Among the early Roosevelt fascist measures was the National Industry
Recovery Act (NRA) of June 16, 1933. The origins of this scheme are worth
repeating. These ideas were first suggested by Gerard Swope of the General
Electric Company ... following this they were adopted by the United States
Chamber of Commerce .... (Herbert
Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941, New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1952, p. 420)
The multi-national giant General Electric has an unparalleled role in
twentieth-century history. The General Electric Company electrified the Soviet
Union in the 1920s and 1930s, and fulfilled for the Soviets Lenin's dictum
that "Socialism = electrification."1 The Swope Plan, created by
General Electric's one-time president Gerard Swope, became
Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal, by a process deplored by one-time President Herbert
Hoover and described in Wall Street and FDR.2 There was a long-lasting,
intimate relationship between Swope and Young of General Electric Company and
the Roosevelt family, as there was between General Electric and the Soviet
Union. In 1936 Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, an early Roosevelt
supporter, became aware of Roosevelt's betrayal of liberal ideas and attacked
the Roosevelt New Deal program as a "tyrannical" measure
"leading to despotism, [and] sought by its sponsors under the communistic
cry of 'Social Justice.'" Senator Reed further charged on the floor of
the Senate that Franklin D. Roosevelt was a "hired man for the economic
royalists" in Wall Street and that the Roosevelt family "is one of
the largest stockholders in the General Electric Company."3
As we probe into
behind-the-scenes German interwar history and the story of Hitler and Naziism,
we find both Owen D. Young and Gerard Swope of General Electric tied to the
rise of Hitlerism and the suppression of German democracy. That General
Electric directors are to be found in each of these three distinct historical
categories — i.e., the development of the Soviet Union, the creation of
Roosevelt's New Deal, and the rise of Hitlerism — suggests how elements of Big
Business are keenly interested in the socialization of the world, for their
own purposes and objectives, rather than the maintenance of the impartial
market place in a free society.4 General Electric profited handsomely from
Bolshevism, from Roosevelt's New Deal socialism, and, as we shall see below,
from national socialism in Hitler's Germany.
Walter Rathenau was, until his
assassination in 1922, managing director of Allgemeine Elekrizitats
Gesellschaft (A.E.G,), or German General Electric, and like Owen Young and
Gerard Swope, his counterparts in the U.S., he was a prominent advocate of
corporate socialism. Walter Rathenau spoke out publicly against competition
and free enterprise, Why? Because both Rathanau and Swope wanted the
protection and cooperation of the state for their own corporate objectives and
profit. (But not of course for anybody else's objectives and profits.)
Rathanau expressed their plea in The
New Political Economy:
The new economy will, as we
have seen, be no state or governmental economy but a private economy
committed to a civic power of resolution which certainly will require state
cooperation for organic consolidation to overcome inner friction and
increase production and endurance.5
When we disentangle the turgid
Rathenau prose, this means that the power of the State was to be made
available to private firms for their own corporate purposes, i.e., what
is popularly known as national socialism. Rathenau spoke out publicly against
competition and free enterprise. inheritance."6 Not their own wealth,
so far as can be determined, but the wealth of others who lacked political
pull in the State apparatus.
Owen D. Young of General
Electric was one of the three U.S. delegates to the 1923 Dawes Plan meeting
which established the German reparations program. And in the Dawes and Young
Plans we can see how some private firms were able to benefit from the power of
the State. The largest single loans from Wall Street to Germany during the
1920s were reparations loans; it was ultimately the U.S. investor who paid for
German reparations. The cartelization of the German electrical industry under
A.E.G. (as well as the steel and chemical industries discussed in Chapters One
and Two) was made possible with these Wall Street loans:
Date of
Offering
|
Borrower
|
Managing Bank
in the U.S.
|
Face Amount
of Issue |
Jan. 26, 1925 |
Allgemeine
Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (A. E, G.) |
National City
Co. |
$10,000,000 |
Dec. 9, 1925 |
Allgemeine National City Co.
Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (A. E.G. ) |
|
10,000,000 |
May 22, 1928 |
Allgemeine
Elektrizitats-
Gesellschaft (A.E.G.) |
National City Co. |
10,000,000 |
June 7, 1928 |
Allgemeine
Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (A. E.G.) |
National City Co. |
5,000,000 |
In 1928, at the Young Plan
reparations meetings, we find General Electric president Owen D. Young in the
chair as the chief U.S. delegate, appointed by the U.S. government to use U.S.
government power and prestige to decide international financial matters
enhancing Wall Street and General Electric profits. In 1930 Owen D. Young,
after whom the Young Plan for German reparations was named, became chairman of
the Board of General Electric Company in New York City. Young was also
chairman of the Executive Committee of Radio Corporation of America and a
director of both German General Electric (A.E.G.) and Osram in Germany. Young
also served on the boards of other major U.S. corporations, including General
Motors, NBC, and RKO; he was a councilor of the National Industrial Conference
Board, a director of the International Chamber of Commerce, and deputy
chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Gerard Swope was president and
director of General Electric Company as well as French and German associated
companies, including A.E.G. and Osram in Germany. Swope was also a director of
RCA, NBC, and the National City Bank of New York. Other directors of
International General Electric at this time reflect Morgan control of the
company, and both Young and Swope were generally known as the Morgan
representatives on the G.E. board, which included Thomas Cochran, another
partner in the J.P. Morgan firm. General Electric director Clark Haynes Minor
was president of International General Electric in the 1920s. Another director
was Victor M. Cutter of the First National Bank of Boston and a figure in the "Banana
Revolutions" in Central America.
In the late 1920s Young,
Swope, and Minor of International General Electric moved into the German
electrical industry and gained, if not control as some have reported, then at
least a substantial say in the internal affairs of both A.E.G. and Osram. In
July 1929 an agreement was reached between General Electric and three German
firms — A.E.G., Siemens & Halske, and Koppel and Company — which between
them owned all the shares in Osram, the electric bulb manufacturer. General
Electric purchased 16% percent of Osram stock and reached a joint agreement
for international control of electric bulbs production and marketing. Clark
Minor and Gerard Swope became directors of Osram.7
In July 1929 great interest
was shown in rumors circulating in German financial circles that General
Electric was also buying into A.E.G. and that talks to this end were in
progress between A.E.G. and G.E.8 In August it was confirmed that 14 million
marks of common A.E.G. stock were to be issued to General Electric. These
shares, added to shares bought on the open market, gave General Electric a
25-percent interest in A.E.G. A closer working agreement was signed between
the two companies, providing the German company U.S. technology and patents.
It was emphasized in the news reports that A.E.G. would not have participation
in G.E., but that on the other hand G.E. would finance expansion of A.E.G. in
Germany.9 The German financial press also noted that there was no A.E.G.
representation on the board of G.E. in the United States but that five
Americans were now on the board of A.E.G. The Vossische Zeitung recorded,
The American electrical
industry has conquered the worM, and only a few of the remaining opposing
bastions have been able to withstand the onslaught...10
By 1930, unknown to the German
financial press, General Electric had similarly gained an effective technical
monopoly of the Soviet electrical industry and was soon to penetrate even the
remaining bastions in Germany, particularly the Siemens group. In January 1930
three G.E. men were elected to the board of A.E.G. — Clark H. Minor, Gerard
Swope, and E. H. Baldwin — and International General Electric (I.G.E.)
continued its moves to merge the world electrical industry into a giant cartel
under Wall Street control.
In February General Electric
focused on the remaining German electrical giant, Siemens & Halske, and
while able to obtain a large block of debentures issued on behalf of the
German firm by Dillon, Read of New York, G.E. was not able to gain
participation or directors on the Siemens board. While the German press
recognized even this limited control as" an historical economic event of
the first order and an important step toward a future world electric
trust,"11 Siemens retained its independence from General Electric
— and
this independence is important for our story. The New York Times reported,
The entire press emphasizes the
fact that Siemens, contrary to A.E.G., maintains its independence for the
future and points out that no General Electric representative will sit on
Stemen's board of directors.12
There is no evidence that
Siemens, either through Siemens & Halske or Siemens-Schukert, participated
directly in the financing of Hitler. Siemens contributed to Hitler only
slightly and indirectly through a share participation in Osram. On the other
hand, both A.E.G. and Osram directly financed Hitler through the Nationale
Treuhand in substantial ways. Siemens retained its independence in the early
1930s while both A.E.G. and Osram were under American dominance and with
American directors. There is no
evidence that Siemens, without American directors, financed Hitler. On the
other hand, we have irrefutable documentary evidence (see page 56) that both
German General Electric and Osram, both with American directors, financed
Hitler.
