Chapter III
LENIN AND GERMAN ASSISTANCE
FOR THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION
It was not until the Bolsheviks had received from
us a steady flow of funds through various channels and under varying labels
that they were in a position to be able to build up their main organ Pravda,
to conduct energetic propaganda and appreciably to extend the originally
narrow base of their party.
Von Kühlmann, minister of foreign affairs, to the kaiser,
December 3, 1917
In April 1917 Lenin and a party of 32 Russian
revolutionaries, mostly Bolsheviks, journeyed by train from Switzerland across
Germany through Sweden to Petrograd, Russia. They were on their way to join Leon
Trotsky to "complete the revolution." Their trans-Germany transit was
approved, facilitated, and financed by the German General Staff. Lenin's transit
to Russia was part of a plan approved by the German Supreme Command, apparently
not immediately known to the kaiser, to aid in the disintegration of the Russian
army and so eliminate Russia from World War I. The possibility that the
Bolsheviks might be turned against Germany and Europe did not occur to the
German General Staff. Major General Hoffman has written, "We neither knew nor foresaw the danger to
humanity from the consequences of this journey of the Bolsheviks to
Russia."1
At the highest level the German political officer who
approved Lenin's journey to Russia
was Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg,
a descendant of the Frankfurt banking family Bethmann, which achieved great
prosperity in the nineteenth century. Bethmann-Hollweg was appointed chancellor
in 1909 and in November 1913 became the subject of the first vote of censure
ever passed by the German Reichstag on a chancellor. It was Bethmann-Hollweg who
in 1914 told the world that the German guarantee to Belgium was a mere
"scrap of paper." Yet on other war matters — such as the use of
unrestricted submarine warfare — Bethmann-Hollweg was ambivalent; in January 1917
he told the kaiser, "I can give Your Majesty neither my assent to
the unrestricted submarine warfare nor my refusal." By 1917
Bethmann-Hollweg had lost the Reichstag's support and resigned — but not before
approving transit of Bolshevik revolutionaries to Russia. The transit
instructions from Bethmann-Hollweg went through the state secretary Arthur
Zimmermann — who was immediately under Bethmann-Hollweg and who handled
day-to-day operational details with the German ministers in both Bern and
Copenhagen — to the German minister to Bern in early April 1917. The kaiser
himself was not aware of the revolutionary movement until after Lenin had passed
into Russia.
While Lenin himself did not know the precise source of the
assistance, he certainly knew that the German government was providing some
funding. There were, however, intermediate links between the German foreign
ministry and Lenin, as the following shows:
LENIN'S TRANSFER TO RUSSIA IN APRIL 1917
|
| Final decision |
|
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG
(Chancellor) |
|
Intermediary I |
|
ARTHUR ZIMMERMANN
(State Secretary) |
|
Intermediary II |
|
BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU
(German Minister in Copenhagen) |
|
Intermediary III |
|
ALEXANDER ISRAEL HELPHAND
(alias PARVUS) |
| Intermediary IV |
|
JACOB FURSTENBERG (alias
GANETSKY)
LENIN, in Switzerland |
From Berlin Zimmermann and Bethmann-Hollweg communicated with
the German minister in Copenhagen, Brockdorff-Rantzau. In turn,
Brockdorff-Rantzau was in touch with Alexander Israel Helphand (more commonly
known by his alias, Parvus), who was located in Copenhagen.2 Parvus was the
connection to Jacob Furstenberg, a Pole descended from a wealthy family but
better known by his alias, Ganetsky. And Jacob Furstenberg was the immediate
link to Lenin.
Although Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was the final authority
for Lenin's transfer, and although Lenin was probably aware of the German
origins of the assistance, Lenin cannot be termed a German agent. The German
Foreign Ministry assessed Lenin's probable actions in Russia as being consistent
with their own objectives in the dissolution of the existing power structure in
Russia. Yet both parties also had hidden objectives: Germany wanted priority
access to the postwar markets in Russia, and Lenin intended to establish a
Marxist dictatorship.
The idea of using Russian revolutionaries in this way can be
traced back to 1915. On August 14 of that year, Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote the
German state undersecretary about a conversation with Helphand (Parvus), and
made a strong recommendation to employ Helphand, "an extraordinarily
important man whose unusual powers I feel we must employ for duration of
the war .... "3 Included in the report was a warning: "It might
perhaps be risky to want to use the powers ranged behind Helphand, but it would
certainly be an admission of our own weakness if we were to refuse their
services out of fear of not being able to direct them."4
Brockdorff-Rantzau's ideas of directing or controlling the
revolutionaries parallel, as we shall see, those of the Wall Street financiers.
