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Chapter 24 Apendix and Index for The Secret Team by L. Fletcher Prouty from ratical .org

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APPENDIX I



The following job description, taken from the U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1959-1960, page 143, is a typical government definition of the term, "special operations". It also defines the work I was in from 1955 through 1963, whether it was with the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations).
          "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the functional fields of intelligence, counterintelligence (except as otherwise specifically assigned), communications security, Central Intelligence Agency relationship and special operations, and psychological warfare operations. He performs functions in his assigned fields of responsibility such as: (1) recommending policies and guidance governing Department of Defense planning and program development; (2) reviewing plans and programs of the military departments for carrying out approved policies and evaluating the
administration and management of approved plans and programs as a basis on which to recommend to the Secretary of Defense necessary actions to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operations and the elimination of duplication; (3) reviewing the development and execution of plans and programs of the National Security Agency and related activities of the department of Defense; and (4) developing Department of Defense positions and providing for Department of Defense support in connection with special operations activities of the United States Government. In the performance of his functions, he coordinates actions, as appropriate, with the military departments and other Department of Defense agencies having collateral or related functions and maintains liaison with the Department of State, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency, and other United States and foreign government organizations on matters in his assigned fields of responsibility. In the course of exercising full staff functions, he is authorized to issue instructions appropriate to carrying out policies approved by the Secretary of Defense for his assigned fields of responsibility. He also exercises the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense relating to the direction and control of the National Security Agency and related activities of the Department of Defense. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) is appointed by the Secretary of Defense."
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APPENDIX II



U.S. Title 50 -- War and National Defense, Chapter 15 -- National Security contains, in one place, a collation of most of the law as it pertains to the Central Intelligence Agency. Most people who write about the CIA and who talk about the CIA -- indeed, many who have served with the CIA -- have never read this law. It is most significant that the legislation that pertains to war and national defense is the same legislation that includes all reference to the CIA. It is almost as if the bomb contained its own live fuse or the gun came with the trigger cocked for action. As we have seen, during the past twenty-five years the CIA has become the active agent that ignites the military establishment whenever that great mass becomes supercritical.
          Fundamental to the whole concept and character of the CIA is the statement of the five powers and duties, which appears in Section 403 (d). This is a precise, clear, and unequivocal delineation of what Congress and the President wanted the Central Intelligence Agency to be. The language of the law has never been substantively altered; yet in practice the CIA and its Secret Team mentors have changed it beyond recognition. (This appendix includes all important material relevant to the CIA from the National Security Act.)


§ 401. Congressional declaration of purpose.
          In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense, but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff. (July 6, 1947, ch. 343, § 2, 61 Stat. 496; Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, § 2, 63 Stat. 579; Aug 6, 1958, Pub. L. 85-599, § 2, 72 Stat. 514)


§ 402. National Security Council.
(a) Establishment, presiding officer; functions, composition.

          There is established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").
          The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.
          The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
          The Council shall be composed of --
              (1) the President;
              (2) the Vice President;
              (3) the Secretary of State;
              (4) the Secretary of Defense;
              (5) the Director for Mutual Security;
              (6) The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and
              (7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
(b) Additional functions.
          In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council --
              (1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and
              (2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.
(c) Executive secretary; appointment and compensation; staff employees.
          The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title %, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.
(d) Recommendations and reports.
          The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require. (July 6, 1947, ch. 343, title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 497; Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, § 3, 63 Stat. 579; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title XI, § 1106 (a), 63 Stat. 972; Oct. 10, 1951, ch. 479, title V, § 501 (e) (1), 65 Stat. 378.)
          1949 -- Subsec. (a) Act Aug. 10, 1949, added the Vice President to the Council, removed the Secretaries of the military departments, to authorize the President to add, with the consent of the Senate, Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments, to authorize the President to add, with the consent of the Senate, Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military department, and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board.
          The National Security Council, together with its functions, records, property, personnel, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds (available or to be made available) were transferred to the Executive Office of the President by 1949 Reorg. Plan No. 4, eff. Aug. 19, 1949, 14 F.R. 5227, 63 Stat. 1067, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.


§ 403. Central Intelligence Agency.
(a) Establishment; Director and Deputy Director; appointment.

          There is established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status, or from among individuals in civilian life: Provided, however, That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in active or retired status.
(b) Commissioned officer as Director or Deputy Director; powers and limitations, effect on commissioned status.
          (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director, or Deputy Director, then --
              (A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and
              (B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit, or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.
          (2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the appointment to the office of Director, or Deputy Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, or Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not lower than that in which serving at the time of his appointment and to receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be, including personal money allowance) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency. He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence Agency from such funds an annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which the compensation established for such position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.
          (3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall, during the period in which such commissioned officer occupies the office of Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be in addition to the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and appropriated for the armed service of which he is a member.
(c) Termination of employment of officers and employees; effect on right of subsequent employment.
          Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652 of Title 5, or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(d) Powers and duties.
          For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council --
              (1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
              (2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
              (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
              (4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
              (5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.
(e) Inspection of intelligence of other departments.
          To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.
(f) Termination of National Intelligence Authority; transfer of personnel, property, records, and unexpended funds.
          Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) of this section has taken office --
              (1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and
              (2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.
(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, § 102, 61 Stat. 498; Apr. 4, 1953, ch. 16, 67 Stat. 20.)



EX. ORD. NO. 11460. PRESIDENTS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
          Ex. Ord. No. 11460, Mar. 20, 1969, 34 F.R. 5535, provided:
          By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
          SECTION 1. There is hereby established the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, hereinafter referred to as "the Board". The Board shall:
          (1) advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities making up the overall national intelligence effort;
          (2) conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies are engaged;
          (3) receive, consider and take appropriate action with respect to matters identified to the Board, by the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government departments and agencies of the intelligence community, in which the support of the Board will further the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort; and
          (4) report to the President concerning the Boards findings and appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for actions to achieve increased effectiveness of the Governments foreign intelligence effort in meeting national intelligence needs.
          SEC. 2. In order to facilitate performance of the Boards functions, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all other departments and agencies shall make available to the Board all information with respect to foreign intelligence and related matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President in accordance with the terms of this Order. Such information made available to the Board shall be given all necessary security protection in accordance with the terms and provisions of applicable laws and regulations.
          SEC. 3. Members of the Board shall be appointed by the President from among persons outside the Government, qualified on the basis of knowledge and experience in matters relating to the national defense and security, or possessing other knowledge and abilities which may be expected to contribute to the effective performance of the Boards duties. The members of the Board shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed hereafter.
          SEC. 4. The Board shall have a staff headed by an Executive Secretary, who shall be appointed by the President and shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed by the Board. The Executive Secretary shall be authorized, subject to the approval of the Board and consonant with law, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary for performance of the Boards duties.
          SEC. 5. Compensation and allowances of the Board, the Executive Secretary, and members of the staff, together with other expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board, shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading "Special Projects" in the Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1969, Public Law 90-350, 82 Stat. 195, and, to the extent permitted by law, from any corresponding appropriation which may be made for subsequent years. Such payments shall be made without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statues and section 9 of the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673)
          SEC. 6. Executive Order No. 10938 of May 4, 1961, is hereby revoked.
RICHARD NIXON.        
SHORT TITLE
          Act June 20, 1949, § 10, formerly § 12, 63 Stat. 212, renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-507, § 21(b) (2), 72 Stat. 337, provided that Act June 20, 1949, which is classified to sections 403a-403j of this title, should be popularly known as the "Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949".


§ 403c. Same; procurement authority.
          (a) In the performance of its functions the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to exercise the authorities contained in sections 151 (c) (1)-(6), (10), (1), (15), (17), 155 and 159 of Title 41.
          (b) In the exercise of the authorities granted in subsection (a) of this section, the term "Agency head" shall mean the Director, the Deputy Director, or the Executive of the Agency.
          (c) The determinations and decisions provided in subsection (a) of this section to be made by the Agency head may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall be final. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the Agency head is authorized to delegate his powers provided in this section, including the making of such determinations and decisions, in his discretion and subject to his direction to any other officer or officers or officials of the Agency.
          (d) The power of the Agency head to make the determinations or decisions specified in sections 151 (c) (1), (15), and 154 (a) of Title 41 shall not be delegable. Each determination or decision required by sections 151 (c) (12), (15), 153, or 154 (a) of Title 41, shall be based upon written findings made by the official making such determinations, which findings shall be final and shall be available within the Agency for a period of at least six years following the date of the determination. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 3, 63 Stat. 208.)


§ 403f. Same; general authorities of Agency.
          In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to --
          (a) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or activities authorized under sections 403 and 405 of this title, and any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of sections 403a to 403c, 403e to 403h, and 403j of this title without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
          (b) Exchange funds without regard to section 543 of Title 31;
          (c) Reimburse other Government agencies for services of personnel assigned to the Agency, and such other Government agencies are authorized, without regard to provisions of law to the contrary, so to assign or detail any officer or employee for duty with the Agency;
          (d) Authorize couriers and guards designated by the Director to carry firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and materials affecting the national defense and security;
          (e) Make alterations, improvements, and repairs on premises rented by the Agency, and pay rent therefor without regard to limitations on expenditures contained in the Act of June 30, 1932, as amended: Provided, That in each case the Director shall certify that exception from such limitations is necessary to the successful performance of the Agencys functions or to the security of its activities. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 5, formerly § 6, 63 Stat. 211; June 26, 1951, ch. 151, 65 Stat. 89; renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L 85-507, § 21(b) (2), 72 Stat. 337, and amended Aug. 19, 1964, Pub. L. 88-448, title IV, § 402(a) (28), 78 Stat. 494; 1970 Reorg. Plan No. 2, eff. July 1, 1970, 35 F.R. 7959, 84 Stat. --.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
          The act of June 30, 1932, as amended, referred to in subsec. (c), is the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1933, act June 30, 1932, ch. 314, 47 Stat. 393, and is classified to section 303b of Title 40, Public Buildings, Property, and Works.
CODIFICATION
          Section was not enacted as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 which comprises this chapter.


§ 403g. Same; protection of nature of Agencys functions.
          In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 403 (d) (3) of this title that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of Title 5, and the provisions of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this section, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section 947(b) of Title 5. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 6, formerly § 7, 63 Stat. 211, renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-507, § 21 (b) (2), 72 Stat. 337; 1970 Reorg. Plan No. 2, eff. July 1, 1970, 35 F.R. 7959, 84 Stat. --.)


§ 403h. Same; admission of essential aliens; limitation on number.
          Whenever the Director, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration shall determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, such alien and his immediate family shall be given entry into the United States for permanent residence without regard to their inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws and regulations, or to the failure to comply with such laws and regulations pertaining to admissibility: Provided, That the number of aliens and members of their immediate families entering the United States under the authority of this section shall in no case exceed one hundred persons in any one fiscal year. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 7, formerly § 8, 63 Stat. 212, renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-507, § 21 (b) (2), 72 Stat. 337.)
CODIFICATION
          Section was not enacted as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 which comprises this chapter.


§ 403j. Central Intelligence Agency: appropriations; expenditures.
          (a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, sums made available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, including --
              (1) personal services, including personal services without regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed, and rent at the seat of government and elsewhere; health-service program as authorized by section 150 of Title 5; rental of news-reporting services; purchase or rental and operation of photographic, reproduction, cryptographic, duplication and printing machines, equipment and devices, and radio-receiving and radio-sending equipment; purchase, maintenance, operation, repair, and hire of passenger motor vehicles, and aircraft, and vessels of all kinds; subject to policies established by the Director, transportation of officers and employees of the Agency in Government-owned automotive equipment between their domiciles and places of employment, where such personnel are engaged in work which makes such transportation necessary, and transportation in such equipment, to and from school of children of Agency personnel who have quarters for themselves and their families at isolated stations outside the continental United States where adequate public or private transportation is not available; printing and binding; purchase, maintenance, and cleaning of firearms, including purchase, storage, and maintenance of ammunition; subject to policies established by the Director, expenses of travel in connection with, and expenses incident to attendance at meetings of professional, technical, scientific, and other similar organizations when such attendance would be a benefit in the conduct of the work of the Agency; association and library dues; payment of premiums or costs of surety bonds for officers or employees without regard to the provisions of section 14 of Title 6; payment of claims pursuant to Title 8; acquisition of necessary land and the clearing of such land; construction of buildings and facilities without regard to sections 59 and 67 of Title 40; repair, rental, operation, and maintenance of buildings, utilities, facilities, and appurtenances; and
              (2) supplies, equipment, and personnel and contractual services otherwise authorized by law and regulations, when approved by the Director.
          (b) The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 8, formerly § 10, 63 Stat. 212, renumbered July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-507, § 21 (b) (2), 72 Stat. 337)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
          Sections 259 and 267 of Title 40, referred to in text, was repealed by Pub. L. 86-249, § 17 (12), Sept. 9, 1959, 73 Stat. 485. See chapter 12 of Title 40, Public Buildings, Property and Works.
CODIFICATION
          Section was not enacted as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 which comprises this chapter.