In the months following the
attempted Wall Street take over of Siemens, the pattern of a developing world
trust in the electrical industry clarified; there was an end to international
patent fights and the G.E. interest in A.E.G. increased to nearly 30 percent.13
Consequently, in the early
1930s, as Hitler prepared to grab dictatorial power in Germany — backed by
some, but by no means all, German and American industrialists — the German
General Electric (A.E.G.) was owned by International General Electric (about
30 percent), the Gesellschaft für Electrische Unternemungen (25 percent), and
Ludwig Lowe (25 percent). International General Electric also had an interest
of about 16 2/3rds percent in Osram, and an additional indirect influence in
Companies
Linked to
German General Electric through Common Electric
Directors:
|
Directors of German General Electric (A.E.G.) |
Relationship of
Linked Firm with Financing of
Hitler: |
Accumulatoran-Fabrik |
Quandt
Pfeffer |
Direct
Finance,
see p, 55 |
Osram |
Mamroth
Peierls |
Direct
Finance,
see p. 57
|
Deutschen Babcock-Wilcox |
Landau |
Not known |
Vereinigte Stahlwerke |
Wolff
Nathan
Kirdorf
Goldschmidt |
Direct Finance,
see p. 57
|
Krupp |
Nathan
Klotzbach |
Direct Finance,
see p. 59
|
I.G. Farben |
Bucher
Flechtheim
von Rath |
Direct Finance,
see p. 57
|
Allianz u.
Stuttgarten Verein
Phoenix |
von Rath
Wolff
Fahrenhorst |
Reported, but not substantiated
see p. 57
|
Thyssen |
Fahrenhorst |
Direct Finance,
see p. 104 |
Demag |
Fahrenhorst
Flick |
see p. 57
|
Dynamit
Gelsenkirchener
Bergwerks |
Flechtheim
Kirdorf
Flechtheim |
Through
I.G. Farben
Direct Finance,
see p. 57
|
International General
Electric |
Young
Swope
Minor
Baldwin |
Through
A.E.G.,
see p. 52
|
American I.G. Farben |
von Rath |
Through
I.G. Farben
see p. 47 |
International Bank
(Amsterdam) |
H. Furstenberg
Goldschmidt |
Not known |
Osram through A.E.G.
directors. On the board of A.E,G., apart from the four American directors
(Young, Swope, Minor, and Baldwin), we find Pferdmenges of Oppenheim & Co.
(another Hitler financier), and Quandt, who owned 75 percent of
Accumlatoren-Fabrik, a major direct financier of Hitler. In other words, among
the German board members of A.E.G. we find representatives from several of the
German firms that financed Hitler in the 1920s and 1930s.
The tap root of modern
corporate socialism runs deep into the management of two affiliated
multi-national corporations: General Electric Company in the United States and
its foreign associates, including German General Electric (A.E.G.), and Osram
in Germany. We have noted that Gerard Swope, second president and chairman of
General Electric, and Walter Rathanau of A.E.G. promoted radical ideas for
control of the State by private business interests.
From 1915 onwards
International General Electric (I.G.E.), located at 120 Broadway in New
York City, acted as the foreign investment, manufacturing, and selling
organization for the General Electric Company. I.G.E. held interests in
overseas manufacturing companies including a 25 to 30-percent holding in
German General Electric (A.E.G.), plus holdings in Osram G.m.b.H.
Kommanditgesellschaft, also in Berlin. These holdings gave International
General Electric four directors on the board of A.E.G., and another director
at Osram, and significant influence in the internal domestic policies of these
German companies. The significance of this General Electric ownership is that
A.E.G. and Osram were prominent suppliers of funds for Hitler in his rise to
power in Germany in 1933. A bank transfer slip dated March 2, 1933 from A.E.G.
to Delbruck Schickler & Co. in Berlin requests that 60,000 Reichsmark be
deposited in the "Nationale Treuhand" (National Trusteeship) account
for Hitler's use. This slip is reproduced on page 56.
