 
by Maj. Bart R. Kessler
March 1997
from
OldThinkerNews Website
Abstract The phrase “New World Order” has been widely used on the political scene since first publicly coined by former president, George Bush. Although quickly adopted as the catch phrase of the 1990s, few people actually agree on what “New World Order” really means.
Since “New World Order,” while elusive in
definition, is most frequently used to describe aspects of the post Cold War
international scenario, understanding the true meaning of that phrase is
critical to projecting our future strategic environment and prospects for
the new millennium. The attempt of this paper is to reveal that true
meaning.
Historical analysis will be the primary methodology used to reveal the meaning of George Bush’s specific terminology describing his concept of “New World Order.”
In a January 16, 1991 speech, he identified the
opportunity to build a New World Order,
These words will be dissected and historically
analyzed to develop a clear picture of “New World Order.”
Additionally, the primary mechanisms for
implementing New World Order will be addressed; and finally, specific
strategic environment and national security implications will be drawn from
those conclusions.
Chapter 1 What “New World Order?”
The phrase, “New World Order” has been widely
used since first coined by George Bush in his 1990 speech before a joint
session of Congress.
Although quickly adopted as the catch phrase of
the 1990s, few people actually agree on what “New World Order” really means.
It has been used to describe such diverse contemporary issues as the post
Cold War balance of power, economic interdependence, fragmentation and the
rise of nationalism, and technology advancement and integration - basically
any issue that appears new and different.
The general feeling is that while elusive, this
“New World Order” is likely significant. Since “New World Order” is most
frequently used to describe aspects of the post Cold War international
scenario, understanding the true meaning of that phrase is critical to
projecting our future strategic environment and prospects for the new
millennium.
The attempt of this paper is to reveal that true
meaning.
New World Order Interpretations
In relation to world politics, there are a few basic paradigm-driven interpretations of the New World Order.
Joseph Nye, in his 1992 Foreign Affairs
article, “What New World Order?” identifies two of those:
Another dichotomy of New World Order
interpretations is presented by Lawrence Freedman in his Foreign
Affairs article, “Order and Disorder in the New World.”
The struggle to ascertain George Bush’s true
meaning of New World Order is not unique to this author.
Richard Falk, in his 1993 work, The
Constitutional Foundations of World Peace, struggled with the realist
and liberalist - or more aptly termed - globalist interpretations.
So far there are three New World Order paradigms
presented: realist based, focused on balance of power; globalist based,
focused on global management and
the
United Nations (UN); and finally, idealist based, focused on
nothing more than the identification of change.
To make an accurate assessment of Bush’s precise
meaning, more information is obviously needed.
On January 16, 1991, he further clarified his
position in a speech announcing the hostilities with Iraq by identifying the
opportunity to build a New World Order,
These specifics in describing Bush’s concept of
New World Order clearly lean toward the
globalist interpretation.
Methodology Joseph Nye pointed out, that the,
Bush’s words, highlighted in the quote above,
will be analyzed in detail to reveal the nature of his globalist “big idea”
called New World Order.
Specifically, Chapter 2 will focus on the
identification of the “UN’s founders.” Chapter 3 will attempt to frame their
“vision.” Chapter 4 will address a “credible United Nations” and its
“peacekeeping role.” Chapter 5 will analyze “the rule of law” in terms of
governing “the conduct of nations.”
Following the detailed analysis of Bush’s words,
the mechanisms for implementing the New World Order will be addressed in
Chapter 6 as well as the implications of New World Order in Chapter 7.
Chapter 8 will reflect this authors final thoughts on the subject.
Notes
Chapter 2
The United Nations’ Founders
Interpreting Bush’s concept of New World Order
begins with identifying the “UN’s founders.”
Who were these men and women “gathered in San
Francisco?”
Before pursuing that question, though, it is
interesting to note that Bush was not basing his “big idea” on the founding
fathers of this great nation, but on a less infamous group of UN founders.
In fact, our nation’s founding fathers may not have been enamored with the
whole concept of a United Nations.
For instance, George Washington commented
in his farewell address that,
San Francisco Conference
The United Nations charter was established at the San Francisco Conference in June, 1945. By analyzing the events leading up to the conference and identifying some of the key players, it may be possible to pinpoint Bush’s “UN founders.” The War and Peace Studies of World War II provided the backdrop for the development of the United Nations. After 1942, all study groups of the War and Peace Studies shifted focus from the war effort to developing the structure and responsibilities of the future United Nations organization.2
In fact,
So exactly who were these people that
transitioned from the War and Peace Studies to the development and
establishment of the United Nations?
On 12 September, 1939, more than two years prior
to United States involvement in World War II, Hamilton Fish Armstrong
(then editor of the Council on Foreign Relations publication, Foreign
Affairs) and Walter Mallory (then Executive Director of the Council)
contacted the State Department to offer the services of the
Council on Foreign Relations.
Aware of the fact that the State Department
would not be able to create a brain trust within a short period of time,
both Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Hull’s undersecretary,
Sumner Welles, agreed to the Council’s plan.5
The State Department/Council relationship was
not public knowledge, though.
Isaiah Bowman, then a Council on
Foreign Relations Director, wrote in November of 1939 that,
Over the next five years, almost 100 men,
financed by nearly $350,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation, formulated 682
memoranda and drafts for the State Department.
The studies were divided into four primary
functional groups:
...all headed and staffed by Council members.7
Determining the precise impact of those
memoranda on the decisions of the State Department is impossible, but
Armstrong and Mallory were convinced that their efforts both defined the
boundaries of debate within the government and secured the Council’s role as
the center of attention for setting foreign policy priorities.8
The cooperation between the Council and the State Department was further enhanced when, in 1942, the State Department invited Council members to participate in the newly created Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.
