General Electric Funded Hitler From Nhan Myrick from Rense.com
General Electric Funded Hitler
From Nhan Myrick
Among the early Roosevelt fascist measures was the National
Industry Recovery Act (NRA) of June 16, 1933. The origins of this scheme
are worth repeating. These ideas were first suggested by Gerard Swope of
the General Electric Company ... following this they were adopted by the
United States Chamber of Commerce .... (Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of
Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941, New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1952, p. 420)
The multi-national giant General Electric has an unparalleled
role in twentieth-century history. The General Electric Company electrified
the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, and fulfilled for the Soviets
Lenin's dictum that "Socialism = electrification."1 The Swope
Plan, created by General Electric's one-time president Gerard Swope, became
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, by a process deplored by one-time President
Herbert Hoover and described in Wall Street and FDR.2 There was a long-lasting,
intimate relationship between Swope and Young of General Electric Company
and the Roosevelt family, as there was between General Electric and the
Soviet Union. In 1936 Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, an early Roosevelt
supporter, became aware of Roosevelt's betrayal of liberal ideas and attacked
the Roosevelt New Deal program as a "tyrannical" measure "leading
to despotism, [and] sought by its sponsors under the communistic cry of
'Social Justice.'" Senator Reed further charged on the floor of the
Senate that Franklin D. Roosevelt was a "hired man for the economic
royalists" in Wall Street and that the Roosevelt family "is one
of the largest stockholders in the General Electric Company."3
As we probe into behind-the-scenes German interwar history
and the story of Hitler and Naziism, we find both Owen D. Young and Gerard
Swope of General Electric tied to the rise of Hitlerism and the suppression
of German democracy. That General Electric directors are to be found in
each of these three distinct historical categories " i.e., the development
of the Soviet Union, the creation of Roosevelt's New Deal, and the rise
of Hitlerism " suggests how elements of Big Business are keenly interested
in the socialization of the world, for their own purposes and objectives,
rather than the maintenance of the impartial market place in a free society.4
General Electric profited handsomely from Bolshevism, from Roosevelt's
New Deal socialism, and, as we shall see below, from national socialism
in Hitler's Germany.
General Electric in Weimar Germany Walter Rathenau was,
until his assassination in 1922, managing director of Allgemeine Elekrizitats
Gesellschaft (A.E.G,), or German General Electric, and like Owen Young
and Gerard Swope, his counterparts in the U.S., he was a prominent advocate
of corporate socialism. Walter Rathenau spoke out publicly against competition
and free enterprise, Why? Because both Rathanau and Swope wanted the protection
and cooperation of the state for their own corporate objectives and profit.
(But not of course for anybody else's objectives and profits.) Rathanau
expressed their plea in The New Political Economy:
The new economy will, as we have seen, be no state or
governmental economy but a private economy committed to a civic power of
resolution which certainly will require state cooperation for organic consolidation
to overcome inner friction and increase production and endurance.5
When we disentangle the turgid Rathenau prose, this means
that the power of the State was to be made available to private firms for
their own corporate purposes, i.e., what is popularly known as national
socialism. Rathenau spoke out publicly against competition and free enterprise.
inheritance."6 Not their own wealth, so far as can be determined,
but the wealth of others who lacked political pull in the State apparatus.
Owen D. Young of General Electric was one of the three
U.S. delegates to the 1923 Dawes Plan meeting which established the German
reparations program. And in the Dawes and Young Plans we can see how some
private firms were able to benefit from the power of the State. The largest
single loans from Wall Street to Germany during the 1920s were reparations
loans; it was ultimately the U.S. investor who paid for German reparations.
The cartelization of the German electrical industry under A.E.G. (as well
as the steel and chemical industries discussed in Chapters One and Two)
was made possible with these Wall Street loans:
Date of Offering Borrower Managing Bank in the U.S.