I.G. Farben was the most
important of the domestic financial backers of Hitler, and (as noted
elsewhere) I.G. Farben controlled American I.G. Moreover, several directors of
A.E.G. were also on the board of I.G. Farben — i.e., Hermann Bucher, chairman
of A.E.G. was on the I.G. Farben board; so were A.E.G. directors Julius
Flechtheim and Walter von Rath. I.G. Farben contributed 30 percent of the 1933
Hitler National Trusteeship (or takeover) fund.
Walter Fahrenhorst of A.E.G.
was also on the board of Phoenix A-G, Thyssen A-G and Demag A-G — and all were
contributors to Hitler's fund. Demag A-G contributed 50,000 RM to Hitler's
fund and had a director with A.E.G.— the notorious Friedrich Flick, and early
Hitler supporter, who was later convicted at the Nuremberg Trials.
Accumulatoren Fabrik A-G was a Hitler contributor (25,000 RM, see page 60)
with two directors on the A.E.G. board, August Pfeffer and Gunther Quandt.
Quandt personally owned 75 percent of Accumulatoren Fabrik.
Osram Gesellschaft, in which
International General Electric had a 16 2/3rds direct interest, also had two
directors on the A.E.G. board: Paul Mamroth and Heinrich Pferls. Osram
contributed 40,000 RM directly to the Hitler fund. The Otto Wolff concern,
Vereinigte Stahlwerke A-G, recipient of substantial New York loans in the
1920s, had three directors on the A.E.G. board: Otto Wolff, Henry Nathan and
Jakob Goldschmidt. Alfred Krupp yon Bohlen, sole owner of the Krupp
organization and an early supporter of Hitler, was a member of the Aufsichsrat
of A.E.G. Robert Pferdmenges, a member of Himmler's Circle of Friends, was
also a director of A, E.G.
In other words, almost all of
the German directors of German General Electric were financial supporters of
Hitler and associated not only with A.E.G. but with other companies financing
Hitler.
Walter Rathenau14 became a
director of A,E.G. in 1899 and by the early twentieth century was a director
of more than 100 corporations. Rathenau was also author of the" Rathenau
Plan," which bears a remarkable resemblance to the "Swope Plan" —
i.e., FDR's New Deal but written by Swope of G.E. In
other words, we have the extraordinay coincidence that the authors of New
Deal-tike plans in the U.S. and Germany were also prime backers of their
implementers: Hitler in Germany and Roosevelt in the U.S.
Swope was chairman of the
board of General Electric Company and International General Electric. In 1932
the American directors of A.E.G, were prominently connected with American
banking and political circles as follows:
GERARD SWOPE |
Chairman of International General
Electric and
president of General Electric Company, director of
National City Bank (and other companies), director of A.E.G. and Osram in Germany. Author of
FDR's New Deal and member of numerous Roosevelt organizations. |
Owen D. Young |
Chairman of board of General
Electric, and deputy
chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Author, with J. P, Morgan, of the Young Plan
which superseded the Dawes Plan in 1929. (See
Chapter One.) |
CLARK H. Minor |
President and director of International General
Electric, director of British Thomson Houston,
Compania Generale di Electtricita (Italy), and
Japan Electric Bond & Share Company (Japan). |
In brief, we have hard
evidence of unquestioned authenticity (see p, 56) to show that German General
Electric contributed substantial sums to Hitler's political fund. There were
four American directors of A.E.G. (Baldwin, Swope, Minor, and Clark), which
was 80 percent owned by International General Electric. Further, I.G.E. and
the four American directors were the largest single interest and consequently
had the greatest single influence in A.E.G. actions and policies. Even
further, almost all other directors of A.E.G. were connected with firms (I. G.
Farben, Accumulatoren Fabrik, etc.) which contributed directly — as
firms — to Hitler's political fund. However, only the German directors of
A.E.G were placed on trial in Nuremburg in 1945.