§ 405 Advisory Committees; appointment; compensation of part-time personnel; applicability of other laws.
          (a) The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the National Security Council, acting through its Executive Secretary, are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions of this Act, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation, while serving as members of such committees, shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Other members of such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed $50 for each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.
          (b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of sections 281, 283, or 284 of Title 18, unless the act of such individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any particular matter which directly involves a department or agency which such person is advising or in which such department or agency is directly interested. (July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title III, § 303, 61 Stat. 507; Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 41, § 10(c), 63 Stat. 585; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 8, 68 Stat. 1228.)


§ 407. Study or plan of surrender; use of appropriations.
          No part of the funds appropriated in any act shall be used to pay (1) any person, firm, or corporation, or any combinations of persons, firms, or corporations, to conduct a study or to plan when and how or in what circumstances the Government of the United States should surrender this country and its people to any foreign power, (2) the salary or compensation of any employee or official of the Government of the united States who proposes or contracts or who has entered into contracts for the making of studies or plans for the surrender by the government of the United States of this country and its people to any foreign power in any event or under any circumstances. (Pub. L. 85-766, ch. XVI, § 1602, Aug. 27, 1958, 72 Stat. 884.)
CODIFICATION
          Section was not enacted as part of the National Security Act of 1947, which comprises this chapter.


§ 409. Definitions of military departments.
          (a) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of the government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.
          (b) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of the government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the united States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.
          (c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of the government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force. (July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title II, §§ 205(c), 206(a), 207(c), 61 Stat. 501, 502.)

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APPENDIX III



The document that follows is one of the most influential documents of the past quarter-century. It was written and compiled from the work of many nameless and faceless authors within the government and from other sources close to these men in the academic world and the world of business. It was drafted by an Army General, Richard G. Stilwell, while he was serving as a member of a special Presidential committee. It includes much material written by Air Force General Edward G. Lansdale, among others. Its origins come from the depths of a special source reaching far back into the history of the man. Its twentieth-century manifestation occurs in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and in other revolutions since that time. These paramilitary ideas and methods know no ideology and no creed or code. They are the craft of those who would seek power and of those who would fight wars by technical means, and who would utilize the military organization of the state to gain that power by influencing the minds of the "elite", by engaging in social, political, economic, and almost incidentally, military activity.
          As we have said this course of action begins with a high-sounding resolve to improve the lot of the poor "under-developed" nations, using the vehicle of the Military Assistance Program to take over the army of that country. This then is repeated in other countries, as we have seen, becoming evident in recent times in such countries as Greece and Brazil, among others.
          If this were all that it meant we might be able to treat it lightly as another evidence of the inherent activity of the "do-gooder" instinct of Western man. However, it is only reasonable to see, in this action, the ominous fact that it is the American soldier who is the teacher of this doctrine; and it is the same American soldier who becomes his own student. Since this action was begun in 1959 tens of thousands -- yes, hundreds of thousands -- of American military men, a whole new generation, have grown up believing that this is not only the right thing for "those foreigners" but for Americans as well.
          The following document begins mildly and almost reasonably. It gets to the heart of the matter smoothly and without alarm. However, as it builds and creates its own crescendo it begins to veer from its scholarly and well-tempered tone and approaches the type of delivery made famous by such men as Hitler, Mussolini, and Joseph Stalin. When highest officials of this Government assert that the majority of the nations of the uncommitted "Third World" would be better off under the control of their military elite, an elite to be selected by Americans, it is time for other Americans to read, to listen to, and to sound the warning on the possibility that this same American elite may not become persuaded of its own role in this country.
          Note that this paper was drafted in May 1959. It was drafted during the Eisenhower Administration, and it was a forerunner of such catchwords, generally associated with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, as counterinsurgency, pacification, special forces, subversive insurgency, and the like. These terms had all been introduced before Kennedy's tenure and were simply awaiting their day in the world of the Secret Team.
          In keeping with Secret Team practice, this so-called draft was unclassified so that it could be processed through all sections of the elite without control of transmittal or copies.






May 15, 1959
TRAINING UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM
(with emphasis on development of leaders)
          CONTENTS
 
I -- INTRODUCTION


The Committee has thus far placed primary stress on defining the quantitative threshold and material guidelines of a continuing mutual security effort. Yet the Committee is mindful -- and indeed so stated in transmitting its Interim Report -- that an adequate United States contribution to the security and growth of our Free World associates, and particularly the less developed countries, involves much more than the provision of military hardware and economic capital, vital though these ingredients be. The indispensable complement, and a clear third dimension of United States programs, is the development of requisite institutional frameworks, managerial organizations and individual talents to effectively use the physical resource inputs. The Committee has had reports, from all quarters, that the severe shortage of trained executives, administrators, and other categories of decision makers is a major impediment to balanced economic growth in the less developed areas. It is conscious that arms alone do not an army make; that leadership, collective motivation, and identification with the aspirations of countrymen are equal determinants of a military establishment adequate to its tasks and compatible with its environment. It is impressed with the magnitude of the tasks which face the fledgling nations in the quest for symbols to replace those no longer valid; in the adaptation of cultural heritage to new settings; in the development of political, social and ideological foundations; and in meeting today's manpower deficiencies while laying the educational base for the future.           One is impelled to speak out on this subject because the record demonstrates that, far from receiving major attention, human resources development has been relegated to secondary importance.
 
II -- THE PRESENT PATTERN


Admittedly, there are impressive statistics as to the numbers of foreign personnel who have received training, under auspices of the Mutual Security Program, in the United States, in their own countries, or in third areas. But the concept and the approach have been largely mechanistic. While there has been a measurable shift in the past year, the bulk of ICA training programs are still "project-oriented": designed to meet the specific administrative, technical, and professional skill requirements generated by the concurrent ICA developmental activities. Likewise, the thrust of the massive training programs of the U.S. military departments has been determined by the materiel aspects of the MAP: production of specialists, technicians and junior tacticians to handle the equipment and systems furnished.           Certainly, these instructional efforts have been essential. Certainly also, such programs must continue, and probably at an expanded rate.
          In the military area, new technical training dimensions are explicit in the second round of arms aid involving provision of advanced weapons systems for the NATO nations and an accelerated rate of modernization elsewhere. They are also explicit in the commendable new emphasis on improvement of indigenous logistic apparata and operating techniques. The Committee is confident that the minor obstacles to expansion will be surmounted and that the Defense agencies will press on to develop and implement programs of requisite scope in these categories.
          In the civil sector, one need only contemplate the staggering estimates of skill deficiencies throughout Afro-Asia to appreciate the magnitude of the gap. Unlike the military, the ICA's ability to meet any measurable portion of this widening gap, at the technical level, is limited by the general inflexibility of its operational base -- built of direct hire personnel and a system of contract which demand detailed governmental administration, planning and supervision. There is a need to change the nature of the base, to bring the tremendous strength and unparalleled competence of our non-governmental institutions to bear on this training problem and, concomitantly, to shift the government role to the more suitable tasks of broad planning, support, and arrangements vis-à-vis the foreign authorities concerned. The modalities of this shift have been explored in other committee papers.
          The Committee's principal concern -- and consequently the subject of this paper -- is that training objectives have been so severely circumscribed, so inadequately related to the full sweep of our own national interest and of the recipient countries as well.
          THE SHORTFALLS
Review of what is being done, and projected, in the training, educational and related fields by the combined efforts of the Department of Defense, the International Cooperation Administration and the International Educational Exchange Service reveals many shortfalls. The following are representative:
    (1) the scale of orientation visits and hand tailored courses for key government or opinion leaders has been much below feasible norms; as indeed has exploitation thereof by the agencies concerned.
    (2) all too few foreign military officers, of middle and upper rank, have been provided instruction in concepts or doctrine governing the employment of the military instrument, in peace and in war. Equally conspicuous is the absence of training in management above the unit level.
    (3) procedures for the identification and grooming of future leaders are lacking.
    (4) analyses of the trained manpower implications of country economic development goals are incomplete; comprehensive plans for meeting deficiencies are non-existent; and U.S. actions to stimulate either are half-hearted.
    (5) higher educational opportunities available through the aggregate of ICA, IES and other non-military programs are below minimum thresholds, lack depth and present serious imbalances and gaps. The fields of under-graduate study is largely uncovered; trainees from the public services and the private profession sector are few; and the potential of ICA university contracts inadequately utilized.
    (6) the substantial technical level and short term programs now in progress have not been paralleled by comparable efforts to accelerate the growth of basic educational systems within cooperating countries.
    (7) effective coordination among the different programs has been wanting; and has resulted in loss of mutual support opportunities. ICA has yet to recognize the potential of the MAP training base for the furtherance of technical assistance objectives.
          And of overriding moment has been the near universal failure to understand and accept concomitant responsibility for the political and psychological orientation and motivation of the trainee, the participant, the counterpart. There has been no guidance or concerted approach in the sensitive but vital area of inculcating, or testing for, compatible precepts of public morality, social responsibility and personal ethics. Notwithstanding the intensity of the struggle for the allegiance of the "middle billion", influence on the thought, habit and attitudes of these peoples, and on the institutions that bind them together, has been left to chance.
          Confronted with these broad deficiencies, the Committee can only conclude that the Executive Branch has grasped neither the measure of the challenge nor the inestimable potential inherent in the human side of development.
          In rendering what is tantamount to an indictment, two tempering considerations have been recognized. The first is a series of factors, cumulative in effect, which serve to place finite limits on the pace and scope of the corrective actions implied by the foregoing compendium of criticisms. The second involves several initiatives, independently pursued unfortunately, with the aim of improving the direction, the depth and the substantive payoff of activities in the human resources field. Neither was sufficiently weighted to invalidate the basic conclusion. Both, however, have had an impact on the proposals to be presented subsequently. They therefore merit treatment in general outline.
          THE LIMITATIONS
The formidable obstacles to rapid expansion and improvement of these activities include such diverse factors as political sensibilities and attitudes, legal restrictions, availability and qualification of trainees and trainers, capacity of facilities, and financing problems. Moreover, they are so intermeshed that all must be attacked concurrently. Among the more significant:
    (1) National educational systems and manpower problems involve such politically sensitive considerations that U.S. initiative and aid are not automatically accepted by local governments; nor does full cooperation necessarily follow acceptance. And in the first instance, the less developed nations simply do not have either statistics or plans and are therefore faced with major, time-consuming efforts to produce both.
    (2) Under the provisions of Section 451c of the Mutual Security Act, a special Presidential determination is required before military training can be extended to any country with whom a bi-lateral agreement has not been negotiated.
    (3) Important strictures surround the present selection base for overseas training for high-level personnel. One is the requirement for a working knowledge of English or third country language, coupled with the limited availability of such instruction. Another is divergence in criteria applied by the cooperating country and by the U.S. agencies in determining candidate qualifications. Still another is reluctance to release individuals for extended instruction abroad, given the competing demands for their services locally.
    (4) Appropriately qualified U.S. personnel for staffing overseas educational, advisory or training projects are in short supply; language is again a problem. There are also finite limits on the absorptive capability of the U.S. educational institutions in terms of teachers and facilities.
    (5) In certain specialty areas, the training establishments of the U.S. military departments are already taxed to capacity; funds and spaces are requirements for expansion; so also is relaxation of security policies with respect to the nationals of a number of countries.
    (6) Patterns of cooperation by U.S. universities with the policy desires of the Government are far from uniform.
    (7) Currently, there are no funds available for educational development of many low income countries.
          ENCOURAGING SIGNS
There has been evidence, in recent months, of increased U.S. awareness of the import of the broader aspects of training. Constructive moves include the following:
    (1) An exploratory project, High Level Human Resources for Economic Development, was initiated by the President, to survey the need of less developed countries in administrative, managerial and technical categories; and to determine the advisability and practicability of a special U.S. assistance program. Work has proceeded under supervision of an inter-agency Task Group (Secretary of Labor, Deputy Undersecretary of State, Directors of ICA and USIA). While the Task Group is unlikely to proceed with the surveys-in-depth originally contemplated, it has stimulated a new order of interest in manpower planning on the part of recipient countries, U.S. missions abroad, and Washington agencies.
    (2) The Department of State has underway a detailed survey of international education and training activities conducted by agencies of the U.S. Government. Aside from the accumulation of important statistical information, the work will provide the basis for establishing an informational clearing house and a more effective coordinating mechanism.
    (3) On 4-5 April, the Department of State convened the first of a series of periodic conferences to bring together the government agencies, the universities and the major private foundations with operative programs for education of foreign nationals. Properly prepared and peopled, such conferences could be of great value. It is worth noting that the university presidents were vocal about the need for clearer national policies and guidelines.
    (4) The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued recently a directive to the military departments underscoring the contribution of training of foreign military personnel to the achievement of international security objectives; and directing, as feasible, a 5-15% program increase in training (or orientation) for senior officers.(5) The proposed FY-60 Military Assistance Training Program and the Technical Assistance Program reflect substantial increases over previous years. The latter includes a first entry into the undergraduate study field. Meanwhile, the geographic emphasis of the International Educational Exchange Service shifts away from Europe.
While commending these initiatives, the Committee has noted that follow-up has lacked vigor; and that even optimum execution would produce results far short of the minimum essential advance.
 