Face Amount of Issue Jan. 26, 1925 Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft
(A. E, G.) National City Co. $10,000,000 Dec. 9, 1925 Allgemeine National
City Co. Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (A. E.G. ) 10,000,000 May 22, 1928
Allgemeine Elektrizitats- Gesellschaft (A.E.G.) National City Co. 10,000,000
June 7, 1928 Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (A. E.G.) National
City Co. 5,000,000
In 1928, at the Young Plan reparations meetings, we find
General Electric president Owen D. Young in the chair as the chief U.S.
delegate, appointed by the U.S. government to use U.S. government power
and prestige to decide international financial matters enhancing Wall Street
and General Electric profits. In 1930 Owen D. Young, after whom the Young
Plan for German reparations was named, became chairman of the Board of
General Electric Company in New York City. Young was also chairman of the
Executive Committee of Radio Corporation of America and a director of both
German General Electric (A.E.G.) and Osram in Germany. Young also served
on the boards of other major U.S. corporations, including General Motors,
NBC, and RKO; he was a councilor of the National Industrial Conference
Board, a director of the International Chamber of Commerce, and deputy
chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Gerard Swope was president and director of General Electric
Company as well as French and German associated companies, including A.E.G.
and Osram in Germany. Swope was also a director of RCA, NBC, and the National
City Bank of New York. Other directors of International General Electric
at this time reflect Morgan control of the company, and both Young and
Swope were generally known as the Morgan representatives on the G.E. board,
which included Thomas Cochran, another partner in the J.P. Morgan firm.
General Electric director Clark Haynes Minor was president of International
General Electric in the 1920s. Another director was Victor M. Cutter of
the First National Bank of Boston and a figure in the "Banana Revolutions"
in Central America.
In the late 1920s Young, Swope, and Minor of International
General Electric moved into the German electrical industry and gained,
if not control as some have reported, then at least a substantial say in
the internal affairs of both A.E.G. and Osram. In July 1929 an agreement
was reached between General Electric and three German firms " A.E.G.,
Siemens & Halske, and Koppel and Company " which between them
owned all the shares in Osram, the electric bulb manufacturer. General
Electric purchased 16% percent of Osram stock and reached a joint agreement
for international control of electric bulbs production and marketing. Clark
Minor and Gerard Swope became directors of Osram.7
In July 1929 great interest was shown in rumors circulating
in German financial circles that General Electric was also buying into
A.E.G. and that talks to this end were in progress between A.E.G. and G.E.8
In August it was confirmed that 14 million marks of common A.E.G. stock
were to be issued to General Electric. These shares, added to shares bought
on the open market, gave General Electric a 25-percent interest in A.E.G.
A closer working agreement was signed between the two companies, providing
the German company U.S. technology and patents. It was emphasized in the
news reports that A.E.G. would not have participation in G.E., but that
on the other hand G.E. would finance expansion of A.E.G. in Germany.9 The
German financial press also noted that there was no A.E.G. representation
on the board of G.E. in the United States but that five Americans were
now on the board of A.E.G. The Vossische Zeitung recorded,
The American electrical industry has conquered the worM,
and only a few of the remaining opposing bastions have been able to withstand
By 1930, unknown to the German financial press, General
Electric had similarly gained an effective technical monopoly of the Soviet
electrical industry and was soon to penetrate even the remaining bastions
in Germany, particularly the Siemens group. In January 1930 three G.E.
men were elected to the board of A.E.G. " Clark H. Minor, Gerard Swope,
and E. H. Baldwin " and International General Electric (I.G.E.) continued
its moves to merge the world electrical industry into a giant cartel under
Wall Street control.
In February General Electric focused on the remaining
German electrical giant, Siemens & Halske, and while able to obtain
a large block of debentures issued on behalf of the German firm by Dillon,
Read of New York, G.E. was not able to gain participation or directors
on the Siemens board. While the German press recognized even this limited
control as" an historical economic event of the first order and an
important step toward a future world electric trust,"11 Siemens retained
its independence from General Electric " and this independence is
important for our story. The New York Times reported,
The entire press emphasizes the fact that Siemens, contrary
to A.E.G., maintains its independence for the future and points out that
no General Electric representative will sit on Stemen's board of directors.12
There is no evidence that Siemens, either through Siemens
& Halske or Siemens-Schukert, participated directly in the financing
of Hitler. Siemens contributed to Hitler only slightly and indirectly through
a share participation in Osram. On the other hand, both A.E.G. and Osram
directly financed Hitler through the Nationale Treuhand in substantial
ways. Siemens retained its independence in the early 1930s while both A.E.G.
and Osram were under American dominance and with American directors. There
is no evidence that Siemens, without American directors, financed Hitler.