Quite apart from financial
assistance to Hitler, General Electric extended its assistance to cartel
schemes with other Hitler backers for their mutual benefit and the benefit of
the Nazi state. Cemented tungsten carbide is one example of this G.E.-Nazi
cooperation. Prior to November 1928, American industries had several sources
for both tungsten carbide and tools and dies containing this hard-metal
composition. Among these sources were the Krupp Company of Essen, Germany, and
two American firms to which Krupp was then shipping and selling, the Union
Wire Die Corporation and Thomas Prosser & Son. In 1928 Krupp obligated
itself to grant licenses under United States patents which it owned to the
Firth-Sterling Steel Company and to the Ludlum Steel Company. Before 1928,
this tungsten carbide for use in tools and dies sold in the United states for
about $50 a pound.
The United States patents
which Krupp claimed to own were assigned from Osram Kommanditgesellschaft, and
had been previously assigned by the Osram Company of Germany to General
Electric. However, General Electric had also developed its own patents,
principally the Hoyt and Gilson patents, covering competing processes for
cemented tungsten carbide. General Electric believed that it could utilize
these patents independently without infringing on or competing with Krupp
patents. But instead of using the G.E. patents independently in competition
with Krupp, or testing out its rights under the patent laws, General Electric
worked out a cartel agreement with Krupp to pool the patents of both parties
and to give General Electric a monopoly control of tungsten carbide in the
United States.
The first step in this cartel
arrangement was taken by Carboloy Company, Inc., a General Electric
subsidiary, incorporated for the purpose of exploiting tungsten carbide. The
1920s price of around $50 a pound was raised by Carboloy to $458 a pound.
Obviously, no firm could sell any great amounts of tungsten carbide in this
price range, but the price would maximize profits for G.E. In 1934 General
Electric and Carboloy were also able to obtain, by purchase, the license
granted by Krupp to the Ludlum Steel Company, thereby eliminating one
competitor. In 1936, Krupp was induced to refrain from further imports into
the United States. Part of the price paid for the elimination from the
American market of tungsten carbide manufactured abroad was a reciprocal
undertaking that General Electric and Carboloy would not export from the U.S.
Thus these American companies tied their own hands by contract, or permitted
Krupp to tie their hands, and denied foreign markets to American industry.
Carboloy Company then acquired the business of Thomas Prosser & Son, and
in 1937, for nearly $1 million, Carboloy acquired the competing business of
the Union Wire Die Corporation. By refusing to sell, Krupp cooperated with
General Electric and Carboloy to persuade Union Wire Die Corporation to sell
out.
Licenses to manufacture
tungsten carbide were then refused. A request for license by the Crucible
Steel Company was refused in 1936. A request by the Chrysler Corporation for a
license was refused in 1938. A license by the Triplett Electrical Instrument
Company was refused on April 25, 1940. A license was also refused to the
General Cable Company. The Ford Motor Company for several years expressed
strong opposition to the high-price policy followed by the Carboloy Company,
and at one point made a request for the right to manufacture for its own use.
This was refused. As a result of these tactics, General Electric and its
subsidiary Carboloy emerged in 1936 or
1937 with virtually a complete monopoly of tungsten carbide in the United
States.
In brief, General Electric —
with the cooperation of another Hitler supporter, Krupp — jointly obtained
for G,E. a monopoly in the U.S. for tungsten carbide. So when World War II
began, General Electric had a monopoly at an established price of $450 a pound
— almost ten times more than the 1928 price — and use in the U.S. had been
correspondingly restricted,
By 1939 the German electrical
industry had become closely affiliated with two U.S. firms: International
General Electric and International Telephone and Telegraph. The largest firms
in German electrical production and their affiliations listed in order of
importance were:
Firm and Type
of Production |
Percent of German
1939 production |
U.S.
Affiliated
Firm |
Heavy Current
Industry
|
|
|
General Electric
(A.E.G. ) |
40 percent |
International General Electric |
Siemens Schukert
A.G. |
40 percent |
None |
Brown Boveri et Cie |
17 percent |
None |
Telephone and Telegraph
|
|
|
Siemens und Halske |
60 percent |
None |
Lorenz A.G. |
85 percent |
I.T.T |
Radio
|
|
|
Telefunken (A.E.G.