III -- NEW HORIZONS


Policy formulation is not a pre-condition to a more comprehensive and responsive program to improve human knowledge, skills and attitudes in the less developed areas. The importance and compelling need therefor is amply underscored in official statements of basic United States security policy. The requirement is widespread recognition, in sectors public and private, of the essentially of properly trained and motivated manpower to the hoped-for evolution of the middle third of the world. This recognition can be stimulated. Education is, after all, among the most cherished elements of the American tradition; and expanded programs provide an opportunity for new initiatives in the conduct of our foreign policy.           The Committee appreciates the substantial nature and diversity of the educational, training and cultural programs -- binational and international, public and private -- now underway outside the purview of the Mutual Security Program and the International Educational Exchange Service; for example, upwards of 100 organizations have programs for Pakistani. Not having examined these programs, no comment is made thereon. In most cases, the United States can exercise only minimal control over the direction of these other activities; she has, however, the continuing information and influence to insure against duplication.
          A look at the vastness of the requirements and at the current activities of the training and educational activities of the MAP, ICA and IEES have focused attention on four general areas. A vigorous approach to all four will provide the basis for the program our security interests demand. The areas, to be discussed in some detail, are:
    (1) The formal training of leadership cadres, in all key sectors of national life.
    (2) The support of educational systems in low-income countries, both allied and neutral.
    (3) The exploitation of MAP supported military establishments in furtherance of political stability, economic growth and social change.
    (4) The role of Americans in developing the professional and ethical code of foreign leaders.
 
IV -- LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS


This, clearly, is the key challenge. All reports emanating from abroad conclude that a major, if not the principal, impediment to progress in the Afro-Asian countries is the severe shortage of individuals capable of filling responsible positions responsibly. Were this not reason enough to expand and improve our leadership programs, there is another -- the traditional activities and growing capabilities of the Soviet Union for the development and control of elite groups.[1] We may elect to stand aloof from competition with her in the supply of military and economic aid. In the leadership area, we cannot!           NON-MILITARY SECTOR
Ways and means of achieving better performance in the top level managerial field have been well explored in various U.S. agency studies.[2] These suggest certain concurrent planning and implementation actions addressed directly to the shortfalls tabulated previously. It is to be noted that the efficacy of these actions will be largely a function of the initiative and competence of our Country Teams.
ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS
Development of Country Plans
There is a requirement to stimulate and, where national sensitivities permit, to offer technical and other assistance for the establishment of machinery and procedures for systematic surveys and analyses of the manpower situation. None of the less developed nations has yet evolved anything approaching a human resources annex in support of national developmental plans. They are not, therefore, capable of measuring the gap over and above the actual and predictable outputs of indigenous institutions and the several operative overseas programs, or of sharply identifying priority of needs in public administration, in industry, business and labor, or in education.
          This is patently a long term project, to be attacked incrementally. Other actions should not depend thereon.
Shift in Emphasis of U.S. Programs
Valid suggestions encompass two main categories: the immediate and the longer range.
          The first envisages expansion of IEES "leader grant" programs; ICA attention to the private entrepreneurial sector and to the decision-makers in other than the public economic sector; and greater participation by U.S. professional associations, major foundations, and private institutions.
          The longer range problem dictates substantial entry into the field of undergraduate and graduate education in the U.S. to groom the future leadership, and in addition, the concept of "junior year abroad" for students studying in their home countries. It also involves, on a major scale, the collaboration of American universities, industry, and professional associations in conducting special "workshops", on-the-job training and specialized projects, for national or multi-national groups, in all pertinent fields.
          The longer range program holds the most promise. For one thing, there will be fewer conflicts with the immediate operating needs of the governments. More important, the collegian or junior executive is in his formative years. He may ultimately embrace an alien philosophy but only if the suasion is of the highest caliber; the lasting influence of undergraduate associations and intellectual intake is not to be underestimated.
Implementing Steps
The foregoing steps will require some additional funds, for they are additive to the essential activities now underway. They also imply some changes in legislation to remove restrictions on utilization of available local currency and, perhaps, to countenance the new directions (as, for example, wholesale departure from the general one year limit on training duration). It also involves expansion of staff and closer coordination among participating U.S. agencies and institutions.
          These concrete steps are manageable for they follow established patterns. But there are others -- less tangible infinitely more difficult.
SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS
Selection of Personnel
It is evident that the success of the entire effort hinges on wisdom and foresight in the choice of trainees. And the burden thereof falls squarely on the U.S. field organizations. Effective performance pre-supposes that the Country team:
    (1) Has adequate biographic registers, personal contacts and reliable informational sources to prepare unilateral lists of promising candidates in all sectors; and priorities within lists.
    (2) Has sufficient rapport and stature vis-à-vis the cooperating government to influence the latter's priorities, selection processes and choices; and to be assured that the trainee is scheduled for employment in posts commensurate with anticipated training.
    (3) Is as attentive to the training of leadership and managerial cadres among the non-communist opposition as to the representatives of the ruling party; and astute enough to devise plans which will provide for such training under other than direct U.S. governmental sponsorship and with minimum impact on official relationships.
    (4) Has full data on all U.S. programs, official and private, affecting the country; is effective in the coordination thereof; is in a position to exploit fully the potential of ICA university contracts in the leadership field; and capable of influencing the direction of unofficial programs to cover priority gaps.
    (5) Is fully aware of activities in adjacent countries and how these activities might be utilized for the good of the country to which accredited.
Training Framework
It is not enough that the training or orientation course itself be carefully designed and competently conducted. The preparation of the trainee and his handling as an individual are of equal import. There must be facilities for, and help in, refresher instruction in English and other Western languages, where indicated or feasible; in this connection, it is essential that the selection base not be limited to those possessing a knowledge of English. There is the matter of cushioning transition from native habitat to the American scene and educational methodology and the consequent requirement for painstaking orientation prior to and after the overseas voyage; and the inverse to help adapt the individual for the return home and subsequent communication to his compatriots.[3] Beyond this -- as discussed more fully in another section -- is the matter of the comportment of the Americans with whom he is professionally and socially in contact: his acceptance as an equal; the understanding afforded his views; the intellectual and ethical challenges presented. The field, the Washington staff, and all others concerned share responsibility for the quality of the resultant impact.
The Follow-Up
The importance of continuing contact with the key decision-maker, actual or potential, subsequent to his training is self-evident. Sober reflection, after the individual's return and in light of new responsibilities, may produce valuable ideas on how training may be altered for improved applicability. Up-to-date knowledge of the individual's professional progress, evolving philosophy and attitudes provides the basis for evaluation of impact; tightens the bonds of association; determines the need for or desirability of further training; and generally promotes the U.S. national interest. The follow-up activities involve arduous tasks for the field. But there is no other means of determining program results or of exploiting the success achieved.
          It may be asked if the Country Teams are now equipped and oriented to handle the responsibilities thus enumerated. Our own reservations on this score have given impetus to the companion annex on the U.S. personnel implications of the Mutual Security Program.
          MILITARY SECTOR
RATIONALE
For reasons both military and political, there are pressing requirements for new foci in leadership programs for the Officer Corps of the MAP supported forces -- and, gain, principally of the less developed areas.           In the first instance, effective control and maneuver of armies (and to a lesser extent the naval and air arms) of growing modernity poses for the senior officers of the several military establishments, professional equipment requirements not dissimilar to the needs of the United States Services: an adequate mastery of military concepts and doctrine; and competence in tactics, logistics and management.
          It is not enough, however, to restrict leadership inputs to U.S. norms. Except in specifically defined circumstances, our Armed Forces have no operative responsibilities within national frontiers; conforming generally to the precepts of Western democracies, they are not an integral part of the mechanism for maintenance of law and order. The prevailing concept is expeditionary -- an instrument of latent power, unentangled domestically, ready for projection abroad should the exigency arise. Not so for the great bulk of the forces of the new nations. Their role has additional dimensions and their missions are actual as opposed to contingent. They are a key element in the maintenance of internal security and are largely determinant of whether stability or instability characterizes the routine of government. The Officer Corps is perforce deeply involved in domestic affairs. Those who lead, or are destined to lead, must therefore acquire qualifications and attributes beyond the criteria which identify the successful commander in combat.
          Finally, the ranks of the Officer Corps in most less developed countries are a rich source of potential leaders of the national civil service, the professional class, and other non-military sectors. Here one finds a high degree of discipline, dedication and political moderation. Moreover, one must reckon with the possibility -- indeed probability -- that the Officer Cops, as a unit, may accede to the reins of government as the only alternative to domestic chaos and leftist takeover. Both considerations point to a program for selection and preparation of promising officers for eventual occupation of high level managerial posts in the civil sector, public and private.
GUIDELINES
It is recognized that practical limitations confront, over the short term, major augmentation of top level military leader programs -- limitations which are identical with those described under the non-military sector. Notwithstanding, there is substantial scope for upgrading the military assistance training programs of the U.S. service departments in conformity with the foregoing.
Higher Level Military Education
Such programs merit first priority. Three avenues are open: development of regional facilities coupled with more extensive bi-national exchanges within regions; augmented local institutions; and accommodation of a larger senior officer load in the U.S.
    (1) The long touted prospect for a Pacific Defense College should be brought to fruition and similar institutes planned for the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. Desirably, these should be school centers, providing not only strategy studies, but specialized courses for those charged with anti-subversion planning, for logisticians, civil affairs chiefs, and key management personnel. The advantages of a regional approach are self-evident.
    (2) The U.S. might well encourage and support, in every country with substantial military forces, the organization of an institute on the concept of our own National War College; on the conversion of existing colleges to the all-service, military-civilian approach. MAAG personnel should be as active therein as the climate will permit -- to insure, among other things, that the curricula grapples with concrete national problems.
    (3) There are valid reasons for excluding foreign officers from the U.S. War Colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College. But, elsewhere -- and with considerably less reason -- the doors of our major school centers are not fully ajar (it is noted, for example, that only 123 foreign nationals are programmed through the Army Command and General Staff School in FY-60). Although considerable effort will be involved, all U.S. Services -- and particularly the Army -- can develop, conduct and administer additional, specially tailored instruction in doctrine, tactics, logistics and management. The school locales need not be limited to military facilities; the growing competence of American universities in military science is exploitable.
Civilian Schooling, Undergraduate and Graduate
This envisages team play as among MAP, ICA and IEES at the country level. ICA and IEES are in a position to finance the education, in the U.S. or third countries, of high caliber career officers in military-applicable fields such as psychology, political science, law, engineering and business administration. MAP can assist ICA in the identification of officers who should be trained for key responsibilities in the civil sector. IEES can assist in the establishment of middle level courses in local educational facilities for officer instruction in administration, finance, military justice and management.[4]
Orientation and Observer Visits
The upper limits of the modest increase in Stateside trips for leaders prescribed (with qualifications) by the Department of Defense should be attained and exceeded. Strains on the military departments would be eased by shifting emphasis from the extreme top level of the military hierarchy to the potential successors a few years hence: the representational burden would be less, the communication problem more surmountable, and the benefits more lasting. Our officials have probably been overconcerned about representation, insufficiently attentive to the substantive impact sought. Where language capability exists, senior foreign officer itineraries should encompass (or even built around) participation in scheduled University or Association seminars and conferences, judged to be within the visitor's scope of interest by reason of functional or geographic coverage; dividends would accrue from his chance to contribute and by his viewing of civilian-military collaborations as practiced in this country. MAP should also support regional conferences to improve personal contacts and promote exchange of ideas and techniques among the military elite of adjacent countries. One possible result, of great value, might be the emergence of more uniform and viable concepts of civil-military relationships.
The Neutral Countries
The stakes for which we contend justify attention to every possibility to improve the competence and influence the orientation of the office corps of these nations. The attach personnel should be so instructed; and the special efforts involved in securing Presidential determinations for training in the U.S. or third countries accepted.
The Advisory Role
The key influence in the development of military leaders of superior motivation and integrity may well be that exerted by the MAAG personnel. It is mentioned here because it is integral to this discussion. However, the cardinal importance of this function dictates separate treatment in subsequent pages.
          Akin thereto, applicable to the military sector, and incorporated by reference, are what have been called the "Substantive Aspects": the responsibilities of U.S. personnel in the selection of trainees, in the establishment of the training environment, and in the follow-up and evaluation phases.
          A collateral requirement, common to all training in the U.S. is expansion of English language instructional facilities in the cooperating countries. The U.S. Military Departments, the USIS, and the USOMs have all made some inroads on this problem in various ways.[5] But the demand, even at present level of activity, is far in excess of available capacity. Here, then, is a principal bottleneck. A coordinated effort, built around the relatively large USIS operators in most countries, is indicated.
          SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF AFRICA
It is appropriate, at this juncture, to point up the leadership implications of the African continent, and more especially those portions still in colonial status or newly emerged therefrom. The sovereign state of Ghana, for example, mans only a third of the essential posts in her embryonic civil service; for another -- and the critical -- third, she is quite dependent on alien employees without assurance of tenure; and the remainder are unfilled. In the non-British colonies, the situation is worse. The problem is staggering. On the other hand, Africa is the one area of the world where we have the leisure for forward planning, where we can lay the groundwork for the sort of comprehensive attack outlined by the Presidential Task Group, where we can begin to identify and groom the future national leaders. The overall approach should be multi-lateral, combining Western European efforts and our own, with broad African representation. We should, however, have a highly selective unilateral program. For any long term African project, looking to the development of high-level managerial talent, to be successful, an adequate planning-operational task force must be fielded, peopled largely by juniors and with their futures guaranteed so the continuity may obtain. Its members should embrace political, economic, military, sociological, anthropological and other competence so the approach will be comprehensive and balanced from the outset.
 