In the spring of 1943, Armstrong and Norman
H. Davis (a Council Director) proposed a plan to Secretary of State Hull
for a “supranational organization” based on the Wilsonian ideals of liberal
internationalism. Hull subsequently asked Davis to present the proposal to
President Roosevelt.
Roosevelt liked the idea and within a short time blueprints for a charter of the successor to the League of Nations were drafted and discussed... In his discussions with Davis, President Roosevelt proposed changes, and Davis introduced these into the discussions and revisions of drafts. Roosevelt, in August 1943, took the final draft with him to the Quebec Conference, where it was accepted by Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Minister Eden.
With only minor changes, the text was taken to
Moscow and signed by delegates of the United States, Great Britain, China,
and the Soviet Union as the
Moscow Declaration on 1 November 1943.
In this document, the nations not only pledged
to coordinate and cooperate in their war aims but also declared,
The framework for the United Nations was clearly
in place. The culmination would come at the San Francisco Conference.
Authors of the subject disagree as to the specific amount of influence
levied by the Council.
Dan Smoot, in
The Invisible Government, concludes
that:
Cleon Skousen in
The Naked Capitalist deduced a
different number when he said:
Whatever the number, it is clear that the
Council was a major player in both the conference and the founding of the
UN.
Even Michael Wala, who is much less
convinced of the power of the Council than Smoot and Skousen, said in
The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign
Policy in the Early Cold War that,
Based the discussion so far, it seems reasonable
to conclude that Bush’s “UN’s founders,” are represented, maybe not
entirely, but at least in large part by the Council on Foreign Relations.
A more detailed look at the Council is required,
though, to determine their importance as related to a New World Order.
Council on Foreign Relations For the Council on Foreign Relations, as a “UN founder,” to play a significant role in the creation of Bush’s New World Order, one would think that they must have some impact on the formulation and/or implementation of American foreign policy.
The relationship between the Council and
American foreign policy will now be further analyzed.
Inquiry The internationalist ideal of the United Nations was not new.
The Council members viewed this as a “second
chance” at internationalism through a supranational organization.14
The first, the League of Nations, was a concept formulated with the help of
the “The Inquiry,” the predecessor to the War and Peace Studies and
catalyst for the creation of the Council on Foreign Relations.
The Inquiry was a working,
In the few years immediately following the Paris
Peace Conference, the leaders of the Inquiry established the Council on
Foreign Relations.
The Council was formally incorporated on July
29, 1921 with the specific purpose,
As supporters of Wilson and the League of
Nations, Council members were greatly disillusioned by the Senate’s
rejection of the League and the swell of isolationist sentiment in America.
They “resolved to awaken America to its
worldwide responsibilities.” 18
Hence, began the Council’s long-standing drive
to advocate globalist foreign policies. Their internationalist bent was
clearly demonstrated by one of the Council’s first internal controversies.
Within the first year or so of the Council’s existence, an avowed
isolationist was invited to speak at private Council dinner meeting.
Many members were outraged.
In response, Isaiah Bowman, of the
original Inquiry, presented a different perspective:
This episode established the precedent for
Hamilton Fish Armstrong’s strategy of presenting the Council as impartial by
inviting varied speakers, but limiting the membership to those “influential
figures who shared an internationalist perspective.” 21
Foreign Policy Process Impact
The Council on Foreign Relations has been singled out as one of the most influential organizations impacting American foreign policy.22 The degree to which the Council has influenced foreign policy over the last 75 years is heavily debated; the fact that it has is not. The Council on Foreign Relations is populated with powerful figures from all walks of life.
Their own 25 year history stated that,
Numerous United States presidents, secretaries
of state, CIA directors, and many other influential foreign policy positions
have been filled with names from the rolls of the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Just by scanning the very short list of Council
on Foreign Relations past and present Directors and Officers, one can
quickly identify several key players in our recent administrations:
A review of the entire Council roll (which this
author did not have the resources to pursue) would produce many more.
The Council on Foreign Relations, because of wealthy, influential members such as the Rockefellers, has been traditionally associated with the “elites” in America and has been referred to by some as representative of the “Eastern Establishment.”
There are many conspiracy theories associated
with the Council’s influence on American foreign affairs. This paper is not
intended to adopt any of those theories, but to show that regardless of
support for these theories, most students of the Council have concluded that
there is substantial linkage between the Council and American foreign
policy.
Michael Wala, who clearly denies support for the conspiracy view, still concludes at the very end of his book, that,
Professor G. William Domhoff has
concluded in his studies that through the Council,
As an example, he highlights that twelve of
fifteen presidential committees dealing with aspects of foreign and military
policy established between 1945 and 1972 were headed by members of the
Council on Foreign Relations.27
Anthony Lukas debunked the conspiracy theory in his article, but pointed out that,
Carroll Quigley, a former Georgetown
professor, who once taught President Clinton, provided the most intriguing
commentary on the subject.
In his 1966 mammoth 1300 plus page work,
Tragedy and Hope - A History of the World in Our Time,
Quigley commented on the conspiracy theory:
He goes on to further clarify that,
Quigley continues:
The linchpin is that Quigley identifies the
“American Establishment” half of the “Anglophile network” as the Council on
Foreign Relations.32
These words probably provide the greatest
testimony of the power and influence of the Council on Foreign Relations
because they come from a man on the inside intimately familiar with the
organization and its linkage to the foreign policy process.
Regardless of their perspective, several students and one insider of the Council have all concluded that the Council is a significant player in the American foreign policy process.
This author would have to agree despite the
Council’s defense that it is nothing more than,
This picture just doesn’t wash with the comments
of members such as Richard Barnet who stated that,
Given the Council’s role as a “UN founder” and
their influence on foreign policy, two more linkages need to be
discussed prior to proceeding.