On the other hand, we have irrefutable documentary evidence (see page 56)
that both German General Electric and Osram, both with American directors,
In the months following the attempted Wall Street take
over of Siemens, the pattern of a developing world trust in the electrical
industry clarified; there was an end to international patent fights and
the G.E. interest in A.E.G. increased to nearly 30 percent.13
Consequently, in the early 1930s, as Hitler prepared
to grab dictatorial power in Germany " backed by some, but by no means
all, German and American industrialists " the German General Electric
(A.E.G.) was owned by International General Electric (about 30 percent),
the Gesellschaft für Electrische Unternemungen (25 percent), and Ludwig
Lowe (25 percent). International General Electric also had an interest
of about 16 2/3rds percent in Osram, and an additional indirect influence
Companies Linked to German General Electric through Common
Electric Directors: Directors of German General Electric (A.E.G.) Relationship
of Linked Firm with Financing of Hitler: Accumulatoran-Fabrik Quandt
Pfeffer Direct Finance, see p, 55 Osram Mamroth Peierls Direct Finance,
see p. 57 Deutschen Babcock-Wilcox Landau Not known Vereinigte Stahlwerke
Wolff Nathan Kirdorf Goldschmidt Direct Finance, see p. 57 Krupp Nathan
Klotzbach Direct Finance, see p. 59 I.G. Farben Bucher Flechtheim von
Rath Direct Finance, see p. 57 Allianz u. Stuttgarten Verein Phoenix
von Rath Wolff Fahrenhorst Reported, but not substantiated see p. 57 Thyssen
Fahrenhorst Direct Finance, see p. 104 Demag Fahrenhorst Flick see
p. 57 Dynamit Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks Flechtheim Kirdorf Flechtheim
Through I.G. Farben Direct Finance, see p. 57 International General Electric
Young Swope Minor Baldwin Through A.E.G., see p. 52 American I.G. Farben
von Rath Through I.G. Farben see p. 47 International Bank (Amsterdam)
H. Furstenberg Goldschmidt Not known
Osram through A.E.G. directors. On the board of A.E,G.,
apart from the four American directors (Young, Swope, Minor, and Baldwin),
we find Pferdmenges of Oppenheim & Co. (another Hitler financier),
and Quandt, who owned 75 percent of Accumlatoren-Fabrik, a major direct
financier of Hitler. In other words, among the German board members of
A.E.G. we find representatives from several of the German firms that financed
Hitler in the 1920s and 1930s.
General Electric and the Financing of Hitler The tap
root of modern corporate socialism runs deep into the management of two
affiliated multi-national corporations: General Electric Company in the
United States and its foreign associates, including German General Electric
(A.E.G.), and Osram in Germany. We have noted that Gerard Swope, second
president and chairman of General Electric, and Walter Rathanau of A.E.G.
promoted radical ideas for control of the State by private business interests.
From 1915 onwards International General Electric (I.G.E.),
located at 120 Broadway in New York City, acted as the foreign investment,
manufacturing, and selling organization for the General Electric Company.
I.G.E. held interests in overseas manufacturing companies including a 25
to 30-percent holding in German General Electric (A.E.G.), plus holdings
in Osram G.m.b.H. Kommanditgesellschaft, also in Berlin. These holdings
gave International General Electric four directors on the board of A.E.G.,
and another director at Osram, and significant influence in the internal
domestic policies of these German companies. The significance of this General
Electric ownership is that A.E.G. and Osram were prominent suppliers of
funds for Hitler in his rise to power in Germany in 1933. A bank transfer
slip dated March 2, 1933 from A.E.G. to Delbruck Schickler & Co. in
Berlin requests that 60,000 Reichsmark be deposited in the "Nationale
Treuhand" (National Trusteeship) account for Hitler's use. This slip
is reproduced on page 56.