V -- DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS


          THE SITUATION
Their importance notwithstanding, programs for the production of leaders, professionals and skilled technicians -- the emphasis of the US. training effort -- are designed only to provide an adequate superstructure. A parallel, even more pressing, need is the development of the base; for if progress is sensitive to the quality of leadership, it is also dependent upon effective response of those who follow to the leader's bidding. In the less developed areas, an adequate response of not forthcoming; nor can it be forthcoming so long as ignorance, illiteracy and lack of basic skills are characteristics of the great bulk of the citizenry. Education of the human beings which constitute the major resource of the poorer countries is a fundamental requirement.           The nations of Latin America, Asia and Africa are conscious of the weaknesses -- in breadth, depth, diversity and quality -- of their educational systems; of the urgency of remedial action, and of the magnitude of the gap, in capital and human terms. They are equally conscious that the responsibility is theirs and theirs alone; it could not be otherwise, for educational institutions are so linked to the national character and fabric that no sovereign state can readily accept collaboration in the design or direction thereof. On the other hand, significant expansion of facilities involves major outlays of capital which is just not available in most countries.
          Financial assistance to indigenous educational institutions has not been a feature of U.S. aid programs, although minor amounts have been expended on schools directly linked with economic development. Other demands coupled with legal restrictions have precluded use of any significant amounts of U.S. foreign currency holdings for the support of cooperating country school systems.[6] Indeed, there have been complaints that U.S. aid programs have operated to the detriment of supported country investment in national schools: it is said, in Latin America, that the pattern of development aid has required such large scale use of local currency resources, as matching contributions to complete, and thereafter maintain, major construction works that the development of public infrastructure, and notably schools, has fallen well behind needs.
          A PROGRAM BASIS
There is a rising clamor, within and without the U.S. government for a strong program of aid to the educational institutions of the low income countries. It is convincingly argued that only by broadening and improving the now narrow educational bases can there begin to be a solution to the long term trained manpower requirements generated by national economic development plans. Adequate systems of educational institutions are equally essential for political stability and social adjustment. They provide the best -- perhaps the only effective -- medium for acquainting and inculcating youth with national values and the ingredients of national esprit; and with traditions, culture, ideals and aspirations. They provide the forum for development of codes of public morality and personal ethics, for defining responsibility to one's fellow man. They provide ever expanding reservoirs of raw material for tomorrow's leadership; and the means of identifying this potential. Given wise guidance and competent administration, a vigorous and growing educational complex is the principal counter to Communist subversion. Beyond this, the United States would stand to gain additional benefits from an educational support program of some magnitude. It will be of enormous value to American prestige and goodwill to be identified with visible symbols of friendship and progress like schools, colleges, libraries and laboratories. There is no more meaningful way of breaking down the myth of imperialist exploitation, of indicating our interest in individual opportunity and social democracy.
          FINANCING
A price tag attaches to any such concept -- one must think in terms of several hundred million dollars over the next few years. However, it need not be primarily new money. The scheduled accumulations of soft currency in repayment of development loans promise a major source of financing. Congress has not indicated how such moneys will be employed; substantial portions could be earmarked for educational purposes. Moreover, legislative authorization could provide for such use of portions of foreign currencies generated by future PL-480 activities. Thus dollars would be required only for those countries where the U.S. did not own substantial quantities of local currency; and for teachers and equipment which could not be funded otherwise.
          ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
There are numerous possibilities for administering an educational development program. A multi-lateral approach, through an independent mechanism or International Development Agency affiliate, has distinct psychological and economic advantages and might be more palatable to certain countries; it would, however, be more ponderous and slow, less exploitable from the vantage of U.S. interest. A new Human Resources or Cultural Cooperation Agency, co-equal to ICA; a Semi-public Foundation, linking the government and the universities; a government Fund with relations to State and ICA paralleling those of the Export-Import Bank; and a broadened ICA charter -- all have advantages and disadvantages.. The key to any organizational choice is that educational assistance must be closely and continuously integrated with the total country development plans. This tends to suggest that ICA should have the responsibility.
          MANAGEMENT
More important to the effectiveness of the envisaged program than Washington organizational arrangements is the work of the Country Team. The latter must be competent in garnering adequate information to be able to analyze the national educational problems; in stimulating country development of comprehensive and balanced plans for expansion of facilities, for production of teachers and for determination of student population; in encouraging devotion of maximum country resources to education; and of insuring that request for assistance relate to priority needs and are consistent with overall plans. Equally, the Country Team has the responsibility of coordinating educational activities of private U.S. agencies and of influencing them, as appropriate, to direct emphasis to better support the key requirements.
          This stress on priorities, as the directrix of aid, is advised. The educational problem is of such vast proportions that U.S. input must be viewed as primarily catalytic. Our aim is to stimulate the greatest feasible local effort, deploying our limited resources to cover the critical needs which cannot be met through any other means. It will require sound judgment to determine the proper division of investment and energy between the education of personnel needed today and those required in the future. The bottlenecks may range from teachers colleges to equipment for vocational training centers to elementary textbooks. It may be that the greatest single contribution will be in the provision of training aids, adapted to the local scene. In any case, while recognizing that there are minimum thresholds of comfort and cheer for satisfactory student morale, our interest should be in the quality of instructional content rather than of physical plant.
          In the field of general education, as in the development of national leadership, the military establishments can play a significant role. To this area, we now turn.
 
VI -- NEW ROLES FOR THE MILITARY


In the past year, a number of informed and thoughtful observers have pointed out that the MAP supported military establishments throughout the less developed areas have a political and socio-economic potential which, if properly exploited, may far outweigh their contribution to the deterrence of direct military aggression. Part of the reasoning rests on the example of history, of which the role of the military under Kemal Ataturk is representative; part on the record of recent months which has witnessed military accession to dominant position in the national affairs of several Asian states; and part of the growing realization that armies are often the only cohesive and reliable non-communist instrument available to the fledgling nations.           The thesis can be defended that the armies -- and their relatively small air and naval counterparts -- are the principal cold war weapon from the shores of the East Mediterranean to the 38th parallel. By the way of substantiation, one can point to command structures which provide for the rapid and effective dissemination of orders, information and propaganda to the lowest echelons; to the patterns of unit deployments which cover the country from the capital to the most remote frontiers; to the identification of officer and soldier with the village in which he was spawned; and to the intangibles of the military mystique -- of variable strength, it is true -- built of pride in the tradition of arms, in contributions to the winning of national independence, in sense of duty to the State.
          It is not enough to charge armed forces with responsibility for the military aspects of deterrence; they represent too great an investment in manpower and money to be restricted to such a limited mission. The real measure of their worthiness is found in the effectiveness of their contribution to the furtherance of national objectives, short of conflict. And the opportunities therefore are greatest in the less developed societies where the military occupy a pivotal position between government and populace. As one writer has phrased it, " . . . properly employed, the army can become an internal motor for economic growth and socio-political transformation."
          EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING
Aside from constituting a principal reservoir for leadership material, one of the military's major contributions to national growth is in the spread of education and skills. Literacy and a level of formal schooling are among the basic criteria of a fully effective soldier; a military establishment adequate to its actual and contingent tasks must include a wide variety of technical and managerial competence. Both are relevant to economic development and social evolution. Given the narrowness of the national educational system, and the obstacles to expansion in the civilian sector, it is logical that training facilities and input, which are required, in any case, to meet military needs, should be exploited for the overall advantage of the country. The returns are proportionately greater when the armed forces are essentially peopled with conscripts as opposed to careerists.
The Three Rs
Practical literacy training for every soldier is a manageable goal, as the programs of the Turkish Armed Forces are demonstrating. It enhances the individual's usefulness in service; it qualifies him for further education; and it equips him to disseminate his knowledge to his home community. As one source has suggested, the ripple effect of military instruction in the official language may be the best method of assuring that language's pre-eminence over local dialects.
Secondary Schooling
There is scope and need for the institution of off-duty courses akin to those which have long been a feature of the U.S. armed forces. The military organization facilitates identification of men of requisite capability and the exigencies of service provide a captive student population.
Vocational Training Centers
This area holds great promise both in reducing the burden on the U.S. of training low level personnel in U.S. facilities, and in meeting the demands of the civil economy. It is the essence of the "dual purpose" concept which has been elaborated in a separate Committee monograph. To the extent conflicts with the primary military mission are avoided and the civilian requirements are not exceeded, there is every justification for programming a student input which exceeds the military needs for artisans, administrative personnel and other commerce-applicable skills.
English Language Instruction
Facilities are not available in most MAP supported countries for providing English instruction for the minor numbers scheduled to be trained in the U.S. There are, however, cogent reasons for expanding knowledge of the English tongue: to broaden the selection vase for overseas training; to help the military in subsequent civilian pursuits involving foreign business contacts; to promote closer orientation and communication between the United States and the recipient country.
          One cannot generalize the relative importance of these avenues, the extent to which they should be followed, or the methods. This can only be determined by specific country analysis. In some countries, encouragement and perhaps minor technical assistance to recipient governments may suffice. In others, direct military assistance may be most appropriate while, elsewhere, the answer may lie in ICA programs under MAAG supervision. What is universally needed is a coordinated survey, planning and execution at the Country Team level.
          STRENGTHENING OF INTERNAL SECURITY
The maintenance of internal security constitutes a major responsibility of these armed forces, whether assigned directly or not. Superior performance will provide the environment of confidence so necessary to national growth. But the dimensions of security are as much political and social as orthodox military and, in the former respect, understanding and positive action have been generally wanting.
Indoctrination
There must be comprehension of the complex nature of the subversive forces at plan and of the variegated methods of communist attack. Similarly, there must be full knowledge of the means of counterattack available to the nation and of the place of the military therein. Most of all, there must be invoked the motivation to combat these influences, whenever and wherever they surface. Much of this is dependent on wise and inspiring leadership but a well planned and conducted program of Troop Information is an essential corollary. It should be a permanent feature of military life, worked and re-worked to insure it deals with vital national problems, and in terms meaningful to the average soldier. Its importance can hardly be exaggerated for it fills a void which has no parallel in the radio-periodical replete West.
Action
If the military is properly led, indoctrinated and motivated, the activities open to it are numerous. In certain instances, a key requirement may be direct military action against armed dissidents; consequently, appropriate elements of the army should be equipped and trained for unorthodox warfare. The main emphasis, however, will be in non-violent fields. An informed soldiery, widely based, is in an ideal position to transmit to the populace the thrust of its own indoctrination. By the example of its own discipline, confidence and deportment, the army provides assurance of physical protection and the identity of interest between protector and protected. Where direct military assistance to community projects is feasible -- on the model of noteworthy "civic actions" in the Philippines, Vietnam and Laos -- the army can demonstrably advance economic and social objectives.
          PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY
Here is the ultimate test of the armed forces. Their role, in the countries under discussion, is unique. They are at once the guardians of the government and the guarantors that the government keeps faith with the aspirations of the nation. It is in their power to insure that the conduct of government is responsive to the people and that the people are responsive to the obligations of citizenship. In the discharge of these responsibilities, they must be prepared to assume the reins of government themselves. In either capacity -- pillar or ruling faction -- the Officer Corps, at least, must possess knowledge and aptitudes far beyond the military sphere.
          Successful discharge of this role depends on something more, however. It becomes the rallying point for energies and allegiance only to the extent that it personifies the spirit of the nation. Thus, to power and organization must be added adaptation to and visible reflection of national symbols, culture and values; and unwavering integrity. Stimulation, through military assistance, of these qualities is perhaps more important than successive increments of combat effectiveness.
 