after 1941) |
60 percent |
International General Electric |
Lorenz |
35 percent |
I.T.T. |
Wire and Cable
|
|
|
Felton &
Guilleaume A.G. |
20 percent |
I.T.T. |
Siemens |
20 percent |
None |
A.E.G. |
20 percent |
International
General Electric |
In other words, in 1939 the
German electrical equipment industry was concentrated into a few major
corporations linked in an international cartel and by stock ownership to two
.major U.S. corporations. This industrial complex was never a prime target for
bombing in World War II. The A.E.G. and I.T.T. plants were hit only
incidentally in area raids and then but rarely. The electrical equipment
plants bombed as targets were not those affiliated with U.S. firms. It was
Brown Boveri at Mannheim and Siemensstadt in Berlin — which were not connected
with the U.S. — who were bombed. As a result, German production of electrical
war equipment rose steadily throughout World War II, peaking as late as 1944.
According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey reports, "In the
opinion of Speers' assistants and plant officials, the war effort in Germany
was never hindered in any important manner by any shortage of electrical
equipment."15
One example of the non-bombing
policy for German General Electric was the A. E.G. plant at 185 Muggenhofer
Strasse, Nuremburg. Study of this plant's output in World War II is of
interest because it illustrates the extent to which purely peacetime
production was converted to war work. The pre-war plant manufactured household
equipment, such as hot plates, electric ranges, electric irons, toasters,
industrial baking ovens, radiators, water heaters, kitchen ovens, and
industrial heaters. In 1939, 1940 and 1941, most of the Nuremburg plant's
production facilities were used for the manufacture of peacetime products. In
1942 the plant's production was shifted to manufacture of war equipment. Metal
parts for communications equipment and munitions such as bombs and mines were
made. Other war production consisted of parts for searchlights and amplifiers.
The following tabulation very strikingly shows the conversion to war work:
Year
|
Total sales
in 1000 RM |
Percent
for war
|
Percent ordinary production
|
1939 |
12,469 |
5 |
95 |
1940 |
11,754 |
15 |
85 |
1941 |
21,194 |
40 |
60 |
1942 |
20,689 |
61 |
39 |
1948 |
31,455 |
67 |
33 |
1944 |
31,205 |
69 |
31 |
The actual physical damage by
bombing to this plant was insignificant. No serious damage occurred until the
raids of February 20 and 21, 1945, near the end of the war, and then
protection had been fairly well developed. Raids during which bombs struck in
the plant area and the trifling damage done are listed as follows:
Date of raid
|
Bombs striking plant
|
Damage done
|
March 8, 1943 |
30 stick type
I.B. |
Trifling, but 3
storehouses outside the
main plant destroyed. |
Sept. 9, 1944 |
None (blast damage) |
Trifling, glass and
blackout curtain
damage. |
Nov. 26, 1944 |
14000 lb. HE in
open space in plant grounds |
Wood shop destroyed,
water main broken. |
Feb. 20, 1945 |
2 HE |
3 buildings damaged. |
Feb. 21, 1945 |
5 HE, many I.B.'s |
Administration bldg.
destroyed & enameling
works damaged by HE. |
Another example of a German
General Electric plant not bombed is the A.E.G. plant at Koppelsdorf producing
radar sets and bomber antennae. Other A.E.G. plants which were not bombed and
their war equipment production were:
LIST OF A.E.G. FACTORIES NOT
BOMBED IN WORLD WAR II
|
Name of Branch
|
Location
|
Product
|
1. |
Werk Reiehmannsdoff
mit Unterabteilungen
in Wallendorf und Unterweissbach |
Kries Saalfeld |
Measuring Instruments |
2. |
Werk Marktschorgast |
Bayreuth |
Starters |
3. |
Werk F18ha |
Sachsen |
Short Wave
Sending Sets |
4. |
Werk Reichenbach |
Vogtland |
Dry Cell
Batteries |
5. |
Werk Burglengefeld |
Sachsen/S.E.
Chemnitz |
Heavy Starters |
6. |
Werk Nuremburg |
Belringersdorf/
Nuremburg |
Small Components |
7. |
Werk Zirndorf |
Nuremburg |
Heavy
Starters |
8. |
Werk Mattinghofen |
Oberdonau |
1 KW Senders
250 Meters &
long wave for
torpedo boats
& U-boats |
9. |
Unterwerk Neustadt |
Coburg |
Radar
Equipment |
That the A.E.G. plants in
Germany were not bombed in World War II was confirmed by the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey, officered by such academics as John K. Galbraith and
such Wall Streeters as George W. Ball and Paul H. Nitze. Their "German
Electrical Equipment Industry Report" dated January 1947 concludes:
The industry has never been
attacked as a basic target system, but a few plants, i.e.