I.G. Farben was the most important of the domestic financial
backers of Hitler, and (as noted elsewhere) I.G. Farben controlled American
I.G. Moreover, several directors of A.E.G. were also on the board of I.G.
Farben " i.e., Hermann Bucher, chairman of A.E.G. was on the I.G.
Farben board; so were A.E.G. directors Julius Flechtheim and Walter von
Rath. I.G. Farben contributed 30 percent of the 1933 Hitler National Trusteeship
(or takeover) fund.
Walter Fahrenhorst of A.E.G. was also on the board of
Phoenix A-G, Thyssen A-G and Demag A-G " and all were contributors
to Hitler's fund. Demag A-G contributed 50,000 RM to Hitler's fund and
had a director with A.E.G." the notorious Friedrich Flick, and early
Hitler supporter, who was later convicted at the Nuremberg Trials. Accumulatoren
Fabrik A-G was a Hitler contributor (25,000 RM, see page 60) with two directors
on the A.E.G. board, August Pfeffer and Gunther Quandt. Quandt personally
owned 75 percent of Accumulatoren Fabrik.
Osram Gesellschaft, in which International General Electric
had a 16 2/3rds direct interest, also had two directors on the A.E.G. board:
Paul Mamroth and Heinrich Pferls. Osram contributed 40,000 RM directly
to the Hitler fund. The Otto Wolff concern, Vereinigte Stahlwerke A-G,
recipient of substantial New York loans in the 1920s, had three directors
on the A.E.G. board: Otto Wolff, Henry Nathan and Jakob Goldschmidt. Alfred
Krupp yon Bohlen, sole owner of the Krupp organization and an early supporter
of Hitler, was a member of the Aufsichsrat of A.E.G. Robert Pferdmenges,
a member of Himmler's Circle of Friends, was also a director of A, E.G.
In other words, almost all of the German directors of
German General Electric were financial supporters of Hitler and associated
not only with A.E.G. but with other companies financing Hitler.
Walter Rathenau14 became a director of A,E.G. in 1899
and by the early twentieth century was a director of more than 100 corporations.
Rathenau was also author of the" Rathenau Plan," which bears
a remarkable resemblance to the "Swope Plan" " i.e., FDR's
New Deal but written by Swope of G.E. In other words, we have the extraordinay
coincidence that the authors of New Deal-tike plans in the U.S. and Germany
were also prime backers of their implementers: Hitler in Germany and Roosevelt
in the U.S.
Swope was chairman of the board of General Electric Company
and International General Electric. In 1932 the American directors of A.E.G,
were prominently connected with American banking and political circles
GERARD SWOPE Chairman of International General Electric
and president of General Electric Company, director of National City Bank
(and other companies), director of A.E.G. and Osram in Germany. Author
of FDR's New Deal and member of numerous Roosevelt organizations. Owen
D. Young Chairman of board of General Electric, and deputy chairman, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. Author, with J. P, Morgan, of the Young Plan
which superseded the Dawes Plan in 1929. (See Chapter One.) CLARK H. Minor
President and director of International General Electric, director of British
Thomson Houston, Compania Generale di Electtricita (Italy), and Japan Electric
Bond & Share Company (Japan).
In brief, we have hard evidence of unquestioned authenticity
(see p, 56) to show that German General Electric contributed substantial
sums to Hitler's political fund. There were four American directors of
A.E.G. (Baldwin, Swope, Minor, and Clark), which was 80 percent owned by
International General Electric. Further, I.G.E. and the four American directors
were the largest single interest and consequently had the greatest single
influence in A.E.G. actions and policies. Even further, almost all other
directors of A.E.G. were connected with firms (I. G. Farben, Accumulatoren
Fabrik, etc.) which contributed directly " as firms " to Hitler's
political fund. However, only the German directors of A.E.G were placed
on trial in Nuremburg in 1945.
