on  Atomic Energy. 37   General Groves, of course, was one of the most powerful men in  postwar Washington, and the full resources of the military-industrial  state were now turned upon the New Jersey farmers. The farmers'  expert witness, scientist Philip Sadder, was singled out by the  military. A handwritten note in General Groves's files in the National  Archives demands to know: Col. Rhodes, Who is Sadtler ? 38     74     CHAPTER FIVE     Groves learned that the Sadtler family name was one of the most  distinguished and respected in American chemistry. The firm of Samuel P.  Sadtler and Son was established in 1891 and routinely consulted for top  industrial corporations, including Coca-Cola and John D. Rockefeller.' '  Philip Sadtler s grandfather, Samuel P. Sadtler, had been a founding  member of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, while his father,  Samuel S. Sadtler, was one of the first editors of the venerable science  publication Chemical Abstracts. (Today Philip Sadtler s Standard Spectra  are a diagnostic tool used in laboratories around the world.)   But back then, in New Jersey, counterespionage agents followed him  and accused him of "dealing with the enemy," stated Sadtler. 40 He recalled  one confrontation with two U.S. Army captains that ended in a South  Jersey orchard when Gotshalk, the farmers lawyer, asked the military  officials, Since when are the farmers of the United States the enemy?   Why was there such a national-security emergency over a few lawsuits  by New Jersey farmers? In 1946 the United States had begun full-scale  production of atomic bombs. No other nation had yet tested a nuclear  weapon, and the A-bomb was seen as crucial for U.S. leadership of the  postwar world. The New Jersey fluoride law -suits were a serious  roadblock to that strategy. In the case of fluoride, If the farmers won, it  would open the door to further suits, which might impede the bomb  programs ability to use fluoride, remarked Jacqueline Kittrell, a  Tennessee public-interest lawyer specializing in nuclear cases, who  examined the declassified fluoride documents. (Kittrell has  represented plaintiffs in several human radiation experiment cases.) She  added, The reports of human injury were especially threatening, because  of the potential for enormous settlements — not to mention  the PR problem. " 41   Indeed, DuPont was particularly concerned about the possible  psychologic reaction to the New Jersey pollution incident, according to a  secret 1946 Manhattan Project memo. Facing a threat from the Food and  Drug Administration (FDA) to embargo the regions produce because of  "high fluoride content," DuPont dispatched its lawyers to the FDA offices  in Washington, where an agitated meet ing ensued. According to a memo  sent the following day to General Groves, DuPont s lawyer argued that in  view of the pending suits     GENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION     75     any action by the Food and Drag Administration . . . would have a  serious effect on the DuPont Company and would create a bad public  relations situation."   After the meeting adjourned, Manhattan Project Captain John Davies  approached the FDA s Food Division chief and impressed upon Dr. White  the substantial interest which the Government had in claims which might  arise as a result of action which might be taken by the Food and Drug  Administration. 42 There was no embargo. Instead, new tests for fluoride in  the New Jersey area would be conducted — not by the Department of  Agriculture but by the Chemical Warfare Service — because work done by  the Chemical Warfare Service would carry the greatest weight as evidence  if .. . lawsuits are started by the complainants. The memo was signed by  General Groves. 43   The farmers kept fighting. On February 2, 1946, Willard Kille wrote to  the influential Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman of the Special  Committee on Atomic Energy, on behalf of the Fluorine Committee,  telling him about the peach trees and poisoning. General Groves quickly  interceded, informing the Senator, I do not believe it would be of any  value to your committee to have Mr. Kille appear before it. Groves assured  Senator McMahon that I am keeping in close personal touch with the  matter from day to day in order that I may be personally certain that while  the government's interests are protected no advantage is taken of any  injured farmer. 44   The New Jersey farmers were ultimately pacified with token financial  settlements, according to interviews with descendants still living the area. 45  Joseph Clemente says that his father told him the family had been "paid  off" by DuPont after the cattle died suddenly during the war. The Clemente  farm lay just across the road from the Chamber Works. His grandfather had  been a wartime manager inside the Chamber Works and his family owned a  construction firm that had helped to build the plant; accordingly, his father  accepted DuPont s cash settlement. It wouldnt have been very good if my  family had caused a lot of stink about the episode, Clemente said.   