Foreign Affairs
Part of the Council on Foreign Relation’s purpose is to provide a foreign affairs educational forum.
One of their primary tools to achieve that
purpose is their publication, Foreign Affairs. Officially, Foreign Affairs
does not represent the views of the Council, but those of individuals, and
is open to all perspectives. However, Wala and Schulzinger have slightly
different interpretations.
Wala points out that through discussion groups
and Foreign Affairs, Council members sought to,
Schulzinger, in The Wise Men of Foreign
Affairs adds that,
Since articles published in Foreign Affairs
primarily represent the ideologies and policies important to the Council,
they will be frequently utilized as primary sources later in this paper.
Foundations It is important to note that the Council on Foreign Relations is not a stand-alone entity with a monopoly on foreign policy influence.
No one organization can be all powerful in
today’s complex society. There are many influential organizations, but the
Council is one of the few that has been consistently identified throughout
the last 75 years.
One additional linkage important to highlight for the rest of this analysis, though, is that of tax exempt foundations.
Republican Congressman Carroll Reese,
heading a Special Committee on Tax-Exempt Foundations, concluded the
following in his final report published December 16, 1954 by the Government
Printing Office:
Nearly twenty years later, Professor Domhoff
further evidenced the linkage by pointing out that,
The foundations have provided a funding source
for many activities of the Council and related organizations. Recall the
earlier mentioned financier of the War and Peace Studies - the Rockefeller
Foundation.
The foundation linkage will reappear in later
discussions on the “vision” of the “UN founders.”
George Bush and New World Order Linkage Two final questions need to be addressed prior to proceeding.
The first is, could George Bush have actually
inferred involvement of an organization like the Council on Foreign
Relations in his “UN founders” phrase? Given Bush’s long-standing
involvement with the organization, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
answer is, yes!
Bush was on the Council Board of Directors in
the years 1977-1979 and a member long before that.39 He stepped
down from the boards of the Council, Yale, and the
Trilateral Commission to shed his “establishment” image prior to
his run for the Republican presidential nomination.40
But, despite early momentum, he lost the 1980
Republican primary to Ronald Reagan due largely to what Holly
Sklar calls,
Obviously, Bush knows a thing or two about the
workings of the Council and as such, clearly understands their linkage to
the formation of the United Nations.
The second question is, why has such a significant amount of effort gone into describing the relationships of the Council on Foreign Relations prior to proceeding with the analysis of Bush’s New World Order words? Understanding the Council relationship is critical to establishing the framework for the upcoming description of New World Order vision and implementation mechanisms.
Council related writings will therefore provide
the predominant sources for the rest of this paper.
Notes
Chapter 3
New World Order Vision
The current task at hand is to build a clear
picture of the New World Order “promise and vision” of Bush’s UN founders.
To accomplish this, the ideas that evolved from the War and Peace studies
will first be examined. Then two, more contemporary world order studies
related to the Council on Foreign Relations will be evaluated.
The aspects of New World Order vision that
impact national security strategy are those that will be highlighted.
War and Peace Studies
In his 1992 Foreign Affairs article, Joseph Nye, comparing the present with the past, concluded that,
And the vision of that liberal institutional
order was driven by the Council’s War and Peace Studies. The first critical
challenge to world order vision was to resolve the competing nature of
universal order on one hand and national sovereignty on the other.
Walter R. Sharp, a general working on the
War and Peace Studies Politics group, denounced the,
Sharp foresaw the advancement of economic
interdependence as means of eroding national barriers.
On the security side, the studies concluded that the new United Nations must have responsibility for policing international disorders. Several recommendations were presented for the creation of an international police-like force. Rather than creating a true multinational army, Colonel George Fielding Eliot advocated assigning whole units of national forces on a two-year rotating basis to UN command.
Eliot’s fear of a permanent UN multinational
police force was that a centralized Chief of Staff,
Another Armaments group staffer, Theodore P.
Wright, presented a truly visionary strategy for international policing
which may be viewed as a prophesy of the outcome of the Gulf War.
Wright foresaw air power as the wise solution to
overcoming the difficulties of forging a true international army. Air power
provided the opportunity for awesome destructiveness while employing
relatively few personnel.
Wright explains:
Minor powers lacked air forces of any
significance and were helpless against superpower fighters and bombers
acting under UN direction.
He expected an international air force to apply
“quick and certain” retribution against peace violators. Such action,
according to Wright would promote the “development of feelings of world
citizenship.” 4
The Gulf War could be viewed as fulfillment of that vision. Asymmetrical coalition air forces under UN authority (via resolution) provided the “quick and certain” retribution against the violator, Iraq.
In fact, George Bush alluded to the,
Grayson Kirk, also of the Armament group,
envisioned the necessity of an “intermediate arrangement” between the jump
from world war to world sovereignty. He advocated an intermediate step of
regional security arrangements built around the United States, Great
Britain, Soviet Union, and China. Additionally, he felt that regionalism
could only be a catalyst for international integration if it remained
informal and flexible.6
The Council strongly backed the loosening of the definition of American interests to include applying military force “wherever a serious threat to peace may arise.”
Aggressor nations must be thwarted by collective
force. As such, a criteria for determining aggression must be established.
The Armaments group identified an aggressor as
a,
The War and Peace Studies therefore
formulated a foundational vision of a New World Order of transitional
sovereignty, aided by economic interdependence; collective security
maintaining international order through a multinational police force under
centralized authority; and, a shift from unilateral actions based solely on
national interests to support of collective actions based on common
interests, especially against “aggressor nations.”
The authors of the War and Peace Studies provided both the framework of the New World Order vision and the realization that the international transformation would be a long term venture.
Unlike their Paris Peace Conference
predecessors, the studies staffers recognized that shift to greater world
sovereignty would take time and that the,
In addition, regional arrangements would provide
the stepping stone to world order.