Technical Cooperation with Krupp Quite apart from financial
assistance to Hitler, General Electric extended its assistance to cartel
schemes with other Hitler backers for their mutual benefit and the benefit
of the Nazi state. Cemented tungsten carbide is one example of this G.E.-Nazi
cooperation. Prior to November 1928, American industries had several sources
for both tungsten carbide and tools and dies containing this hard-metal
composition. Among these sources were the Krupp Company of Essen, Germany,
and two American firms to which Krupp was then shipping and selling, the
Union Wire Die Corporation and Thomas Prosser & Son. In 1928 Krupp
obligated itself to grant licenses under United States patents which it
owned to the Firth-Sterling Steel Company and to the Ludlum Steel Company.
Before 1928, this tungsten carbide for use in tools and dies sold in the
United states for about $50 a pound.
The United States patents which Krupp claimed to own
were assigned from Osram Kommanditgesellschaft, and had been previously
assigned by the Osram Company of Germany to General Electric. However,
General Electric had also developed its own patents, principally the Hoyt
and Gilson patents, covering competing processes for cemented tungsten
carbide. General Electric believed that it could utilize these patents
independently without infringing on or competing with Krupp patents. But
instead of using the G.E. patents independently in competition with Krupp,
or testing out its rights under the patent laws, General Electric worked
out a cartel agreement with Krupp to pool the patents of both parties and
to give General Electric a monopoly control of tungsten carbide in the
The first step in this cartel arrangement was taken by
Carboloy Company, Inc., a General Electric subsidiary, incorporated for
the purpose of exploiting tungsten carbide. The 1920s price of around $50
a pound was raised by Carboloy to $458 a pound. Obviously, no firm could
sell any great amounts of tungsten carbide in this price range, but the
price would maximize profits for G.E. In 1934 General Electric and Carboloy
were also able to obtain, by purchase, the license granted by Krupp to
the Ludlum Steel Company, thereby eliminating one competitor. In 1936,
Krupp was induced to refrain from further imports into the United States.
Part of the price paid for the elimination from the American market of
tungsten carbide manufactured abroad was a reciprocal undertaking that
General Electric and Carboloy would not export from the U.S. Thus these
American companies tied their own hands by contract, or permitted Krupp
to tie their hands, and denied foreign markets to American industry. Carboloy
Company then acquired the business of Thomas Prosser & Son, and in
1937, for nearly $1 million, Carboloy acquired the competing business of
the Union Wire Die Corporation. By refusing to sell, Krupp cooperated with
General Electric and Carboloy to persuade Union Wire Die Corporation to
Licenses to manufacture tungsten carbide were then refused.
A request for license by the Crucible Steel Company was refused in 1936.
A request by the Chrysler Corporation for a license was refused in 1938.
A license by the Triplett Electrical Instrument Company was refused on
April 25, 1940. A license was also refused to the General Cable Company.
The Ford Motor Company for several years expressed strong opposition to
the high-price policy followed by the Carboloy Company, and at one point
made a request for the right to manufacture for its own use. This was refused.
As a result of these tactics, General Electric and its subsidiary Carboloy
emerged in 1936 or 1937 with virtually a complete monopoly of tungsten
carbide in the United States.
In brief, General Electric " with the cooperation
of another Hitler supporter, Krupp " jointly obtained for G,E. a monopoly
in the U.S. for tungsten carbide. So when World War II began, General Electric
had a monopoly at an established price of $450 a pound " almost ten
times more than the 1928 price " and use in the U.S. had been correspondingly
A.E.G. Avoids the Bombs in World War II By 1939 the German
electrical industry had become closely affiliated with two U.S. firms:
International General Electric and International Telephone and Telegraph.