VII -- DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES


Up to this point, we have concentrated on defining the quantitative measurements of future programs in the human resources field. We have done this only to establish a framework within which expanded activities may be planned -- not from any mistaken belief that the exposure of increased numbers of individuals to formal instruction will, per se, lead to accelerated national pogress along paths desired by the United States. As manifested by earlier references, we are acutely conscious that the indispensable complements to learning are viable concepts to guide the application of that learning; that a nation cannot progress without ethical codes to regulate the conduct of its citizens and institutions. We recognize that the test of leadership is less its competence in the organization of men than its fashioning and exemplication of the principles which inspire and drive the organization.           The special pertinency of these matters to the Afro-Asian area is evident. There the political and social revolution has uprooted most of the symbols, beliefs and concepts to which men previously clung. The gap must and will be filled. The U.S. has a vital interest in the nature of the new symbols and concepts for they are critical to the attainment of our foreign policy objectives.
          It is one thing to subscribe to the fundamental importance or proper standards; it is quite another to materially influence their formulation and their acceptance. Ths component of our programs for the training of foreign nationals has been indifferently pursued and has met with scant success. The reasons are readily identifiable. While we have embraced "the struggle for the minds of men" as a slogan, we have been inept at translating it into personalized terms and meaningful courses of political action. We have been ineffective in codifying and communicating the principles by which we live; and we have entertained the misconception that our approval or our widely heralded social traits signified absorption of the political and moral precepts we are incapable of articulating. We are essentially non-political and empathy is not our forte. Most of all, we have invoked the myth of non-interference to cloak timidity, lack of assurance, sometimes want of moral courage when confronting issues which, admittedly, run close to national nerve centers and traditions. Yet nothing covert or insidious is involved. The tasks call for sophisticated handling but they are above board: to inculcate standards consistent with, and designed to support, the aspirations of the newer nations of the East. Alternate, incompatible standards are already being proffered.
          There is no programming guidance which spells out the chapter and verse of this area of activity; nor, in fact, can there ever be set rules to govern the development of motivation, integrity and moral principles. A few points are, of course, clear. The complexity and delicacy of the problem dictates a highly selective approach; our aim is to build the current and future leadership that it may coalesce and build the nation. The intangible inputs to leadership can only be supplied by individuals, and particularly the membership of the Country Team, who have direct contact with the foreign elites.
          As we see it, the categories of contact are two. The first, transitory as to time but not impact, involves the American associates to form part of the environment of the leader's training in this country. The second, and more significant, is the advisor-advised relationship.
          U.S. TRAINING ENVIRONMENT
We have already alluded to the requirment for raising our sights with respect to the objectives of leadership training in the United States. Extra-curricular activities should be as carefully planned as the formal course of instruction, and the keynote should be something more than traditional American hopitality. Here is the opportunity for indoctrination in the dynamics of our society and for give-and-take discussions on the elements thereof adaptable and tranferable to the trainee's native land. There should be conscious efforts to demonstrate the identity among Constitution, government and governed; our theorems of public service; the responsibilities of the citizen to State and community; the role and importance of our national symbols; and the other major factors which contribute to balance, stability, confidence and progress within the American society. Conversely, attention should focus on the pressing deficiencies and needs in the trainee's own society and understanding but forthright comment on what remedial actions are feasible.
          Exchanges of this nature cannot be haphazard; their efficacy depends on thorough knowledge of the individual's background and passable skill in political dialetics. It will require real work and real imagination; and adequate arrangements with, and full support by the military installaitons, universities, commercial establishments where the basic instruction takes place. Most important is the selection of the personnel to whom the indoctrination, conditioning and grooming activities are entrusted; their interest, comprehension, knowledge of the trainee's country and preferably its language, tact, ability to reduce arguments to meaningful terms, and the example they set, are the final determinants of success or failure. Here is where the real costs of this training lie. The dollar expenditure in a year's course at the Army's Ft. Leavenworth or the Harvard Business School for eight Indonesian General Staff Colonels is no more than that required for pilot training of an Indonesian lieutenant. But the input of effort, imagination and motivaiton demanded of the hand picked Americans acting as these colonels' counselors cannot be priced.
          It should be noted in passing that the Defense Department has an infinitely better mechanism -- should it be willing to employ it - for the handling of these activities than do State or ICA.
          ROLE OF THE ADVISOR
In the last analysis, inculcation of the values which distinguish responsive and responsible leadership rests with the members of the Country Team. It is only at this level that effective communication between nations can take place; that compatibility of United States and recipient country aims and objectives can be ascertained; and that progress towards mutual objectives can be measured and assured.
          The starting point, as this paper has repeatedly underscored, is knowledge: knowledge of the attitudes, aspirations and pulse of a selective cross-section of the populace, and of their national institutions; knowedge of the background, views and factors which motivate the leadership elite; knowledge of the extent to which community of interest among government, armed forces and people is lacking, and why; and knowledge of the temper of the oposition and the nature of the weaknesses it exploits. There must, of course, be knowledge of the basic characteristics of local traditions, culture and religion; of the well springs of national pride and superstitions; and of prevailing social customs and practices. Extensive personal contacts with all strata of society can alone provide such knowledge. This is the first, and key, collective responsibility of the Country Team; the routine of reports, inspections and administration must be subordinated thereto.
          Through understanding of the local scene and the identification of the major vulnerabilities inherent therein are essential bases for the reorientation and improvement of the national leadership. The others, and all-important, are the careful choice of the instrument -- the relationship between the U.S. representative and the native leaders with whom he is associated -- and the equally careful determination of the media to be utilized. We stress the necessity of meticulous attention to the selection process. As one uniquely successful military advisor has phrased it, we are dealing with "one of mankind's most sophisticated activities" and consummate wisdom and skill are required.
          An honest answer to the question, "how can an advisor strengthen the national leadership, and through that leadership the stability and growth of the nation must be that the potential is limited only by the individual's ingenuity and dedication, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of this rapport with key indigenous figures on the other. However, one can establish certain directional signs. Since we have pondered the military more deeply, models can be constructed in that area.[7] But the approach to the non-military leadership problem is generally similar.
Force of Example
It is basic that the advisor demonstrate, in his own conduct, the very ideals and traits he seeks to inculcate in others. Integrity and devotion to duty must be respected in his every action. While conforming to local customs, he must meticulously observe the same rules and spirit of military courtesy, vis-à-vis the local forces, as practiced in his own service. He must display, on all inspections and visits, the same concern for the health, welfare and comfort of the troops and for objective standards of military justice as accords with the best traditions of the U.S. forces. These things rub off. There is evidence that the example of MAAG officers has often resulted in the adoption of practices which have strengthened local military esprit and cohesion.
          The corollary to example is suggestion in matters which are vital to the morale and vigor of a military establishment. Practices which have a debilitating effect thereon, which reflect on the integrity of leaders, merit the attention of advisors. These may include the diversion of portions of troop pay and rations; command acceptance of unsatisfactory living conditions; partiality in bestowal of promotions and other rewards; inequities in the system of military justice; in short, any action which reflects abuse of prerogative or disregard for the paternalistic responsibilities of the Commander. The advisor must know the facts; comprehend the background thereof; be forthright in discussions; and, above all, have effective solutions. In certain areas, the answer may be straightforward. No special problems exist in encouraging counterparts to correct omissions as, for example, in frequency and thoroughness of inspections; or display greater interest and energy in troop welfare programs; greater energy in welfare activities. More imagination is required where reversal of precedent is involved. Convincing the Commander that the establishment of troop messes is, on its own merits, an excellent course of action may be the optimum -- and only -- answer to "squeeze" of subsistence allowances. Suggestion that the leader conduct a troop information program on the fundamentals of military justice may focus his attention of deficiencies which had previously gone unnoticed.
Development of Symbols
The traditions which sustain and uplift military forces are generally lacking in the newly emerged nations. They can, however, be found in the cultural heritage, refurbished and made meaningful. The U.S. Army helped build Jos Rizal into the Philippine national hero; and did the same with respect to the legendary figures who today furnish inspiration for the armed forces of Vietnam. The U.S. MAAGs have the research facilities, the contacts and the troop information know-how to encourage and assist the Ministers of Defense in the development of symbols which reflect the highest ideals of the nation.
Formulation of a Military Creed
We have pointed out the unique responsibilities of the military forces -- one might almost say armies -- in the development of political stability and national unity. How well these responsibilities will be discharged depends upon the evolution of proper standards of service to guide the leaders; and upon the latter's effectiveness in securing acceptance thereof by all ranks. To the extent that the advisor is attuned to the local environment, perceptive of the significant undercurrents, able to communicate his understanding and motives, and discreet in his approach, he can exercise appreciable influence on the formulation and expression of enduring principles. The latter include the relationship of the military instrument to the State and to the civil power; professional and personal codes for military men; the deeper meaning behind the observance of the forms of military courtesy; and the constraints on the military in the emergency discharge of the functions of government. His influence in the dissemination of these creeds and concepts may be no less important. Forethought and imagination can assist in effective design and direction of the troop information and education programs to be conducted by commanders for the troops.
Increased Unity of Army and Populace
The achievement of internal security involves more than adequate physical protection. The populace must be confident of the motives of the protectors; assured that the price of protection is not the deprivation of individual rights and privileges, that the military is indeed the servant of the State. The advisor must be able to suggest ways and means of promoting mutuality of objective and interest between the civil community and the military. Joint consultative committees are an excellent mechanism for the quick resolution of points of friction in Local community relations. If there are unit farms there should be no occasion for the commandeering of provisions. Military equipment and labor, temporarily idle, can expedite completion of village communal projects. Army medical facilities have the capacity to handle emergency cases, to help control the spread of disease or to eliminate critical sanitation problems.


The membership of the Country Team must be no less imaginative and persuasive in the non-military leadership sectors, where the search continues for meaningful forms and concepts of government, tuned to domestic and external realities. The increasing tendency, throughout Afro-Asia, to relinquish national responsibility to the military instrument is evidence of the non-viability of the Western forms and concepts which were originally embraced, deficiencies in local political leadership, or both. While the military deserves our full support in their discharge of their trusteeship responsibilities, it is in our best interest that the reins of government be returned to the civil authority as soon as one adequate to its tasks can be created. It is the duty of American field representatives to ascertain what has gone wrong and to proffer guidance and advice in the development of governmental and institutional structures and concepts of service, which will restore the confidence of the populace. Only thus can an enduring relationship be established among the governments, the military and the people themselves. The record is witness to the tremendous influence exerted by a few dedicated Americans over the policies and points of view of key decision-makers; the value of their efforts, both to the country concerned and the United States, has been inestimable. It is regrettable, however, that these initiatives have been so limited in number and that they have sprung from the individual rather than governmental direction and impetus. Yet this is the real test of our ability to develop national leaders of integrity, objectivity and devotion to standards compatible with our own; and, through these leaders, to insure the kind of stability and growth that constitutes the basis of our aid. Our selection, preparation and guidance of our field representatives must henceforth reflect this basic fact.
 