Since this evolution - as predicted - has been a long term venture, it pays to look at some more recent Council related studies to provide more fidelity to the contemporary New World Order vision. In the 1970s, two independent studies related to New World Order were undertaken.
One, the World Order Models Project, was
directed by Council member and former Rutgers Professor of Law, Saul H.
Mendlovitz, with heavy academic contributions by another Council member,
Princeton Professor Richard A. Falk, and financed by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation. 9
The second, The 1980s Project, was an
extensive study produced by the Trilateral Commission, a Council offshoot
created by David Rockefeller to focus on developing trilateral regional
cooperation between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
World Order Models Project Richard Falk and other World Order Models Project (WOMP) contributors give credit to Mendlovitz as having “done much to shape the course of this world order journey” over the past 25 years.10
The WOMP provides probably the most idealistic
vision for the New World Order, concentrating on evolving a “transnational
framework of world order values, thinking, and action.” 11
The four central world order values are:
It is interesting to note that Robert S.
McNamara was a member of the WOMP Sponsoring and Policy Review
Committee.13 The WOMP, while idealistic, was surely not utopian.
Mendlovitz describes the action-oriented WOMP
methodology:
While the WOMP values seem mundane enough, their
conclusions were not.
With the main concern of the WOMP being war and
its destructive nature, one of their central New World Order visions in
Falk’s A Study of Future Worlds was the,
Hidemi Suganami, in his review of world
order proposals, summarizes Falk’s New World Order guiding principles as
world disarmament, establishment of an international police force to settle
disputes, implementation of a global checks and balances system, and
constitution of a coordinating body to provide unity to the global
structure.16
WOMP-related work has continued throughout the years. Mendlovitz more recently developed specific time phased objectives to support what he called a “Movement For A Just World Peace.”
His short run objectives for 1991-1993 included,
His intermediate targets for 2001-2003 included:
And finally, Mendlovitz’s long range goals for
2011-2013 were much more ambitious.
They included,
Mendlovitz presents a vision of evolutionary
disarmament accompanied by corresponding strengthening of a UN security
apparatus. Additionally, he advocates a mechanism - global tax - to fund
international organizations and foresees an enhancement of international
judiciary powers.
This vision at first blush may seem somewhat
radical, but a closer look shows it not to be far off the mark. The process
of disarmament, spurred by the end of the Cold War, did in fact begin about
the time Mendlovitz predicted. The UN security apparatus has strengthened
through the course of recent activities in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and
Rwanda.
The United States seems to have fully adopted
the concept of UN sponsored and supported actions based on the extent of
UN/multinational related doctrine being published by the Department of
Defense. Several recommendations for a tax on international flights to
financially support the UN have recently been presented, the most notable by
former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.18
And finally, the enhancement of international
judiciary powers is demonstrated by such recent events as the 1996
swearing-in of 21 judges constituting the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea.19
The reason for success in implementing world order visions is not chance. These visionaries do not perceive their actions as academic exercises. They do not advocate passive acceptance of evolutionary world order shifts, but active engineering of the transition process.
Falk clearly states that,
Later, in A Study of Future Worlds, Falk
provides a specific strategy:
The articulated philosophies of former
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the active advocacy of UN
peacekeeping by Canada, may be evidence of reasonable success of Falk’s
twenty year old strategy.
1980s Project There is one additional New World Order project which needs to be addressed prior to proceeding. In the 1970s, the Council on Foreign Relations, primarily through its offshoot - the Trilateral Commission - undertook a five year, $1.6 million research effort titled the “1980s Project.”
According to its Director, Richard H. Ullman,
the 1980s Project was,
The 1980s Project’s task was to define the
issues and policies required to respond to a post Cold War international
scenario. Unlike its predecessors, the Inquiry and the War and Peace
Studies, the 1980s Project was a study effort open to members and
non-members, and openly published to stimulate a broad professional audience
- not just government decision-makers.23
The primary focus of the 1980s Project was social and economic issues, but a few security related studies were pursued. In fact, Cyrus Vance, former Council director, chaired a group charged with studying weapons of mass destruction immediately prior to becoming Secretary of State.24 One clear influence on our current military came from the study titled International Disaster Relief (1977)
It recommended that Washington should do more to
coordinate its relief efforts to assist flood, earthquake, famine, and other
disaster victims. Relief agencies should be given more direct responsibility
for operations.
And, all nations should accept the,
This concept has manifest itself this decade in
the likes of Somalia and Rwanda. The United States has adopted humanitarian
assistance as a military mission and corresponding military doctrine is
currently on the street and being written to more effectively involve the
relief agencies in humanitarian assistance operations.
The 1980s Project, under the auspices of the Trilateral Commission, primarily involved authors from the United States, Europe, and Japan. The broadly based recommendations ignored the centrality of the Cold War and as a whole indicted the “narrow, ethnocentric, and ideological course of American foreign policy since 1945.26
The diverse set of policy recommendations,
clearly globalist in nature, advocated an incremental approach to functional
interdependence. The project ideas, while seemingly ahead of their time, set
the agenda for the next couple of decades. The Carter administration
attempted to implement some of the 1980s Project “world order politics” in
1977 and 1978, but fell victim to the reality of the Cold War.27
The Council, in its own historical account, again highlights its ability to influence the implementation of its own world order ideas:
Visionary Conclusion By analyzing the above studies, the “vision of the UN founders” comes into a little better focus.
The vision is clearly globalist.
It advocates:
This New World Order vision provides the
framework for interpreting a “credible United Nations” and its “peacekeeping
role” in the upcoming chapter.
Notes
Chapter 4
A Credible United Nations and its Peacekeeping Role
To be “credible,” the United Nations is
dependent upon the full development of its “peacekeeping role” as envisioned
by its founders.