The largest firms in German electrical production and their affiliations
listed in order of importance were:
Firm and Type of Production Percent of German 1939 production
U.S. Affiliated Firm Heavy Current Industry General Electric (A.E.G. )
40 percent International General Electric Siemens Schukert A.G. 40 percent
None Brown Boveri et Cie 17 percent None Telephone and Telegraph Siemens
und Halske 60 percent None Lorenz A.G. 85 percent I.T.T Radio Telefunken
(A.E.G. after 1941) 60 percent International General Electric Lorenz
35 percent I.T.T. Wire and Cable Felton & Guilleaume A.G. 20 percent
I.T.T. Siemens 20 percent None A.E.G. 20 percent International General
In other words, in 1939 the German electrical equipment
industry was concentrated into a few major corporations linked in an international
cartel and by stock ownership to two .major U.S. corporations. This industrial
complex was never a prime target for bombing in World War II. The A.E.G.
and I.T.T. plants were hit only incidentally in area raids and then but
rarely. The electrical equipment plants bombed as targets were not those
affiliated with U.S. firms. It was Brown Boveri at Mannheim and Siemensstadt
in Berlin " which were not connected with the U.S. " who were
bombed. As a result, German production of electrical war equipment rose
steadily throughout World War II, peaking as late as 1944. According to
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey reports, "In the opinion of Speers'
assistants and plant officials, the war effort in Germany was never hindered
in any important manner by any shortage of electrical equipment."15
One example of the non-bombing policy for German General
Electric was the A.E.G. plant at 185 Muggenhofer Strasse, Nuremburg. Study
of this plant's output in World War II is of interest because it illustrates
the extent to which purely peacetime production was converted to war work.
The pre-war plant manufactured household equipment, such as hot plates,
electric ranges, electric irons, toasters, industrial baking ovens, radiators,
water heaters, kitchen ovens, and industrial heaters. In 1939, 1940 and
1941, most of the Nuremburg plant's production facilities were used for
the manufacture of peacetime products. In 1942 the plant's production was
shifted to manufacture of war equipment. Metal parts for communications
equipment and munitions such as bombs and mines were made. Other war production
consisted of parts for searchlights and amplifiers. The following tabulation
very strikingly shows the conversion to war work:
Year Total sales in 1000 RM Percent for war Ordinary
production 1939 12,469 5 95 1940 11,754 15 85 1941 21,194 40 60 1942
20,689 61 39 1948 31,455 67 33 1944 31,205 69 31
The actual physical damage by bombing to this plant was
insignificant. No serious damage occurred until the raids of February 20
and 21, 1945, near the end of the war, and then protection had been fairly
well developed. Raids during which bombs struck in the plant area and the
trifling damage done are listed as follows:
Date of raid Bombs striking plant Damage done March
8, 1943 30 stick type I.B. Trifling, but 3 storehouses outside the main
plant destroyed. Sept. 9, 1944 None (blast damage) Trifling, glass and
blackout curtain damage. Nov. 26, 1944 14000 lb. HE in open space in plant
grounds Wood shop destroyed, water main broken. Feb. 20, 1945 2 HE 3 buildings
damaged. Feb. 21, 1945 5 HE, many I.B.'s Administration bldg. destroyed
& enameling works damaged by HE.
Another example of a German General Electric plant not
bombed is the A.E.G. plant at Koppelsdorf producing radar sets and bomber
antennae. Other A.E.G. plants which were not bombed and their war equipment
LIST OF A.E.G. FACTORIES NOT BOMBED IN WORLD WAR II Name
of Branch Location Product 1. Werk Reiehmannsdoff mit Unterabteilungen
in Wallendorf und Unterweissbach Kries Saalfeld Measuring Instruments
2. Werk Marktschorgast Bayreuth Starters 3. Werk F18ha Sachsen Short
Wave Sending Sets 4. Werk Reichenbach Vogtland Dry Cell Batteries 5. Werk
Burglengefeld Sachsen/S.E. Chemnitz Heavy Starters 6. Werk Nuremburg
Belringersdorf/ Nuremburg Small Components 7. Werk Zirndorf Nuremburg
Heavy Starters 8. Werk Mattinghofen Oberdonau 1 KW Senders 250 Meters
& long wave for torpedo boats & U-boats 9. Unterwerk Neustadt
Coburg Radar Equipment
That the A.E.G. plants in Germany were not bombed in
World War II was confirmed by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey,
officered by such academics as John K. Galbraith and such Wall Streeters
as George W. Ball and Paul H. Nitze. Their "German Electrical Equipment
Industry Report" dated January 1947 concludes:
The industry has never been attacked as a basic target
system, but a few plants, i.e. Brown Boveri at Mannheim, Bosch at Stuutgart
and Siemenstadt in Berlin, have been subjected to precision raids; many
others were hit in area raids.17
At the end of World War II an Allied investigation team
known as FIAT was sent to examine bomb damage to German electrical industry
plants. The team for the electrical industry consisted of Alexander G.P.E.