VIII -- REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


The foregoing discussion constitutes the arguments for and describes the broad objectives of efforts commensurate with the importance of the human side of development to the total mutual security program. Full attainment of these objectives may well be infeasible. Long term and complex undertakings are involved. Progress will be slow and not susceptible to precise measurement. The most difficult obstacles involve intangibles: it will be easier to surmount fiscal and legislative problems than to condition and motivate American trainees for a series of responsibilities without precedent. We are convinced, however, that we cannot set our sights on any lower targets. For, we repeat, the achievement of political stability and economic growth throughout the less developed areas depends upon the competence of the national leadership, today and henceforward.           Our proposals have dealt mainly with new emphasis, with the strengthening of the training framework and with qualitative improvements as to substance. These requirements do not translate into concrete recommendations. What follows, therefore, is a mixture of the general and specific.
          RE-ENUNCIATION OF POLICY
The first requirement is an attitudinal shift: widespread recognition and acceptance of the essentially of greater efforts in the development of human resources; and the gearing for such cohorts. While it must permeate both government and private sectors, the initiative lies with the Executive Branch. Existing policy must be reviewed and updated: and there must be teeth. The sympathy and support of the Congress must be secured. Similarly, mechanisms must be found for eliciting the understanding of and greater cooperation from the American educational apparatus, the private foundations and the industrial and business world.
          We recommend that the National Security Council be seized with this matter and that it:
    (1) enunciate the need for greater efforts to identify, train and groom the foreign leadership cadres in all key sectors and provide the authorization for the MAP, ICA and IES actions to meet this need;
    (2) underscore the policy of the United States to provide substantial assistance for the development of national educational systems;
    (3) provide guidelines for closer relationships with and support from the private sector;
    (4) stress the importance of the advisory function of American representatives in contact with foreign nationals;
    (5) issue the requisite instructions to give force to the above and charge the OCB with the responsibility for follow-up and evaluation.
          ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
The conduct of leadership programs of the nature and size we have envisaged will require a considerably strengthened U.S. organizational framework and an increased capability to manage and coordinate the activities at the country level, in Washington and at the locales where training or orientation takes place.
Country Teams must assume a new order of responsibility as regards selection and programming of trainees, both with and independent of the local government. It has heavy coordination tasks in several arena. It needs comprehensive and up-to-date biographic registers and other data. All Teams will require a full time individual as central control point; most will need some personnel augmentation.
Department of Defense's present training management arrangements are inadequate; however, that organization has the capability to effect the necessary readjustments. Within ISA, the training element must be reinforced and moved from its present backwater to the status of a major division under the Director of the Military Assistance Program elsewhere proposed. The several Departments will need to create separate mechanisms for planning and monitoring the training and orientation visits of an expanded group of military leaders.
          The training staffs of the International Cooperation Administration will likewise need to be augmented. These are already overtaxed in handling current programs.
Department of State's responsibilities will likewise increase. Aside from expanded and more carefully tailored International Educational Exchange Service activities, it has a primary interest in the totality of programs designed to build the national leadership of foreign countries. It must therefore assume an active coordinating role not only with respect to the activities of MAP and ICA in this field, but also as regards those of the international agencies and private foundations and institutions.
          These requirements are clear; their measure and the extent to which they are met will be proportional to the vigor of the new national approach. Recommendations in the premises would be redundant.
          LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Part of the "gearing up" involves both revisions of existing law, and further enactments.
          The underlying objectives of leadership programs apply with full force to all nations of the Free World. This aspect of military assistance is of such importance to the United States that it should proceed even where the country concerned is not eligible under the provisions of Section 142(a) of the Mutual Security Act; likewise, it should not require the special Presidential determinations prescribed by Sections 105 and 141 of the same legislation.
    Accordingly, we recommend that the Executive Branch seek Congressional action to divorce training assistance from Section 142(a), if not earlier repealed, as well as Sections 105 and 141 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
          The bulk of the expenditures involved in the massive support of indigenous educational institutions would be in the currency of the recipient country. U.S. holdings of such currencies will increase markedly over the next two decades as a result of Development Loan Fund operations and expanded PL-480 activities; and will far exceed predictable needs for support of U.S. missions.
          We recommend that the Executive Branch seek Congressional action to:
    (1) Specify support of local educational systems in the less developed countries as a principal purpose in the utilization of the foreign currencies accruing from development loan repayments.
    (2) Modify or extend other pertinent legislation to provide greater authorization for use of U.S. own foreign currencies for training and educational purposes.
          Congress does not now get a full picture of the training and educational activities programmed annually in the non-military sector. The International Education Exchange Service programs are presented as an element of the overall Department of State operations. Moreover, the IEES must compete for funds within the context of what is essentially an administrative budget. We believe that the prospect of securing the additional resources required for expanded leadership programs, and coordination as well, would be enhanced by combining IEES and ICA proposals for the purposes of Congressional presentation. Such action would further emphasize the new accent on human resources development.
    We recommend that title III of the Mutual Security Act be broadened to include all non-military U.S. programs for training and education.
          BASIC PLANNING
As underscored in this paper, the nerve center of an expanded program is the Country Team. The needs, problems and exploitable opportunities vary widely from nation to nation; and they can only be ascertained on the ground.
          The Washington agencies must activate new efforts by the revision of instructions, guidance, authorities and latitude. Detailed planning and preparations are the tasks of the field.
          It would be presumptuous to suggest the content of the planning directives to the Country Team. It would appear, however, that four separate areas should be covered and that there should be parallel instructions through State, ICA and DOD channels:
As to High-Level Manpower Development:
    (1) Collaboration with, and offer of technical and other assistance to, the host government in establishment of machinery and procedures to survey and analyze priority needs.
    (2)Cooperation with host country in developing a training plan to meet critical known needs for decision-making, managerial and professional personnel: and active participation in the selection process.
    (3) Development of unilateral U.S. plans, as necessary, to insure balanced coverage particularly with respect to the private sector and the non-communist opposition.
    (4) Determination of ways and means for fuller exploitation of ICA University Contract program, operating in the host country, for support of leadership activities through scholarship competitions, grants for faculty development and student overseas study.
    (5) Attention to long range, as well as short term, leadership requirements.
As to Support of Indigenous Educational Systems:
    (1) Encouragement to host country in latter's development of sound long range plans for expansion of educational systems; and in devotion of maximum resources thereto.
    (2) Willingness of U.S. to consider requests for Financial assistance where such is justified in meeting priority needs.
    (3) Independent survey to determine priority needs and optimum nature of U.S. support.
As to Exploiting Potential of Military Structure:
    (1) Field investigation of feasibility of promoting education through the local military establishments and primarily in the fields of universal practical literacy training; of vocational training centers with capacity beyond military requirements; and of night or off-duty schools at the secondary level. As a corollary, development of country team plans for coordinated exploitation of these possibilities.
    (2) MAAG cooperation in the identification of promising military personnel For IEES or ICA grants and scholarships to prepare them for responsible posts in the non-military sector.
    (3) Support for development of higher level military schools in host country with curricula to include national political and economic matters; and for senior officer attendance at civilian graduate schools.
    (4) MAAG encouragement to host Ministry of Defense in development of improved troop indoctrination programs; and provision of technical assistance in the preparation and conduct thereof.
As to the Advisory Role:
    (1) Enunciation of principle that a primary function of the members of the Country Team is to improve the competence and sense of responsibility of their foreign opposites; and that effectiveness in the discharge of this role shall constitute a fundamental basis of future performance evaluations.
    (2) Re-emphasis of the essentiality of comprehensive knowledge of the local traditions, attitudes, culture, customs and significant undercurrents; of the identification of the major vulnerabilities in the local structure; and of extensive personal contacts in all strata of society as the underpinning of substantive advisory efforts to develop leadership adequate to its tasks and responsive to the aspirations of the populace.
    (3) Forceful suppression of the American tendency to do the task himself and the substitution of the tolerance and forbearance of the true teacher.
    (4) The overriding importance of demonstrating the highest standards of integrity and ethics in professional and personal conduct; of exhibiting moral courage to point out deficiencies in the attitudes and performance of local officials; and of devising and proposing remedies in keeping with native mores.
          SUBSIDIARY PLANNING
Of the numerous supporting actions to be undertaken at the Washington level, those designed to improve the handling of the trainee are the most vital. They include:
    (1) Development by the Office, Secretary of Defense and the Military Department of definitive guidance to the training establishments for the meticulous programming of off-duty activities for earmarked leaders; such guidance should provide information of techniques demonstrated to have been successful.
    (2) The most careful selection and preparation of interpreter-escorts, official or private, for high level personnel who lack knowledge of the English language.
    (3) Efforts to secure greater cooperation from the universities and business sector with respect to the desired extracurricular inputs; to this end. the collaboration initiated by the recent State Department Annapolis conference should be intensified and extended to the working level.
    (4) Development of methods to elicit greater attention on the part of private institutions operative in the foreign field to the development of indigenous managerial competence and Leadership ability.
    (5) Development of facilities and procedures to insure that the content of training and education, pursued either in major institutions or under special tutorial arrangements, are adapted and tailored to the specific requirements of the individual's background and probable future utilization.
    (6) Organization of a permanent interdepartmental task force, peopled with young careerists, to tackle the problem of identifying and grooming a highly selective group of political national leaders for those portions of Africa still in colonial status, or newly emerged there from; the principal criteria of such a group to be continuity and breadth of collective competence.
          THE ULTIMATE REQUIREMENT
The basic determinant of our performance will necessarily be the quality of the American personnel who provide the training and counsel. Improvement of that quality must engage our major efforts, now and over the long term. There is much that can be done to orient our representatives more fully.
          The Executive Branch agencies need to maintain continuing contact with the research institutions evaluating the performance of our representatives abroad and reflect the constructive suggestions emanating therefrom in selection and preparation processes. But our basic deficiencies in linguistics, in political awareness, empathy and cross-cultural comprehension can only be restricted through a measurable reorientation of the American educational system. Contribution to the development of guidelines for such reorientation is an important responsibility of State, Defense and Health, Education and Welfare in close collaboration.





_______

  1. to be expanded
  2. Among the most noteworthy are the several papers produced by the staff of the Presidential Task Group on High Level Human Resources for Economic Development, mentioned earlier; and a thoughtful study by Mr. James Howe of ICA.
  3. ICA has recently initiated a week long Communications Seminar for selected trainees following completion of their course of instruction. The emphasis is on professional conduct at home and the communication of ideas.
  4. This thought, and certain others, reflect ideas advanced by the "Study on MAP in the Underdeveloped Areas" prepared for the Committee by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, by Dr. George Liska; and by Dr. Buy Pauker.
  5. Electronic Teaching Laboratories; English courses in local educational systems; bi-national centers; text books; and refresher training facilities in this country, utilized by trainees upon arrival.
  6. Technical assistance is, of course, available for provision of instructors, U.S. university contracts, etc.
  7. Much of what follows has been taken from a Confidential memorandum prepared by Colonel E. G. Lansdale, Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense. 

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Major, John. The Oppenheimer Hearing. New York: Stein & Day Publishers, 1971.
"The Pentagon Papers." The New York Times, Jume 13, 1971;   June 14, 1971; Jume 15, 1971; July 1, 1971.
The Pentagon Papers:   The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. The Senator Gravel Edition. 4 vols. Boston:   Beacon Press, 1911.
Ransom, Harry Howe. Can American Democracy Survive the Cold War? New York:   Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1964.
_______. Great Britain's Secret, Secret Service. Chicago:   Midway-Univ. of Chicago Press, June 1967.
Sundquist,James L. Politics and Policy:   The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years. Washington, D.C.:   The Brookings Institution, 1968.
Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York:   Harper and Bros., 1959.
"The Trial of the U-2," Trans. Chicago:   World Publications, 1960.
Wicker, Tom. JFK and LBJ:   The Influence of Personality Upon Politics. New York:   Morrow, 1968.
Wiener, Norbert. The Human Use of Human Beings. New York:   Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1954.
Wise, David, and Ross, Thomas B. The Invisible Government. New York:   Random House, Inc., 1964.