As a second attempt to implement Wilsonian-like
internationalism, the United Nations must achieve international credibility
to shed the stigma of its aborted predecessor, the League of Nations.
The interdependence between credibility and
peacekeeping is most clearly articulated by former Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali:
So, credibility of the UN as a guarantor of
international security is contingent upon having both the authority and
means to take military action. In understanding the UN’s peacekeeping role,
it is important to note the semantic difference between war and peacekeeping
from the UN founders’ perspective.
Peacekeeping is a more contemporary word for what the UN founders envisioned as international police action.
Payson Wild of the War and Peace
Studies Armaments group distinguished between war and international
policing (or peacekeeping in today’s vernacular) by defining police action
as force used “in behalf of the community” for “the maintenance of order and
the establishment of the supremacy of law” versus war which is “conducted
for a national authority” to achieve “the defeat of the enemy.”
Policing or peacekeeping implied that armed
forces are “under community control and used only against those who break
community laws.” 2 The supremacy of law in this context relates
to Bush’s “rule of law” which will be covered in the next chapter.
Roosevelt himself used the police analogy in describing credible UN peacekeeping:
In discounting the extreme leverage applied by
Security Council members such as the United States, Roosevelt continued his
analogy:
Again, it is clear that the UN must possess both
the authority and means to be an effective and credible international
“policeman.”
The authority comes through reduction in the role of the Security Council veto. The “means” most generally advocated is that of a permanent UN peacekeeping force.
Robert C. Johansen in the WOMP related
work, The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace explains:
He then paints a very quaint picture of
international police enforcement:
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, also a permanent
force advocate, recommended that negotiations commence to create the,
He felt that the end of the Cold War removed the
major political obstacles preventing earlier fulfillment of this Charter
vision.
Burns H. Weston, another Constitutional Foundations of World Peace author, provides the most comprehensive strategy for achieving “credible” UN peacekeeping.
He suggests:
In summary, further clarification of George
Bush’s words identifies a New World Order where a “credible United Nations”
achieves authority by minimizing the role of Security Council veto and uses
permanently assigned/allocated armed forces in a “peacekeeping role” to
fulfill the international policeman “vision of the UN’s founders.”
Notes
Chapter 5 Rule of Law
Critical to the interpretation of Bush’s call
for a New World Order “where the rule of law... governs the conduct of
nations,” is the understanding of the context of “rule of law.”
It is interesting that while using the same
“rule of law” phrase in their addresses, Bush failed to provide any
clarification of meaning, yet Gorbachev explicitly highlighted that states
“subordinate their foreign policy activities to law.” 1
Former Secretary of State James Baker provided some “rule of law” clarification on September 26, 1990 when he advised the House Foreign Affairs Committee that,
Henry Kissinger additionally pointed out
that “conventional American thinking” supports the notion of “a New World
Order,” emerging from a “set of legal arrangements.” 3
It is important to note the linkage created
between New World Order, rule of law-international law, and the United
Nations. Just how would these New World Order “legal arrangements” of
international law be implemented and what is the relationship to the United
Nations?
James Baker once again provided some insight.
Responding to House Foreign Affairs Committee
questioning, Baker said that we, the United States,
Author Laura L. Kirmse, after researching
the details of Baker’s premise, has concluded that Bush’s New World Order
refers to a move toward world authority under the auspices of a revitalized
United Nations, and that UN treaties, once ratified by the Senate, may
override and supersede the laws of the US, and even the Constitution itself.5
The Constitution of the United States directs the following in regard to treaties:
In the Jeffersonian tradition, treaties were
intended to affect state-to-state actions, not to have direct authority
within a country over the laws, regulations, or the relationship between the
government and its citizens.
Several legal decisions and constitutional
interpretations have demonstrated otherwise, though. Kirmse identifies
several legal rulings which support the supremacy of the UN Charter.
Fuji v. the State of California provides the
most eye-opening position:
John Foster Dulles understood this concept well
as attested by these comments made in a 1952 speech [documented in the
Congressional Record] of his prior to being appointed Secretary of State:
Several wise Americans in the 1950s began to
fear both the legal power of United Nations-related treaties to supersede
the Constitution and the vague authority of the President through the
“conduct of foreign affairs” to bind the United States legally by executive
agreements requiring no Senate ratification.
The deals at Yalta between President Roosevelt
and Stalin, the Potsdam agreement between President Truman and Stalin, and
according to then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, over 10,000 NATO
agreements all fall within the context of “executive agreements.” Many were
never published.
As a result, Senator John W. Bricker,
supported by 63 other Senators, sponsored an amendment to close the
perceived Constitutional loopholes.
The Bricker Amendment would have added
the following language to clarify the Constitution:
Although seemingly patriotic and simple, the
amendment was killed by President Eisenhower.10
Not to infer cause and effect, but only to note
the curious - Dwight D. Eisenhower was a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations.11 The fears that United States citizens may be
legally subject to trials of international courts were not suppressed.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee discussion with Secretary of State Baker in September of 1990 reveals that this concern is not antiquated:
The evidence of constitutional logic, legal
precedence, and executive and legislative intent seems to support Kirmse’s
conclusion that:
The international “rule of law” then has the
potential to govern much more than the “conduct of nations.”
It also may govern the conduct of the
individual. In the Council on Foreign Relations and American Assembly
(founded in 1950 by Dwight D. Eisenhower) 1992 work,
Rethinking American Security - Beyond Cold War to
New World Order, John H.
Barton and Barry E. Carter identify the most notable aspects of
international law evolution over the last 50 years.
They recognized that,
Former UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali provided insight into recent events related to international
law and tribunals.