Sanders of International Telephone and Telegraph of New York, Whit-worth
Ferguson of Ferguson Electric Company, New York, and Erich J. Borgman of
Westinghouse Electric. Although the stated objective of these teams was
to examine the effects on Allied bombing of German targets, the objective
of this particular team was to get the German electrical equipment industry
back into production as soon as possible. Whirworth Ferguson wrote a report
dated March 31, 1945 on the A.E.G. Ostland-werke and concluded, "this
plant is immediately available for production of fine metal parts and assemblies.18
To conclude, we find that both Rathenau of A.E.G. and
Swope of General Electric in the U.S. had similar ideas of putting the
State to work for their own corporate ends. General Electric was prominent
in financing Hitler, it profited handsomely from war production "
and yet it managed to evade bombing in World War II. Obviously the story
briefly surveyed here deserves a much more thorough " and official
Footnotes: 1For the technical details see the three-volume
study, Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development,
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1968, 1971), 1973), hereafter
cited as Western Technology Series.
2(New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1975)
3New York Times, October 6, 1936. See also Antony C.
Sutton, Wall Street and FDR, op. cit.
4Of course, socialist pleading by businessmen is still
with us. Witness the injured cries when President Ford proposed deregulation
of airlines and trucking. See for example Wall Street Journal, November
5Mimeographed Translation in Hoover Institution Library,
p. 67. Also see Walter Rathenau, In Days to Come, (London: Allen &
6Ibid, p. 249.
7New York Times, July 2, 1929.
8Ibid, July 28, 1929.
9Ibid, August 2, 1929 and August 4, 1929.
10Ibid, August 6, 1929.
11Ibid, February 2, 1930.
12Ibid, February 2, 1930.
13Ibid, May 11, 1930. For the prewar machinations of
General Electric, Osram, and the Dutch company N.V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken
of Eindhoven Holland, see Chapter 11, "Electric Eels," in James
Stewart Martin, op cit. Martin was Chief of the Economic Warfare Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice and comments that "The A.E.G. of
Germany was largely controlled by the American company, General Electric."
The assumption by this author is that the G.E. influence was somewhat less
than controlling although substantial enough. Because of Martin's official
position and access to official documents, not known to the author, his
statement that A.E.G. was "largely controlled" by U.S. General
Electric cannot be lightly dismissed. However, if we accept that G.E. "largely
controlled" A.E.G., then the most serious questions arise which clamor
for investigation. A.E.G. was a prime financier of Hitler and "control"
would more deeply implicate the U.S. parent company than is suggested by
the evidence presented here.
14Son of Emil Rathenau, founder of A.E.G., born in 1867
and assassinated in 1922.
15The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, German
Electrical Equipment Industry/Report, (Equipment Division, January 1947),
16U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Plant Report of A.E.G.
(Allgemeine Elektrizitats Gesellschaft), Nuremburg, Germany: June 1945),
17p. 3. Consequently, "production during the war
was adequate until November 1944" and "in the opinion of Speer
assistants and plant officials the war effort in Germany was never hindered
in any important manner by any shortage of electrical equipment."
Difficulties arose only at the very end of the war when the whole economy
was threatened with collapse. The report concluded, "All important
needs for electrical equipment in 1944 may therefore be said to have been
met, since plans were always optimistic."
18U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, AEG-Ostlandwerke GmbH,
by Whitworth Ferguson, 31 May 1945.