It was J.P. Morgan and the American International Corporation that attempted to
control both domestic and foreign revolutionaries in the United States for their
own purposes.
A subsequent document5 outlined the terms demanded by Lenin,
of which the most interesting was point number seven, which
allowed "Russian troops to move into India"; this suggested that Lenin
intended to continue the tsarist expansionist program. Zeman also records the
role of Max Warburg in establishing a Russian publishing house and adverts to an
agreement dated August 12, 1916, in which the German industrialist Stinnes
agreed to contribute two million rubles for financing a publishing house in
Russia.6
Consequently, on April 16, 1917, a trainload of thirty-two,
including Lenin, his wife Nadezhda Krupskaya, Grigori Zinoviev, Sokolnikov, and
Karl Radek, left the Central Station in Bern en route to Stockholm. When the
party reached the Russian frontier only Fritz Plattan and Radek were denied
entrance into Russia. The remainder of the party was allowed to enter. Several
months later they were followed by almost 200 Mensheviks, including Martov and
Axelrod.
It is worth noting that Trotsky, at that time in New York,
also had funds traceable to German sources. Further, Von Kuhlmann alludes to
Lenin's inability to broaden the base of his Bolshevik party until the Germans
supplied funds. Trotsky was a Menshevik who turned Bolshevik only in 1917. This
suggests that German funds were perhaps related to Trotsky's change of party
label.
In early 1918 Edgar Sisson, the Petrograd representative of
the U.S. Committee on Public Information, bought a batch of Russian documents
purporting to prove that Trotsky, Lenin, and the other Bolshevik revolutionaries
were not only in the pay of, but also agents of, the German government.
These documents, later dubbed the "Sisson
Documents," were shipped to the United States in great haste and secrecy.
In Washington, D.C. they were submitted to the National Board for Historical
Service for authentication. Two prominent historians, J. Franklin Jameson and
Samuel N. Harper, testified to their genuineness. These historians divided the
Sisson papers into three groups. Regarding Group I, they concluded:
We have subjected them
with great care to all the
applicable tests to which historical students are accustomed and . . .
upon
the basis of these investigations, we have no hesitation in declaring
that we see no reason to doubt the genuineness or authenticity of
these fifty-three documents.7
The historians were less confident about material in Group
II. This group was not rejected as. outright forgeries, but it was suggested
that they were copies of original documents. Although the historians made "no
confident declaration" on Group III, they were not prepared to reject
the documents as outright forgeries.
The Sisson Documents were published by the Committee on
Public Information, whose chairman was George Creel, a former contributor to the
pro-Bolshevik Masses. The American press in general accepted the
documents as authentic. The notable exception was the New York Evening Post, at
that time owned by Thomas W. Lamont, a partner in the Morgan firm. When only a
few installments had been published, the Post challenged the authenticity
of all the documents.8
We now know that the Sisson Documents were almost all
forgeries: only one or two of the minor German circulars were genuine. Even
casual examination of the German letterhead suggests that the forgers were
unusually careless forgers perhaps working for the gullible American market. The
German text was strewn with terms verging on the ridiculous: for example, Bureau
instead of the German word Büro; Central for the German Zentral; etc.
That the documents are forgeries is the conclusion of an
exhaustive study by George Kennan9 and of studies made in the 1920s by the
British government. Some documents were based on authentic information and, as
Kennan observes, those who forged them certainly had access to some unusually
good information. For example, Documents 1, 54, 61, and 67 mention that the Nya
Banken in Stockholm served as the conduit for Bolshevik funds from Germany. This
conduit has been confirmed in more reliable sources. Documents 54, 63, and 64
mention Furstenberg as the banker-intermediary between the Germans and the
Bolshevists; Furstenberg's name appears elsewhere in authentic documents.
Sisson's Document 54 mentions Olof Aschberg, and Olof Aschberg by his own
statements was the "Bolshevik Banker." Aschberg in 1917 was the
director of Nya Banken. Other documents in the Sisson series list names and
institutions, such as the German Naptha-Industrial Bank, the Disconto
Gesellschaft, and Max Warburg, the Hamburg banker, but hard supportive evidence
is more elusive. In general, the Sisson Documents, while themselves outright
forgeries, are nonetheless based partly on generally authentic information.