In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, in an attempt to reinforce the role of the International
Court of Justice, recommended that,
Note the similarity to Mendlovitz’s WOMP decade
of the 1990s goal of “submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice” identified in Chapter 3.
The most revealing fulfillment of Barton and Carter’s revelation was the October 1996 swearing-in ceremony of twenty-one Law of the Seas Tribunal’s Judges by Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
During his swearing-in statement, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali said:
Boutros Boutros-Ghali continues with words that
seem to be extracted directly from Bush’s New World Order speech:
It seems like everyone in the business of New
World Order is singing from the same sheet of music.
Nearly twenty years ago, Peter Jay, in his 1979 Foreign Affairs article, “Regionalism as Geopolitics,” noted that:
The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War reduced the suspicion and cynicism by creating the perception
of stability.
The 1990s then provided George Bush the
opportunity to fulfill Jay’s New World Order prophesy.
Notes
Chapter 6
The Road to New World Order
World order as a set of concepts, objectives,
and strategies is anything but “new.”
George Bush was not the father of New World
Order thinking, just an advocate that happened to be in the right
position at the right time to flame the fires of the next significant thrust
in the evolutionary development of world order.
The Bush instigated post-Cold War New World
Order thrust can be interpreted as the third major attempt in this century
to create a world ordered by a “credible” universal authority enforcing the
international “rule of law” through collective security measures, police
action or “peacekeeping.”
The “vision” of world order has remained fairly
constant throughout this century; specific strategies for attainment,
though, have varied widely. The climax of the three most significant world
emotional events in this century, World War I, World War II, and the Cold
War, have provided the catalyst for successive attempts at New World Order.
The first two attempts were manifested in the
form of the League of Nations and the United Nations. The third attempt at
achieving New World Order is much more complex, amorphous, and difficult to
distinguish.
Discernment of the third attempt is the subject
of this chapter.
Third Try at New World Order The epigraph quote on the previous page by F.S. Marvin referred to the world order precedent set by the formation of the League of Nations.
Marvin was careful to point out, though, that
the League was an important symbol, but not the genesis or end-all of world
order:
He provides further clarification by describing
the New World Order goal and limited role of the League:
So, we can see that 65 years ago, there was
perceived to be a New World Order movement towards world unity and decreased
nationality/sovereignty. The League was an unparalleled symbol of the
movement, but a symbol nonetheless. The League, as a mechanism of the world
order movement, failed to fulfill expectations largely due to lack of
support from isolationist Americans.
Recall from Chapter 2 the framework for the League of Nations was formulated by the “Inquiry” - the predecessor to the Council on Foreign Relations World War II War and Peace Studies. World War II conveniently provided an opportunity for the “founders of the UN” to propose a second attempt at world order which would presumably account for the flaws inherent in the League structure.
In Michael Wala’s words:
The establishment of the United Nations became
the second attempt.
Although more successful than its predecessor,
the UN again failed to meet New World Order expectations largely because of
the Cold War friction between the United States and the Soviet Union.
International dynamics had to change for the world to accept a “credible” UN
fulfilling the “vision” of its “founders.”
The trigger event was the fall of the Berlin
Wall and corresponding end to the Cold War. The fact, though, is the third
attempt, very dissimilar to the first two, was well under way prior to that
event.
Evidence of this was provided by Harlan
Cleveland, former Assistant Secretary of State, former Ambassador to
NATO, and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, in his comments
regarding a 1976 report he helped author, United Nations, released by the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
New World Order Paths The third attempt, more complicated than the others, involves traversing three interlinked paths that pave the road to world order.
One path involves strengthening the powers of
the United Nations and its associated institutions to enhance their world
authority. The second path on the road to New World Order is through
evolutionary regionalism.
The idea is to develop regional entities that
bind states through super-state political, economic, and legal arrangements.
The third path is built on the foundation of
piecemeal functionalism whereby functional issues such as economics and
trade, environmental conservation, and weapons of mass destruction
proliferation drive international interdependence and further international
law constraints. Much of “piecemeal functionalism” is directly related to UN
subsidiaries.
The following sections briefly describe the
historical and recent support for the three paths on the road to world
order.
United Nations Strengthening The call for strengthening the United Nations from the world order advocates has been strong and consistent.
Robert Ducci in his 1964 Foreign Affairs
article, “The World Order in the Sixties,” said that:
A detailed plan for strengthening the UN was
articulated by John Logue, Vice-President of World Federalist
Association.
On December 4, 1985, he gave the following
testimony to the Human Rights and International Organization subcommittee of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee joint hearing on the United Nations:
Over the last few years, almost all of those
recommendations have been pursued by the United Nations and its supporters.
As one example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was aided
by the Ford Foundation (tax-exempt foundation link to financing New World
Order strategies) in creating an advisory group of financial specialists and
bankers to identify “dependable sources of revenue.” Their recommendations
included imposing a UN tax on international plane tickets.7
Another example was the previously discussed
establishment of the International Law of the Sea Tribunal providing the
mechanism “to make and enforce law on the individual.”
The continuous strengthening and legitimization of the UN sets the stage for Bush’s observation that:
Trilateral Regionalism The strategy of building world order on the framework of regionalism has also been around for quite some time.
In 1929, N.S.B. Gras in his Foreign
Affairs article, “Regionalism and Nationalism,” stated:
Gras emphasized the importance of the region to
a “super-state of some kind.”
A reasonably accurate fulfillment of this vision
is found in the European Community which is well on its way to becoming a
super-state containing its own political, economic, and judicial systems.
