Strategies Born In The Mind. What are Russia’s “Intentions”
In May 2019, a curious document was made publicly available
under the aegis of the US Defense Department and the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It is entitled “Russian Strategic Intentions” and was prepared
as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment programme.
The report is the joint effort of more than 30 authors, including John Arquilla, one of the founders of the Netwar concept; Marlene Laruelle, who has specialised in the ideology of Eurasianism for many years; Daniel Flynn
from the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and a
number of other academics and military officials from relevant
organisations, such as the US Military Academy at West Point; the
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism; the US Air Force; the Center for Political–Military Analysis
at the Hudson Institute; the US Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute; the US Central Command; the Naval Postgraduate School; and
the USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative.
The list of names also includes several specialists on Russia, such as Anna Borshchevskaya
from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who has spent years
dishing out Russophobic propaganda to US think tanks; and Pavel Devyatkin from
The Arctic Institute, who also works with the US Peace Corps, a
long-standing NGO that peddles US propaganda and conducts intelligence
activities in other countries.
As early as the preface, written by Lieutenant General Theodore Martin from the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, it states that
“Russian actions occurring within the Competitive Zone, or ‘Gray Zone,’ profoundly impact and continue to threaten vital aspects of US national interest and security. Finding a way to understand the overarching campaign plan behind Russian actions will enable the United States to more effectively counter Moscow.”
So, the idea is clear. It is an attempt
to think like the Russian government does in order to know for certain
which actions the Kremlin will take in the future. Given that the report
is broken down into regions – Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East,
Africa, Latin America, and the Arctic – it appears that US military and
political leaders believe Russia is a threat to the US in all these
areas.
Where the recent study by the RAND Corporation
openly talks about the various scenarios to be implemented in order to
directly or indirectly weaken Russia and hurt its interests in the
post-Soviet space and critical areas like Syria, here we see the results
of some kind of brainstorming session that was organised to “provide
government stakeholders—intelligence, law enforcement, military, and
policy agencies—with valuable insights and analytic frameworks to assist
the US, its allies, and partners in developing a comprehensive strategy
to compete and defeat this Russian challenge.” It sounds almost
identical to the Cold War era.
It is telling that, on 8 May, the
Strategic Multilayer Assessment, together with the US National Defence
University and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, held
a panel discussion
on the future of global competition and conflict with Russia. The list
of speakers (with just as venerable experts and experienced politicians,
such as retired Brigadier General Peter Zwack, former US Defense Attaché to Russia, and Angela Stent,
director of Georgetown University’s Eurasian, Russian, and East
European Studies, who also once served as National Intelligence Officer
for Russia and Eurasia) differed from the authors of the report
mentioned earlier, which means that these two initiatives are just the
tip of an iceberg that is only visible thanks to the publicity of the
events.
As well as using current favourite terms like “Grey Zone” and “hybrid warfare”, US experts note in the Executive Summary that,
“[t]he military exercises which Russia conducts regularly require a total mobilization of society”, “Russia increasingly is operating more to save face” (e.g. Venezuela), Russia is seeking to destroy “institutions in Europe”, and even that Russia established the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) “to extend the rules of the Russian economy, and allow Russia access to the policies of privileged sphere nations and further prevent Western encroachment and influence”.
It is interesting that Kazakhstan, for
example, in no way reduced its economic relations with the EU after the
establishment of the EAEU, but actually increased them. It also makes no
mention of the fact that all decisions within the EAEU are reached by
consensus. So, when such US academics try to pass off wishful thinking
as reality and rationalise certain concepts (such as “Putinism”,
“imperial DNA”, and a “new Brezhnev doctrine”), it only serves to show
their bias and incompetence. Incidentally, a mysterious flurry of
activity around US Army recruiting stations was listed among Russia’s
hostile actions. Mysterious because it is only mentioned in the context
of “Russia’s influence activities” in the 2016 US presidential election.
It goes without saying that no facts or evidence are provided.
As for the report on Russia’s “strategic
intentions”, there are no noticeable attempts to penetrate the
Kremlin’s thinking, while much is said of the need to reduce Europe’s
dependence on Russian gas, of Russia’s near abroad (especially Georgia,
Moldova and Donbass), of the activities of the GRU and FSB, of the
strategy of “maskirovka” (or military deception), and of Moscow’s
machinations.
There is even a fantastic story about
Russia exploiting insurgents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). (Mention is also made of the Spanish-language
television channel Russia Today en Español as an agent of
disinformation.)
The view is even expressed that Russia
has an “assertive grand strategy”. Allegedly behind this strategy are:
the desire of the Russian elite for Russia to be recognised as a great
power; the desire to protect Russian identity and a broader Slavic
identity; and the desire to see the US global power limited. But desires
are not the same as institutionalised practice, which requires
resources and certain mechanisms for a plan to be implemented. It is
interesting to watch US academics discussing links between the
thousand-year history of Rus’, Christianity, the Yalta conference and
present-day Russia, of course, but it crosses the line when these
digressions get mixed up with the expansion of NATO, the role of the
Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the EAEU (Jeremy Lamoreaux),
and Russia being credited with the “most aggressive methods […] to
achieve its grand strategic vision of a multipolar world defined by
exclusive spheres of influence” (Robert Person).
The observation that Russia and
America’s strategies on Europe are different, and that what Washington
wants, Moscow doesn’t want and vice versa, is true, but it is a
long-known truth and does not need further comment.
And listing the various outcomes of
Russia’s foreign policy activities is like a digest of Russia’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, except with a negative interpretation.
On the whole, there is a noticeable number of clichés and exaggerated metaphors.
Proposals for combating Russian
influence include the spread of liberalism; strengthening NATO;
recruiting a large number of experienced diplomats; promoting American
culture, language, and values; using the private sector as proxy actors
in countries neighbouring Russia; squeezing out Russian weapons exports
using security cooperation programmes; providing incentives to countries
carrying out pro-Western reforms (such as Uzbekistan); and targeted
programmes in a number of countries where they can be implemented.
The most rational opinion was probably
given by John Arquilla, who noted: “We should think about potential
‘shocks,’ the most troubling of which would be if Putin performed a
‘reverse Nixon’ and played his own version of the ‘China card.’ The
world system, and American influence in it, would be completely upended
if Moscow and Beijing aligned more closely. Perhaps a good American
strategy would be to play a ‘Russia card’ first.”
This is one of those times when the
Russian government should do just that, and as soon as possible. Where
the minds of US experts have given rise to chimeras that will become the
rationale for their next strategy, Russia’s real grand strategy will be
based on logical conclusions, sustainable mechanisms, and decisions
acceptable to everyone involved.
*
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Leonid Savin is a
geopolitical analyst, Chief editor of Geopolitica.ru, founder and chief
editor of Journal of Eurasian Affairs; head of the administration of the
International Eurasian Movement.
Featured image: Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe, according to RAND Corporation (Source: OR)
The original source of this article is Oriental Review
Copyright © Leonid Savin, Oriental Review, 2019
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