One puzzling aspect in the light of the story in this book is
that the documents came to Edgar Sisson from Alexander Gumberg (alias Berg, real
name Michael Gruzenberg), the Bolshevik agent in Scandinavia and later a
confidential assistant to Chase National Bank and Floyd Odium of Atlas
Corporation. The Bolshevists, on the other hand, stridently repudiated the
Sisson material. So did John Reed, the American representative on the executive
of the Third International and whose paycheck came from Metropolitan magazine,
which was owned by J.P. Morgan interests.10 So did Thomas Lamont, the Morgan
partner who owned the New York Evening Post. There are several possible
explanations. Probably the connections between the Morgan interests in New York
and such agents as John Reed and Alexander Gumberg were highly flexible. This could
have been a Gumberg maneuver to discredit Sisson and Creel by planting
forged documents; or perhaps Gumberg was working in his own interest.
The Sisson Documents "prove" exclusive German
involvement with the Bolsheviks. They also have been used to "prove" a
Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy theory along the lines of that of the Protocols of
Zion. In 1918 the U.S. government wanted to unite American opinion behind an
unpopular war with Germany, and the Sisson Documents dramatically
"proved" the exclusive complicity of Germany with the Bolshevists. The
documents also provided a smoke screen against public knowledge of the events to
be described in this book.
A review of documents in the State Department Decimal File
suggests that the State Department and Ambassador Francis in Petrograd were
quite well informed about the intentions and progress of the Bolshevik movement. In the summer of 1917, for example,
the State Department wanted to stop the departure from the U.S. of
"injurious persons" (that is, returning Russian revolutionaries) but
was unable to do so because they were using new Russian and American passports.
The preparations for the Bolshevik Revolution itself were well known at least
six weeks before it came about. One report in the State Department files states,
in regard to the Kerensky forces, that it was "doubtful whether government
. . . [can] suppress outbreak." Disintegration of the Kerensky government
was reported throughout September and October as were Bolshevik preparations for
a coup. The British government warned British residents in Russia to leave at
least six weeks before the Bolshevik phase of the revolution.
The first full report of the events of early November reached
Washington on December 9, 1917. This report described the low-key nature of the
revolution itself, mentioned that General William V. Judson had made an
unauthorized visit to Trotsky, and pointed out the presence of Germans in Smolny —
the
Soviet headquarters.
On November 28, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson ordered no
interference with the Bolshevik Revolution. This instruction was apparently in
response to a request by Ambassador Francis for an Allied conference, to which
Britain had already agreed. The State Department argued that such a conference
was impractical. There were discussions in Paris between the Allies and Colonel
Edward M. House, who reported these to Woodrow Wilson as "long and frequent
discussions on Russia." Regarding such a conference, House stated that
England was "passively willing," France "indifferently
against," and Italy "actively so." Woodrow Wilson, shortly
thereafter, approved a cable authored by Secretary of State Robert Lansing,
which provided financial assistance for the Kaledin movement (December 12,
1917). There were also rumors filtering into Washington that "monarchists
working with the Bolsheviks and same supported by various occurrences and
circumstances"; that the Smolny government was absolutely under control of
the German General Staff; and rumors elsewhere that "many or most of them
[that is, Bolshevists] are from America."
In December, General Judson again visited Trotsky; this was
looked upon as a step towards recognition by the U.S., although a report dated
February 5, 1918, from Ambassador Francis to Washington, recommended against
recognition. A memorandum originating with Basil Miles in Washington argued that
"we
should deal with all authorities in Russia including Bolsheviks."
And on February 15, 1918, the State Department cabled Ambassador Francis in
Petrograd, stating that the "department desires you gradually to keep in
somewhat closer and informal touch with the Bolshevik authorities using such
channels as will avoid any official recognition."
The next day Secretary of State Lansing conveyed the
following to the French ambassador J. J. Jusserand in Washington: "It is
considered inadvisable to take any action which will antagonize at this time any
of the various elements of the people which now control the power in Russia ....