A more radical concept in the evolutionary development of world order regionalism was presented in 1949 by Maurice Parmelee in Geo-Economic Regionalism and World Federation:
Parmelee further specifies that,
In fact, geo-economic, interdependent
regionalism is exactly the policy advocated and pursued over the last
twenty-five years by the Trilateral Commission. The Trilateral
Commission was founded in July 1973 by David Rockefeller, then Council on Foreign Relations Chairman of the Board. Its purpose was previewed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor, Council Director, and Trilateral Commission President, in his 1973 Foreign Affairs article when he stated that,
Brzezinski and the
Trilateral Commission took their mission very seriously:
With the Cold War still at the forefront of
international relations, the Trilateral Commission seemed somewhat
omniscient when in the 1970s they observed that the,
The Trilateral Commission recognized that this
third attempt at world order, building a “global political system” primarily
through economic interdependence, would not come quickly:
The Commission’s primary undertaking was to
create a new international economic order through trilateral cooperation.
Some of their early successes were highlighted
by former Washington Post reporter, Jeremiah Novak:
Recall that trilateral regionalism represents
only one world order path.
In the words of William Hoar,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali provided the contemporary
linkage between regionalism and the first path to world order, UN
strengthening. In his “Agenda for Peace” speech, Boutros-Ghali said,
His focus at that point was security
arrangements, but the concept of regional linkage to UN authority applies
universally.
Not to lose sight of the objective of this analysis - interpreting George Bush’s meaning of “New World Order” - it is important to come full cycle to Bush’s vision as articulated to the United Nations General Assembly:
Piecemeal Functionalism The final, and most intriguing path supporting the third attempt at world order is referred to as piecemeal functionalism. Several Council on Foreign Relations related authors and studies have advocated world order strategies based on piecemeal functionalism.
The Trilateral Commission recommends piecemeal
functionalism as a means of achieving the interdependence between nations
and regions as discussed in the previous section.
The 1977 Trilateral Commission Task Force
Report, Towards a Renovated International System, laid out a specific
definition and strategy for piecemeal functionalism:
Richard N. Gardner, former Carter
advisor, Ambassador to Italy, Council member, and Columbia University law
professor, presented the most revealing look at an integrated New World
Order strategy in his 1974 Foreign Affairs article, “The Hard Road to World
Order”
He answered the call for an innovative third
attempt at world order by advocating a decentralized functional - ”piecemeal
functionalism” - approach anchored by the “rule of law” and integrated with
the United Nations:
Gardner’s specific functional
institution-building issues were: the international monetary system,
international trade, environment, population explosion, food shortages, the
world’s oceans, weapons proliferation, and peacekeeping.23
All of those issues have indeed been catalysts
for international action over the last twenty-three years. It’s apparent
that the international growth of interdependence at the functional level
that we have experienced over the last quarter of a century may not have
been the result of random “booming, buzzing confusion,” but in fact a more
calculated strategy of world order.
Twenty-three years seems to be beyond the
planning range of most, but not Gardner and certainly not the Council.
Gardner realistically explained that:
Notes
Chapter 7 New World Order Implications The intent of this paper was to derive some conclusions about the strategic environment and prospects for the new millennium based on the interpretation of George Bush’s New World Order - where the,
This author’s perspective of Bush’s New World
Order will be briefly recapped.
The implications of new world orderism,
taken independently, do not appear to be surprising revelations.
Taken as a whole and taken within the context of
the New World Order vision laid out over the past chapters, these
implications may raise some concern.
Multilevel Interdependence The first conclusion drawn from this analysis involves the structure of the international system. One of the current hot topics of political discussion is projecting the nature of the post-Cold War international system. The simple bipolar structure no longer exists.
Many scholars present variations of what
Daniel S. Papp calls the three primary possibilities,
The truth, though, is that the complexity of the
strategy for world order drives an international structure that does not
lend itself to simple models. Joseph Nye, a Trilateral Commission
author, provides the most descriptive world analogy in his model termed
“multilevel interdependence.”
In a 1992 Foreign Affairs article, he said:
Note the reflection of trilateral regionalism
and piecemeal functionalism in this model.
He adds that:
State permeability implies the leakage or
transfer of national authority and sovereignty to some other medium. One
willing and active recipient is the United Nations.
United Nations Sovereignty Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace first emphasized that respect for the state’s,
Then he refined his statement by declaring that,
The attack on national sovereignty is real, but
subtle. The League of Nations failed in part because of its overt
grab at national sovereignty. The UN proponents are careful not to repeat
that mistake.
Joseph Nye predicts that,
Foreign Affairs published an article in 1996 by
conservative Senator Jesse Helms which, not surprisingly, was
critical of the United Nations’ attempt to dissolve national sovereignty.
Senator Helms, who was severely blasted in the
letters to the editor of the following Foreign Affairs issue, said that,
He continues by noting that,
The subtle complexity by which the United
Nations is likely to enhance their sovereignty at the expense of the
sovereignty of the states is best described by a model presented by
Farida Aziz in his work, New World Order, the 21st Century.
He astutely concludes that,
This analogy nicely integrates the “rule of law”
concept and resolves the dichotomy of Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s statement
apparently supportive of fundamental state sovereignty yet against exclusive
state sovereignty. State sovereignty will be relegated to “leasehold”
activities under the “rule of law governing the conduct of nations.”
The landlord becomes the United Nations and the
lease enforcement mechanism is international “peacekeeping.”
Peacekeeping
With the decline of state sovereignty will come the increase in types and frequency of United Nations peacekeeping actions. Recall that to be “credible,” the UN must develop the capability to enforce international order.
Under the vision of its founders, this
collective security mechanism was to be a UN military force under Security
Council control. When those key elements did not materialize, the UN pursued
a role not originally foreseen - ”peacekeeping.”
Now that the United Nations is within sight of
fulfilling the vision of its founders, the “peacekeeping” concept must be
expanded to encompass world order enforcement. “Peacekeeping” is a
convenient phrase to spin-off of because of its non-threatening nature.