ToC | Prev




INDEX



[The index has been included verbatim from the original book. Although the page numbers have no meaning here, it was felt the subjects noted are useful as a reference. The original chapter page numbers are listed below to facilitate cross-referencing --ratitor]
   Acknowledgments                                    vi
   Preface                                           vii
 1 The "Secret Team" -- the Real Power Structure       2
 2 The Nature of Secret Team Activity                 22
 3 An Overview of the CIA                             54
 4 From Law to Interpretation                         94
 5 "Defense" as a National Military Philosophy       121
 6 "It Shall Be the Duty of the Agency . . ."        140
 7 The Nature of Clandestine Operations              159
 8 "The Cover Story" Intelligence Agency             180
 9 The Coincidence of Crises                         201
10 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report in Action            224
11 The Dulles Era Begins                             244
12 Personnel:  The Chameleon Game                    266
13 Communications: The Web of the World              281
14 Transportation: Anywhere in the World -- Now      294
15 Logistics by Miracle                              303
16 Cold War:  The Pyrrhic Gambit                     314
17 Mission Astray, Soviet Gamesmanship               328
18 Defense, Containment, and Anti-Communism          337
19 The New Doctrine: . . .                           355
20 Khrushchev's Challenge:  The U-2 Dilemma          371
21 Time of Covert Action:  U-2 to Kennedy Inaugural  381
22 Camelot:  From the Bay of Pigs to Dallas, Texas   391
23 Five Presidents:  "Nightmares We Inherited"       417
   App. I: Definition of Special Operations          427
   App. II: Powers and Duties of the CIA             428
   App. III: Training Under Mutual Sec Prog          442
   Bibliography                                      481


Acheson, Dean, 200
Advisory functions of CIA, 140-47
Aerial reconnaissance, 151-53, 307-308
Africa, CIA bases in, 271
Air America, 174-75, 232, 280, 297-303
Air Defense Command (New York & Colorado), 162, 219-20
  intelligence and, 168-69
Air Division (DD/P; CIA), 161-64
Air Force, U.S., 40-41, 72, 145
  aerial reconnaissance of, 15254, 307-308
  airlift of munitions for CIA by, 90, 161
  B-29, 205
  B-36 controversy and, 107108
  B-52 use of, 67-68, 162
  CIA and, 232, 262-63
  CIA Indonesia coup and, 140, 324
  as a member of intelligence community, 141
  P2V-7 aircraft and, 316-19
  placed under DOD (1947), 127
  Special Air Warfare squadrons of, 77, 138
  U-2 affair and, 260-61
Air Laos, 173
Air Operations (CIA), 316-18
Air Resupply and Communications (Air Force; ARC Wings), 
    161, 165, 221
  CIA and, 247, 248, 311, 314
Air warfare, 122-23
Aircraft, use of in CIA coup d'etat, 8748
Airlines of CIA, 271
Air America, 174-75, 232, 280, 297-303
  CAT, 232, 299
Alexander, Field Marshal Harold, 304
Algeria, 351
Aliens, illegal, CIA and, 277-78
Alsop, Joseph, 14, 182
Ambassadors, 143, 399-400 
  CIA activities and, 88-89, 100-101, 118, 166 
  Military Aid Program and, 145 
  role in CIA communications of, 285-86
Ambassador's Journal (Galbraith), 100
American Legion, 45
Amory, Bob, 201
Analysis Branch (OSS), 64
Anderson, Jack, 26
Anderson Papers (1971-72), 75-76
Anti-Communism, 2-3 
  counterinsurgency and, 119 
  creation of a coordinated central intelligence 
    agency and 125-27, 202-207 
  expansion of CIA authority and, 136-38 
  "peacetime operations" of CIA and, 142-44 
  in Vietnam, 193 
  See also Communism; Cold War; Counterinsurgency
Anti-guerrilla warfare support, 87
Appropriations of CIA, 277
Arab-Israeli War (1956), 348
Arango, Aureliano Sanchez, 45
Armed Forces, see Military, the
Armed Forces Staff College 214-15
Armored Forces, 122
Army, U.S., 144 
  CIA and, 232 
  CIA Indonesia coup and, 140 
  counterinsurgency connections with CIA and, 107
  as a member of intelligence community, 141 
  placed under DOD (1947), 127 
  political-social-economic role of, 15, 87, 355-69, 394 
  separation of Air Force and, 72 
  See also Military Assistance Program (MAP); 
    Special Forces
Artime Buesa, Manuel, 45, 47
Arundel, Arthur, 196    
Ashby, W. Ross, 227 
Assistant to the Secretary for Special Operations 
  (Defense Department), 43 405-407 
  description of, i27_28   
Atomic Energy Commission, 141, 202, 226-27
Atomic warfare, 64-65, 123-24
Attorney General, 277


B-17 (bomber), 94-95
B-26 (bomber), 41-42, 48-59, 324, 413
B-29, 205
B-36 (bomber), 107-108
B-47 (bomber), 154
B-52 (bomber), 67-68, 162, 218
Baker, Bobby, 88
Baldwin, Hanson W., 70-71
Bao Dai (Emperor of Vietnam), 58, 60
Barnes, Tracy, 44, 347, 393
Bay of Pigs (Cuba; 1961), 6, 8, 13
  aftermath of, 321-22
  Board of Inquiry on, 104-14, 396
  CIA and, 22-34, 37-52, 103-104
  CIA preparations for, 382, 388-70, 392-93
  Douglas on, 417-18
Bay of Pigs, The (Johnson), 113
Berlin, 67, 370
Berlin Corridor, 153
Big Minh (Duong Van Minh), 7
Binh Dinh province, 360
Bissell, Richard, 50, 106, 116
  as head of IDA, 408
  1959 C-118 affair and, 331
  U-2 project and, 156, 328, 372, 378
Black cargos, 23
Bohanon, Charles, 196
Border flights, development of U-2, 152-57, 260-61, 
  314, 318-19, 320
Boston Globe, 26
Braun, Werner von, 349
British Special Operations Executive (SOE), 62
Budget of CIA, 261, 305-306
Bulgaria, 213, 230
Bundy, McGeorge, 14, 35, 120, 131, 197n, 199
Bundy, William, 11, 120, 347, 414
  as CIA operative, 110, 134-35, 290
  Krulak and, 407
  Pentagon Papers memo (1964) of, 199-200
Bureau of the Budget, 63
Burke, Adm. Arleigh, 40, 105, 414 
  aftermath of Bay of Pigs and, 107, 111
  CIA Indonesia coup and, 140-41, 324
Busby, Fred, 98
Byrd, Senator Harry, 273
Byrnes, James F., 72-74, 123, 125, 201, 203


C-46 (transport), 41-42, 48-49, 271, 299, 413
C-47 (transport), 413
C-54 (transport), 22-24, 41, 271, 413
C-97 (transport), 117
C-118 affair (1959), 328-37
C-119 (transport), 232
C-130 (transport), 144-45
Cabell, Gen. Charles P., 50, 157, 161, 164, 181, 
    198, 332-33
Califano, Joseph, 11, 14
Cam Ranh Bay, 35
Camau (Vietnam), 360
Cambodia, 9, 15, 18, 20, 27, 198 
Can American Democracy Survive the Cold War?
    (Ransom), 131-32
CARE, 54
Carter, General Marshall, 213
Castro, Fidel, 30, 351, 388-89
CAT Airlines, 232, 299
Center for International Studies (MIT), 339
Central Intelligence Agency Act (1949), 187, 275
  personnel and funding and, 274, 275-78, 383
  quoted, 436-38
Central Intelligence Group, 65, 98
Century series planes, 154
Chancellor, John, 423
Chiang Kai-shek, 175, 299
Chief of Naval Operations, 112
Chief White House adviser on foreign affairs, 3
China, CIA flights over, 95, 328
Churchill, Winston, 55, 73-74, 125, 201
"CIA and Decision Making" (Cooper), 190
Civic Action teams of Vietnamese government, 361
Civil Affairs and Military Government Command 
    (CAMG), 215, 217, 357
Civil Affairs School (Fort Gordon, Ga.), 357-60, 362-63, 
    385
Clandestine Intelligence, 57
Clandestine Operations, 57
  nature of CIA, 159-79
Clauswitz, Gen. Karl von, 218
Clifford, Clark, 340-42, 347, 384
Cline, Ray, 201
Coast Guard patrol ships, 413
Cold War, 218-19
  CIA peacetime operations and, 142-44
  CIA use of P2V-7 aircraft and, 314-20
  Indonesia (1958) and, 323-38
  origins of, 74-76
  theory of, 320-23
  See also Anti-communism; Communism
Collection Intelligence, 139, 148
Commander in Chief Pacific Armed Forces (CINCPAC), 
    174, 297, 388
Commissioner of Immigration, 277
Common concern, services of, 158
Communications networks of CIA, 14, 88-89, 261, 281-94
  ambassadors in, 285-86
Communism
  Civil Affairs School class on techniques of Aggression
      on, 358-60
  Cold War and, 321-23
  containment policy and, 337-55
  as excuse for CIA counterinsurgency activities, 90-91, 
      93-94, 230
  post-war responses to, 72-76, 124-27 
  See also Anti-Communism; Cold War; Soviet Union
"Communist Techniques of Aggression" (Civil Affairs 
    School), 358-60
Comptrollership of CIA, 261
Computers, 224
Conein, Lucien, 196
Congo, 67, 100, 102, 117, 388
Constellation (aircraft), 271
Containment policy, 337-55, 384
Continental Air Command, 219
Cooper, Chester L., 190, 195-96, 198-201
Coordination of Intelligence by CIA, 147-48
Coordinator of Information (COI), 54-55, 128
Cordona, Jose Miro, 45, 48
Correa, Mathias F., 147, 181, 200, 208
Correlation of intelligence by CIA, 148-55
Council on Foreign Relations, 190, 195, 197n
Counterinsurgency of CIA, 87-94, 107 
  communism as excuse for, 90-91, 93-94, 230 
  theories advanced under Kennedy of, 104-21, 136-38, 
    396-99
Coup d'etat, 13, 104 
  of Diem (1963), 4-6, 7 
  example of CIA procedures for. 76-94 
  in Guatemala, 41
"Cover," 279-80, 393
Covert operation, 57
Craft of Intelligence, The (Dulles), 17-18, 61, 373
  collection described in, 139
  concept of intelligence in, 66
  whitewash of CIA by, 180, 182-85, 187-89
Craig, Gen. William H., 407
Cuba, 6, 54, 102, 369-70 
  Eisenhower's curtailing of CIA flights and, 381-82 
  See also Bay of Pigs
"Cult of the gun," 2
Current Intelligence Office (CIA), 234-41, 245, 338
Cybernetics, 224