Brown Boveri at Mannheim, Bosch at
Stuutgart and Siemenstadt in Berlin, have been subjected to precision raids;
many others were hit in area raids.17
At the end of World War II an
Allied investigation team known as FIAT was sent to examine bomb damage to
German electrical industry plants. The team for the electrical industry
consisted of Alexander G.P.E. Sanders of International Telephone and Telegraph
of New York, Whit-worth Ferguson of Ferguson Electric Company, New York, and
Erich J. Borgman of Westinghouse Electric. Although the stated objective of
these teams was to examine the effects on Allied bombing of German targets,
the objective of this particular team was to get the German electrical
equipment industry back into production as soon as possible. Whirworth
Ferguson wrote a report dated March 31, 1945 on the A.E.G. Ostland-werke and
concluded, "this plant is immediately available for production of fine
metal parts and assemblies.18
To conclude, we find that both
Rathenau of A.E.G. and Swope of General Electric in the U.S. had similar ideas
of putting the State to work for their own corporate ends. General Electric
was prominent in financing Hitler, it profited handsomely from war production
— and yet it managed to evade bombing in World War II. Obviously the story
briefly surveyed here deserves a much more thorough — and official — investigation.
Footnotes:
1For the technical
details see the three-volume study, Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology and
Soviet Economic Development, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution
Press, 1968, 1971), 1973), hereafter cited as Western
Technology Series.
2(New York: Arlington
House Publishers, 1975)
3New York Times, October
6, 1936. See also Antony C. Sutton, Wall
Street and FDR, op. cit.
4Of course, socialist
pleading by businessmen is still with us. Witness the injured cries when
President Ford proposed deregulation of airlines and trucking. See for example Wall
Street Journal, November 25, 1975.
5Mimeographed
Translation in Hoover Institution Library, p. 67. Also see Walter Rathenau, In
Days to Come, (London: Allen & Unwin, n.d.)
7New York Times,
July
2, 1929.
9Ibid, August 2, 1929
and August 4, 1929.
11Ibid, February 2,
1930.
12Ibid, February 2,
1930.
13Ibid, May 11,
1930.
For the prewar machinations of General Electric, Osram, and the Dutch company
N.V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken of Eindhoven Holland, see Chapter 11, "Electric
Eels," in James Stewart Martin, op cit. Martin was Chief of the
Economic Warfare Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and comments that
"The A.E.G. of Germany was largely controlled by the American company,
General Electric." The assumption by this author is that the G.E. influence
was somewhat less than controlling although substantial enough. Because of
Martin's official position and access to official documents, not known to the
author, his statement that A.E.G. was "largely controlled" by U.S.
General Electric cannot be lightly dismissed. However, if we accept that G.E.
"largely controlled" A.E.G., then the most serious questions arise
which clamor for investigation. A.E.G. was a prime financier of Hitler and
"control" would more deeply implicate the U.S. parent company than is
suggested by the evidence presented here.
14Son of Emil
Rathenau,
founder of A.E.G., born in 1867 and assassinated in 1922.
15The United States
Strategic Bombing Survey, German Electrical Equipment Industry/Report, (Equipment
Division, January 1947), p. 4.
16U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey, Plant Report of A.E.G. (Allgemeine Elektrizitats Gesellschaft), Nuremburg,
Germany: June 1945), p. 6.
17p. 3. Consequently,
"production during the war was adequate until November 1944" and
"in the opinion of Speer assistants and plant officials the war effort in
Germany was never hindered in any important manner by any shortage of electrical
equipment." Difficulties arose only at the very end of the war when the
whole economy was threatened with collapse. The report concluded, "All
important needs for electrical equipment in 1944 may therefore be said to have
been met, since plans were always optimistic."
18U.S. Strategic
Bombing Survey, AEG-Ostlandwerke GmbH, by Whitworth Ferguson, 31 May
1945.
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