All we knew is that DuPont released some chemical that burned up  all the peach trees around here, a second resident, Angelo     76     CHAPTER FIVE     Giordano, whose father James was one of the original plaintiffs, told the  medical writer Joel Griffiths, who visited the orchard country in 1997.  The trees were no good after that, so we had to give up on  the peaches.   Their horses and cows also acted sick and walked stiffly, recalled his  sister Mildred. "Could any of that have been the fluoride?" she asked.  According to veterinary toxicologists, various symptoms she went on to  detail are cardinal signs of fluoride toxicity. The Giordano family has been  plagued by bone and joint problems, too, Mildred added. Recalling the  settlement received by the Giordano family, Angelo told Griffiths that "my  father said he got about $200.   The New Jersey farmers were blocked in their legal challenge by the  government's refusal to reveal the key piece of information that would  have settled the case — the amount of fluoride DuPont had vented into the  atmosphere during the war. "Disclosure ... would be injurious to the  military security of the United States, wrote Manhattan Project Major C.  A. Taney Jr."   Gotshalk, the farmers' attorney, was outraged at the stonewalling. He  called it a callous disregard for the rights of people and accused the  Manhattan Project of using the sovereign power of the government to  escape the consequences of what undoubtedly  was done." 47   Gotshalk was right. A once-secret memorandum sent to General  Groves in Washington — which Gotshalk and the farmers never  saw — reveals that the wartime DuPont plant was belching out mass  quantities of hydrogen fluoride: at least 30,000 pounds, and perhaps as  much as 165,000 pounds, was expelled over the adjacent farmland each  month. 48   The scale of the pollution was explained to General Groves. DuPont  was then producing 1,500,000 pounds of HF each month for its  commercial Freon-producing [Kinetics] plant, according to his deputy  Major C. A. Taney. "Assuming that the losses were only 1 percent at  Kinetics, the amount vented to the atmosphere would be about equal to the  average loss from the Government facilities at the Chamber Works during  the worst months of 1944," Major Taney wrote. But the pollution might be  much worse, he added, in which case the lion's share of the blame would  be attributable to DuPont's commercial operations. "If the losses at  Kinetics ran as     rGENERAL GROVES S SOLUTION     77     high as 10 percent, which is possible, the fumes produced at the  Chamber Works would obviously be caused to the greatest extent by  DuPonts own operations and not by the Government facilities, the memo  stated.   The memo to Groves is probably the smoking gun tying DuPont to the  reported injuries. The emissions data would certainly have been crucial  courtroom ammunition for the plaintiffs, according to the scientist  Kathleen M. Thiessen, an expert on risk analysis and on the health effects  of hydrogen fluoride" She notes that the amount of fluoride spilled over the  orchards and farms in 1944 from the Chamber Works — at least 30,000  pounds monthly — is consistent with the injuries reported within a  ten-kilometer radius around the DuPont plant. The air concentrations  could easily have been high enough to cause vegetation damage, and if they  are high enough to cause vegetation damage they are high enough to cause  damage to livestock eating that pasture," the scientist estimated.   Could the fluoride have hurt the local citizens too?   It is going to depend on where they lived and how much of that local  produce [they ate], Thiessen explained. The reports of high blood fluoride  levels in local citizens, and of badly contaminated local produce, were  again consistent with human fluoride injury, she added.   Denied the government data, the farmers settled their lawsuit, and  their case has long since been forgotten. But the Garden State peach  growers unknowingly left their imprint on history. Their complaints of  sickness reverberated through the corridors of power in Washington and  triggered Harold Hodge's intensive secret bomb-program research on the  health effects of fluoride.   "Because of complaints that animals and humans have been injured  by hydrogen fluoride fumes in [the New Jersey] area," reads a 1945 memo  to General Groves from a deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Cooper B. Rhodes,  although there are no pending suits involving such claims, the University  of Rochester is conducting experiments to determine the toxic effect of  fluoride." 50     6     How the Manhattan  Project Sold Us Fluoride 

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