"12
On February 20, Ambassador Francis cabled Washington to
report the approaching end of the Bolshevik government. Two weeks later, on
March 7, 1918, Arthur Bullard reported to Colonel House that German money was
subsidizing the Bolsheviks and that this subsidy was more substantial than
previously thought. Arthur Bullard (of the U.S. Committee on Public
Information) argued: "we ought to be ready to help any honest
national government. But men or money or equipment sent to the present rulers of
Russia will be used against Russians at least as much as against
Germans."13
This was followed by another message from Bullard to Colonel
House: "I strongly advise against giving material help to the
present Russian government. Sinister elements in Soviets seem to be gaining
control."
But there were influential counterforces at work. As early as
November 28, 1917, Colonel House cabled President Woodrow Wilson from Paris that
it was "exceedingly important" that U.S. newspaper comments advocating
that "Russia should be treated as an enemy" be "suppressed."
Then next month William Franklin Sands, executive secretary of the
Morgan-controlled American International Corporation and a friend of the
previously mentioned Basil Miles, submitted a memorandum that described Lenin
and Trotsky as appealing to the masses and that urged the U.S. to recognize
Russia. Even American socialist Walling complained to the Department of State
about the pro-Soviet attitude of George Creel (of the U.S. Committee on Public
Information), Herbert Swope, and William Boyce Thompson (of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York).
On December 17, 1917, there appeared in a Moscow newspaper
an attack on Red Cross colonel Raymond Robins and Thompson,
alleging a link between the Russian Revolution and American bankers:
Why are they so interested in enlightenment? Why was the
money given the socialist revolutionaries and not to the constitutional
democrats? One would suppose the latter nearer and dearer to hearts of
bankers.
The article goes on to argue that this was because American
capital viewed Russia as a future market and thus wanted to get a firm foothold.
The money was given to the revolutionaries because
the backward working men and peasants trust the social
revolutionaries. At the time when the money was passed the social
revolutionaries were in power and it was supposed they would remain in control
in Russia for some time.
Another report, dated December 12, 1917, and relating to
Raymond Robins, details "negotiation with a group of American bankers of
the American Red Cross Mission"; the "negotiation" related to a
payment of two million dollars. On January 22, 1918, Robert L Owen, chairman of
the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and linked to Wall Street
interests, sent a letter to Woodrow Wilson recommending de facto recognition of
Russia, permission for a shipload of goods urgently needed in Russia, the
appointment of representatives to Russia to offset German influence, and the
establishment of a career-service group in Russia.
This approach was consistently aided by Raymond Robins in
Russia. For example, on February 15, 1918, a cable from Robins in Petrograd to
Davison in the Red Cross in Washington (and to be forwarded to William Boyce
Thompson) argued that support be given to the Bolshevik authority for as long as
possible, and that the new revolutionary Russia will turn to the United States
as it has "broken with the German imperialism." According to Robins,
the Bolsheviks wanted United States assistance and cooperation together with
railroad reorganization, because "by generous assistance and
technical advice in reorganizing commerce and industry America may entirely
exclude German commerce during balance of war."
In brief, the tug-of-war in Washington reflected a struggle
between, on one side, old-line diplomats (such as Ambassador Francis) and
lower-level departmental officials, and, on the other, financiers like Robins,
Thompson, and Sands with allies such as Lansing and Miles in the State
Department and Senator Owen in the Congress.
Footnotes:
1Max
Hoffman, War Diaries and Other Papers (London: M. Secker, 1929), 2:177.
2Z. A. B.
Zeman and W. B. Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution.. The Life of
A1exander Israel Helphand (Parvus), 1867-1924 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1965).
3Z. A. B.
Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918. Documents from the
Archives of the German Foreign Ministry (London: Oxford University Press,
1958), p. ????5.
5Ibid., p. 6,
doc. 6, reporting a conversation with the Fstonian intermediary Keskula.
7U.S., Committee
on Public Information, The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy, War Information
Series, no. 20, October 1918.
8New York
Evening Post, September 16-18, 21;
October 4, 1918. It is also interesting, but not conclusive of anything, that
the Bolsheviks also stoutly questioned the authenticity of the documents.
9George F.
Kennan, "The Sisson Documents," Journal of Modern History 27-28
(1955-56): 130-154.
10John Reed, The
Sisson Documents (New York: Liberator Publishing, n.d.).
11This part
is based on section 861.00 o[ the U.S. State Dept. Decimal File, also
available as National Archives rolls 10 and 11 of microcopy 316.
12U.S. State
Dept. Decimal File, 861.00/1117a. The same message was conveyed to the Italian
ambassador.
13See Arthur
Bullard papers at Princeton University.
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