Therefore,
Bruce Russett, former Director of the
Executive Office of the UN Secretary General, and James S. Sutterlin
present a comprehensive discussion of the UN collective security and
peacekeeping roles in their 1991 Foreign Affairs article, “The UN in a New
World Order.”
They also note the flexible application of the
term peacekeeping:
Their most revealing observation is that,
So the concept of Security Council decision
making autonomy is introduced. That autonomy is an integral aspect of UN
“credibility.”
Many internationalists now advocate full execution of Article 43 of the UN Charter whereby member nations make units of their armed forces available for UN enforcement actions in accordance with special agreements between themselves and the Security Council.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali reinforced the
concept when he declared:
Richard Gardner more specifically
addresses the possibility of Security Council autonomy in his explanation of
the benefits of full implementation of Article 43:
The Senate is probably not ready to sign up to
that level of United States commitment to the UN in the near future, but a
move in that direction is possible.
The shift will likely come in the form of
apportioned rapid deployment forces fully trained in and available for UN
operations. This concept is widely advocated by likes of Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, Richard Gardner, Joseph Nye, and many others. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali envisions the capability for a 24-hour call-up contingency
force sourced from any of a number of nations.14
Gardner and Nye intuitively highlight the
necessity of common training and multinational exercises to develop an
effective UN command and control structure and operational procedures.15
The United States is likely to move in this
direction - enhancing UN peacekeeping related doctrine, training, and
exercises, while for the meantime, maintaining control over commitment of
forces.
Common vs. National Interests The commitment of forces to UN peacekeeping missions will most likely continue to increase, though.
The principle driver will be the shift of
emphasis of the American leadership from the protection of vital national
interests as commitment criteria to the protection of “common” world
interests. This is a reflection of the interdependence created by years of
piecemeal functionalism.
The Washington Times presented an
interesting perspective on the relationship between the UN, New World Order,
and U.S. interests in an April 18, 1986 article:
Will the United States send American soldiers
across the globe to support UN actions that may not directly support United
States interests? We have and we will. George Bush clearly articulated his
position on this issue in his “Toward a New World Order” speech to Congress.
He emphatically stated:
We have already seen a dilution of the meaning
and application of “national vital interests.”
The concept of “common vital interests” is even
more fluid, and can be used to justify United States involvement in almost
any contingency. Consequently, as the UN grows in strength, we will likely
experience increased United States military operations tempo supporting more
ambiguous missions. At the same time, military force structure will continue
to decline due to budget and New World Order pressures.
Again, nothing is particularly new about the “New World Order.” The issues of armed force, sovereignty, and national interests have been the focus of world order discussions and recommendations for decades.
The “founders of the UN,” though, just seem to
have a particularly peculiar vision that has survived through years of
evolution of the international system.
Former Council on Foreign Relations member and
influential Kennedy administration State Department Official, Walt
Whitman Rostow in his 1960 work, The United States in the World Arena,
said:
An odd interpretation of national interests,
indeed!
Summary The road to New World Order at the international level is somewhat comparable to the path this country has taken over the past two hundred years at the national level.
Our founding fathers perceived the states to be
the sovereign foundation of the United States of America, with the central
government only exercising control over those areas allowed by the states.
But, as time passed and the central government grew in power and size, the
states lost more and more of their sovereignty.
Each successive gain of authority at the central
level was justified on the basis of altruistic motives. But, one day the
country wakes up to discover that the altruistic piecemeal expansion has
resulted in a bloated bureaucracy that consumed countless valuable
resources, limited state freedoms, and created a debt structure that no
generation is likely to recover from.
What is to say that the same will not happen at the international level?
The nation states are espoused by the likes of
Boutros Boutros-Ghali as the sovereign foundation of the New World Order
just as our country’s states were the sovereign foundation of America. But
as with our federal government, achievement of the New World Order is
contingent upon shifting that sovereignty from the state to central level.
Again, the justification is righteous - peace
and prosperity for all mankind. What will be the end result, though? Bloated
bureaucracy, limited freedoms, and international debt?
Many internationalists argue that the only way to end wars is through the creation of a New World Order based on world authority and collective security. The trouble that comes with that New World Order will be overshadowed by the benefit of peace and prosperity. The problem is that all governmental entities are run by people.
And not all people have the purest of motives.
International “peacekeeping” may not always be used in an altruistic manner.
Hundreds of years ago, the Old Testament prophet, Daniel, prophesied that in
the end times,
Current momentum favors implementation of the
internationalist world order model as advocated by
George Bush. Success, though, will be dependent upon the
dynamics of world politics.
There are too many factors and unknowns in the
world to declare New World Order victory, but continued progress in
that direction seems inevitable.
Notes
Chapter 8
Final Thoughts In this author’s assessment, the Gulf War was a cornerstone event in the fulfillment of the internationalist vision of world order. The UN sanctioned collective multinational military retribution against an aggressor nation that violated the territorial integrity of a nation state validated the concept of world order and provided the catalyst for the culminating third attempt at “New World Order.”
They key is not to view the Gulf War as a
specific model for future UN actions, but as a trigger event that jumped the
evolution of the international system from its derailed Cold War state back
on the tracks or road to New World Order.
Bush recognized the significance of this event
as evidenced by his statement to the UN General Assembly:
There has been a lot of conjecture over the
reason for terminating the Gulf War ground offensive at 100 hours.
One candidate explanation has to be that at the
100-hour point all UN objectives had been met. The United States had not
achieved its own objective of destroying the Republican Guard, but as a
collective security force, the coalition had fulfilled all the requirements
of the UN resolution. That established the precedent for a “credible United
Nations” to use its “peacekeeping role” against international aggressors
under the “rule of law.”
The cornerstone had been laid for the final
fulfillment of the “promise and vision of the UN’s founders.”
Notes
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