Title 28 of the United States Code by Paul Andrew Mitchell

Private Attorney General Cracks

Title 28 of the United States Code

by

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Counselor at Law, Federal Witness

and Private Attorney General

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                       November 26, 2001 A.D.

Sacramento.  Paul Andrew Mitchell, the Private Attorney General at the Supreme Law Firm and Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library on the Internet, today announced major developments in his ongoing project to decode Title 28 –- the set of American laws that govern the federal court system.

In a brief but direct application of this knowledge, written for a trainee in federal litigation, Mitchell demonstrated how the federal courts lacked original jurisdiction in the anti-trust case against the Microsoft Corporation.

That case was allegedly brought by the “United States of America” (or “USA”), but attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have no powers of attorney to represent the “USA”, as such.  Willful misrepresentation is a violation of the McDade Act at 28 U.S.C. 530B, which requires DOJ attorneys to obey State Bar disciplinary guidelines:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/530B.html

The federal government recently reversed its policy in the case against the Microsoft Corporation, and is now pushing equitable settlements across the board.

The term “USA” is mentioned only once in Title 28 –- at section 1746 –- and there it is clearly distinguished from the “United States” –- the proper legal term that is used for the federal government throughout Title 28:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1746.html

Mitchell’s findings have consequences that reach far beyond the anti-trust case against Microsoft.  It is now painfully apparent that DOJ are pretending to represent the “USA” in all civil and criminal cases, intentionally to avoid exercising the judicial power of the United States.

Under Article III in the U.S. Constitution, this power must be exercised in constitutional courts that guarantee cherished fundamental Rights, like the Right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.  Article III courts must be convened to hear Controversies to which the United States is a Party (singular).

To make matters worse, the U.S. Supreme Court has also erred by ruling that the term “Party” as used in Article III means “Plaintiff” but not “Defendant”.  See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).  In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, the term “Party” embraces both plaintiffs and defendants.

By substituting the “USA” as Plaintiffs (plural), DOJ have perpetrated a fraud by switching to legislative courts where fundamental Rights are not guarantees, but merely privileges granted (or denied) at the discretion of arbitrary judges, sitting on legislative tribunals.  Mitchell describes these courts as operating in legislative mode as opposed to constitutional mode.

Glaring proof of this fraud can be seen at section 132 of Title 28.  In this section, Congress attempted to broadcast into all 50 States a territorial tribunal –- the United States District Court (“USDC”).  Congress did this under another pretense, namely, that those States could be treated as if they were all federal Territories:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/132.html

More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court invented a false doctrine by which the U.S. Constitution did not extend into U.S. Territories and Possessions.  Mitchell later refuted this doctrine, after discovering two Acts of Congress that expressly extended the U.S. Constitution into the District of Columbia in 1871 A.D., and then into all federal Territories in 1873 A.D.  See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34;  and 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively.

In the year 1992 A.D., Paul Mitchell authored a popular classic book entitled The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue.  The Federal Zone is now in its eleventh edition.

In that book, he proved that federal municipal law governs U.S. Territories like Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, but federal municipal law does not extend into any of the 50 States of the Union.  The income tax statutes in the Internal Revenue Code are federal municipal law.

Because they are not yet States of the Union, Congress is the state legislature for all Territories, Possessions, and Enclaves like military bases –- an area now collectively called the federal zone.  In the year 1995 A.D., Justice Kennedy used the term “federal zone” as a household word in his concurring opinion in U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).

Section 132 of Title 28 is even more deceptive for creating the false notion that the Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) was abolished, but nothing could be further from the truth.  A careful reading of section 132 reveals that the DCUS is not even mentioned in that statute.

The DCUS was never expressly abolished by any Act of Congress, and it is still mentioned in numerous other places throughout Title 28.  Congress knows how to abolish a court when it wants to do so.  The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that repeals by implication are not favored.  Thus, for the DCUS to be abolished, a clear Act of Congress would be required to effect that result.  Whatever Congress creates, Congress must destroy.

Another stunning application of this knowledge came recently, when a federal criminal defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC.  An interlocutory order is one that occurs before final judgment is reached at sentencing after a jury verdict.

In response to Mitchell’s pleadings, the Ninth Circuit cited a case which ruled that final judgment in a criminal case means the sentence.  That citation was U.S. v. Powell, 24 F.3d. 28, 31 (9^th Cir. 1994).  Then, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Under Mitchell’s expert guidance, the defendant proved that the Ninth Circuit has no appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the legislative USDC.  However, the Ninth Circuit does have appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the constitutional DCUS.  The proof is found at 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1):

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1292.html

Mitchell then persuaded the defendant to request a published opinion holding that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed also.  It is already well decided that statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed.  Such a holding is a logical extension of existing federal case law.

Clearly, these findings expose the USDC in all 50 States as a summary tribunal that compels criminal defendants to endure lengthy trials, conviction and sentencing before any U.S. Court of Appeals can take jurisdiction under the Final Judgments Act at 28 U.S.C. 1291:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1291.html

In closely related developments, the main culprit has now been identified as the Act of June 25, 1948, in which Congress radically re-organized the entire federal court system.  This is the Act of Congress that broadcasted the USDC from the federal Territories into all 50 States of the Union.  This Act has now been formally challenged for being deliberately vague, and therefore unconstitutional.

By attempting to re-define the DCUS retroactively, this Act also violates the ex post facto prohibition at Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, in the U.S. Constitution.  This prohibition strictly bars Congress from enacting laws that have any retroactive effect.  Without a clear amending statute, Congress cannot later re-define the term “District Court of the United States” in statutes that predate June 25, 1948 A.D.

For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act was first enacted in the year 1890 A.D., and that Act granted original jurisdiction to the DCUS.  Subsequently, the Act of June 25, 1948, did not change or otherwise amend that grant of original jurisdiction to the DCUS.  Therefore, cases enforcing the Sherman Antitrust Act must be brought by the “United States” (not the “USA”) in an Article III federal court proceeding in constitutional mode.  Identical results obtain from many other federal laws, like the Securities and Exchange Acts.

Other sections of Title 28 have already been challenged properly in court for violating the U.S. Constitution.  In 1996 A.D., in the case of a subpoena issued by a federal grand jury, Mitchell was allowed to prove that the federal Jury Selection and Service Act is also unconstitutional.  That Act expressly discriminates against Citizens of the 50 States –- the only class of Citizens contemplated when Article III was being drafted, circa 1787 A.D.  For definitive authority on this crucial point, see Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914.

There are now two (2) classes of citizens under American laws that have never been repealed ‑‑ State Citizens and federal citizens ‑‑ but only State Citizens are qualified to be federal lawmakers.  See the Qualifications Clauses in the U.S. Constitution;  the “United States” in those provisions means “States united”.

Moreover, those Citizens who are qualified to make federal laws cannot vote or serve on any juries, State or federal.  And, those who can vote and serve on juries are not qualified to make federal laws.

This seriously twisted situation is due, in part, to the Act of June 25, 1948, and related Congressional efforts to foist a legislative democracy upon all 50 States.  These efforts violate the Guarantee Clause in the U.S. Constitution.  The federal government is required by that Clause to guarantee a Republican Form of Government to the 50 States of the Union.

Paul Andrew Mitchell can be reached at email address:

supremelawfirm@gmail.com

He is currently available for speaking engagements on this, and related topics in American constitutional law, the focus of his extensive judicial activism.

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