DC-4 (transport), 24, 41
DC-6 (transport), 271, 300
DC-7 (transport), 271
Dalai Lama, 13, 351
Dayan, Moshe, 348-49
Dean, Gen. Fred, 407
Debriefings, 279
Defectors, 216, 277-78
Defense Department (DOD), 10-11, 18 
  CIA and, 43, 60, 130, 210 
  CIA funding and, 187 
  CIA infiltration of, 109, 134, 279 
  counterinsurgency expansion of, 136 
  degradation of role of, 67-68 
  establishment of (1947), 127 
  Indochina involvement and, 196 
  NSAM and, 114-15 
  post-war theory of defense and, 226-28
  transportation networks of, 296
Defense Intelligence Agency, 131, 141 
  rivalry with CIA of, 142
De Gaulle, Charles, 34, 351, 370, 372
Deputy Director of Administration (DD/A; CIA), 27, 231 
  Dulles abolishes, 245, 261
Deputy Director of Intelligence (DD/I; CIA), 27, 147, 
    231 
  Dulles strengthens, 245, 261 
    Amory, Bob, 201
    Cline, Ray, 201
Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P; CIA), 27n, 147, 197, 
    231, 280, 382
  Air Force and, 160-61 
  Dulles strengthens, 245, 261 
  White, L. K. ' Red" as, 246 
  Wisner as, 161, 164
Deputy Director of Support (DD/S; CIA), 27n, 231, 245,
    382 
  logistics and, 246-47
  personnel and, 267-68, 280
Dewey, Thomas E., 182, 208-209, 233
Dickerson, Nancy, 423
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 2, 21, 58-60, 174-75, 390, 411 
  CIA support of, 196 
  death of, 416 
  Lansdale and, 269-70, 389
  1963 coup and, 4-6, 7, 289 
  U.S. support of, 192, 194
Dien Bien Phu, 60, 172, 232, 359
Dillon, Douglas, 370
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 14, 42, 65, 
    431-32 
  agent accessibility to, 285-86 CIA, 27, 58 
  under CIA Act (1949), 275-78 
  concept of, 54 
  as head of intelligence community, 141, 146 
  National Intelligence Authority and, 122 
  NSAM # 55 and, 115 
  NSC and, 133-34, 228, 291-92 
  under the Office of the President, 63, 69, 98 
  OPC and, 186, 209 
  Souers as, 70-71
Displaced person, 216
Dissemination of intelligence by CIA, 148-55
DOD, see Defense Department
Dominican Republic, 289
Domino Theory, 198-99
Donovan, Gen. William J., 2, 54, 130, 232n 
  as COI, 54-55, 128 
  Communist "bogey" and, 126, 206-207, 340-42
  as Director of OSS, 56, 61-63, 411 
  National Intelligence Authority and, 65, 69, 70-71
Douglas Aircraft, 300
Douglas, James, 39n, 385-87
Douglas, William O., 417-18, 420
Dulles, Allen Welsh, 29, 60, 212 
  appointment as DCI by Eisenhower, 233-34 
  Bay of Pigs and, 40, 45, 48-51, 104 
  Bay of Pigs aftermath and, 105-13, 396
  CIA infiltration of governmental organizations and, 
    260, 270
  Communist "bogey" and, 126
  containment policy and, 340-42
  Dewey and, 181
  J. Foster Dulles and, 163-64
  duplicity in CIA involvements and, 58, 192-94
  extension of CIA authority and, 99, 129, 136, 138-39,
    291, 337-39
  funding of CIA and, 274
  initial reorganization of CIA by, 244-45, 261
  Kennedy and, 389
  National Intelligence Authority and, 69, 70-71
  news media and, 181
  1959 C-118 affair and, 329, 333
  1960 election and, 327
  NSAM #55 and, 116, 402
  NSAM #57 and, 118-19
  under Smith, 231
  stockpiling by CIA and, 311-12
  Taylor and, 408
  U-2 affair and, 378
  See also Craft of Intelligence (Dulles);
    Dulles-Jackson-Correa report (1949)
Dulles-Jackson-Correa report (1949), 147-48, 241
  cover agencies and, 306
  placing CIA within structure of U.S. government and, 
    259-60
  Smith implementations of, 228-33
  Dulles and, 181, 209-11, 241
  DuPicq, Colonel (France), 320, 346
  DuPuy, Gen. William, 19, 412
Dulles, John Foster, 166, 195, 207, 384
  containment policy and, 340-41
  death of, 351
  Dewey and, 182, 209
  A. W. Dulles and, 163-64
  1956 Suez crisis and, 348-49
  1959 C-118 affair and, 333
  as Sec. of State, 233
  Vietnam involvement and, 192, 194, 196 

 
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 8, 164, 192
  Bay of Pigs and, 38-39, 42, 44-45, 48, 388-90
  CIA stockpiling and, 310-11
  curtails CIA Hights, 381-82
  A. W. Dulles and, 210, 233, 241 
  events leading up to U-2 affair and effects on 1960 
    Summit of, 351-55, 369-71
  Indonesia investigation by, 326-27
  IRBM and, 350 
  Korea and, 232-33
  NSC uses of, 131, 132, 135-36. 291-92
  U-2 affair and, 13, 25, 28-29, 197, 371-80
Electronic Intelligence information (ELINT), 152, 166,
    292
Ellsberg, Daniel, 26, 189
  Cooper and, 198-201
  Lansdale and, 61
  Pentagon Papers and, 191, 195-96
Erskine, Gen. Graves B., 405406, 413
Establishment of CIA (1947), 10, 98-104
  under the law, 431-32
  See also National Security Act
Ethiopia, 271, 328
Evaluation of intelligence by CIA, 148-55
Expenditures of CIA, 277


F-80 (jet fighter), 153-54
F-90 (jet fighter), 153-54
F-94 (jet fighter), 154
Fairways Incorporated, 88
Federal Aviation Administration, 109
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 56, 63, 141
  CIA and, 268
Filipino Operation Brotherhood, 361
Finished intelligence,' 158
Fitzgerald, Desmond, 347
Flame-out," 155
Flexible response," 384
Florida, 382, 387, 388, 389
Flying Tigers, 299
Foreign Affairs, 190, 192, 194-95, 199-200
Formosa, secret CIA bases on, 94-95
Forrestal, James, 132-33, 208
Forrestal, Mike, 14
Fort Bragg, 363, 385
Fort Gulick (Panama), 43
"Fourth Force," 214
France, 74, 171-74
Frost, Adm. Luther H., 140
Funding of CIA, 186-87, 382-83 
  Central Intelligence Act (1949) and, 274, 275-78


Galbraith, John Kenneth, 100, 285
Gates, Thomas, 38, 39n, 405
Geneva Conference (1954), 194
Genghis Khan, 303
Gilpatric, Roswell, 39n
Glennan, Keith, 28-29, 377
Gramont, Sanche de, 98
Greece, 34, 35, 102, 230 
  British evacuate (1947), 202203 
  CIA involvement in, 213 
  MAP in, 355 
  Truman Doctrine and, 125
Green Berets, see Special Forces
Governmental agencies, CIA infiltration of, 109-10, 
    134, 259-60 
  as cover, 280 
  of DOD, 279 
  of Executive Department, 109 
  military and, 268-70
Guatemala, 213, 382, 387, 388, 389 
  CIA base in, 22-23, 26, 29-30 1961 
  coup in, 13, 40-41
Guerrilla and Resistance Branch (OSS), 62


Hagerty, Jim, 381
Halberstam, David, 237
Hammerskjold, Dag, 2, 382
Heintges, Gen. John A., 173, 407
Helicopter forces, 387
Helicopter use in Vietnam, 411-13
Helio Aircraft Corp., 161
Helio courier (L-28), 159-61, 298-99, 413
Helms, Richard, 106, 161
Herter, Christian, 38-39, 351, 370, 376, 379
Hillenkoetter, Adm. Roscoe H., 214, 220, 229-30
Hider, Adolph, 56
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 68
Hoopes, Townsend, 17
Hoover, J. Edgar, 61-63, 389
Houston, Larry, 382
Huks (Philippines), 34, 90, 93
Human Use of Human Beings, The (Weiner), 97
Hungary, 54
Hussein (King of Jordan), 144-45
Hydrogen bomb, 224, 2a6-a7


"Illegal" aliens, CIA and, 277-78 
India, 92, 100
India-China border dispute (1962), 117
India-Pakistani War (1971), 75-76, 100
Indonesia, 21, 34, 102-103, 140-41, 321, 381
  CIA airpower and, 275-76
  Eisenhower curtails involvement in, 8
  1958 CIA involvement in, 323-28
Industry, 2
Information, concept of, 55 56
  intelligence and, 158
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), 86, 106, 137, 
    270, 408
Intelligence, information and, 158
Intelligence, U.S. post-war theories of, 65-76
  Cold War and, 74-76
Intelligence community, 141
Intelligence functions of CIA
  coordination and, 147-48
  correlation, evaluation, dissemination and, 148-55
Intelligence operations, 57
Intelligence Review Committee (1948), 208
Intelligence vs. secret operations in CIA, 54-64, 
    94-97, 98-104
Inter-American Police Academy, 394
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), 322, 
    349-50
International Jaycees, 361
Investment houses, 2
Invisible Government, The (Wise and Ross), 21, 30
Iran, 13, 67, 213, 221, 230, 271, 328 
  MAP in, 355
Italy, 74


Jackson, William H., 147-48, 181-82, 200, 208 
  Smith and, 231, 233
Jakarta, 140, 324
Japan, 64, 232
JCS, see Joint Chiefs of Staff
Johnson, Haynes, 113
Johnson, Kelly, 154
Johnson, Louis, 132, 186-87, 210, 265
Johnson, Lyndon B., 4, 7, 191 
  CIA and, 420-21 
  involvement in Vietnam and, 13, 17, 19, 196, 198-99 
  NSC and, 179
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 5, 9, 11, 15, 30 
  briefing procedure of, 257-58 
  Burke and, 111-12 CIA 
  Cuban involvement and, 37-39, 44, 106-107, 110-13, 178 
  establishment of (1947), 127 
  IDA and, 106, 137
  Indochina involvement and, 193, 414 
  National Intelligence Authority and, 65, 71 
  NSAM #55 and, 115, 119, 401-402, 415 
  nuclear weapons and, 214-15 
  Pentagon Papers and, 290 
  Special Operations under, 406 
  Taylor and, 110-11 
  See also Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and 
    Special Activities; Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D.
Jones, Jesse, 383
Jordan, Kingdom of, 144-46, 271
Junior Officer Training Program (CIA), 268-69
Jupiter missile, 322, 349


Kasavubu, Joseph, 388
Katanga province (Congo; 1962), 117, 388
Keating, Kenneth, 100
Kennan, George F., 201, 340-41
Kennedy, John F., 54, 389-90
  advance of CIA counterinsurgency
  theories under, 104-21, 136-38, 396-99
  Bay of Pigs and, 13, 38-39, 44-46, 378
  CIA briefings before 1960 election of, 45-46, 327
  Cuba stand of, 389
  death of, 2, 416, 417
  1963 Diem coup and, 4-7
  NSC use of, 132, 136-37, 179, 183-84, 292, 392
  history of CIA under, 390-416
  Vietnam involvement and, 16, 198, 400-416
  See also Cuba
Kennedy, Robert F., 2, 17, 105, 120, 326
  Bay of Pigs aftermath and, 116, 396
  A. W. Dulles and, 106-107, 113-14, 183-84
Kent, Sherman, 200-201
Khamba tribesmen (Tibet), 294-95
Khanh, Gen. Nguyen, 7
Khrushchev, Nikita, 66, 107, 349
  Kennedy and, 397
  1960 Summit and, 351-52, 369-71
  U-2 affair and, 25, 29, 371-80
King, Col. J. C., 47
King, Martin Luther, 2, 420
Kirkpatrick, Lyman, 128, 129, 179, 180-81, 184
  on Current Intelligence Office, 234-40
  on Dulles-Jackson-Correa report, 211
  on early CIA, 205, 212
Kissinger, Henry, 69, 75-76, 100 131, 197n
"Kitchen Debate" (1959), 351
Knebel, Fletcher, 116
Kong Le, 366
Korea, 21, 355
Korean War (1950-53), 205, 213, 221-22, 228, 230, 232
Krulak, Gen. Victor H., 9, 11-12, 16, 19
  as Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and 
    Special Activities, 120, 135, 401
Ky, Nguyen Cao, 174, 269, 365


L-28 (Hello "Courier"), 159-61, 298-99, 413
Laird, Melvin, 149-50, 308-309
Lansdale, Gen. Edward, 347, 411, 412, 443
  as CIA operative, 134-35, 290, 414
  Ellsberg, Pentagon Papers and, 61, 195-96, 197
  Krulak and, 407
  McNamara and, 11, 197, 199, 406
  Magsaysay support by, 107, 288
  Vietnam, Diem and, 59-60, 174, 193, 194, 269-70, 389
Laos, 13, 15-16, 18, 21, 67, 382
  airlifts to 271
  covert raids on, 27
  Eisenhower's curtailing of CIA flights and, 8
  French discovery of CIA involvement in, 171-74
  use of Helio "Courier" in 298-99
  McNamara and, 9, 20
  Meo tribesmen of, 256, 387, 404
  Pathet Lao, 172, 366, 387
  Special Forces in, 387
  Thailand border patrols and, 269
Leafleting drops of communist countries, 152, 314
Leahy, Adm. William D., 62, 70
Lee, Gen. J. C. H., 304
Legislative Branch Appropriations Act (1933), 187
Lemay, Gen. Curtis, 414
Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 38-40, 111-12, 258, 414 
  NSAM #55 and #57 and, 119-20, 401-403, 415 
  succeeded by Taylor in JCS, 350 
Lilienthal, David E., 202 
Lindbergh, Charles A., 123 
Lloyd, Selwyn, 348-49 
Loan, Gen. Nguyen Ngoc, 366 
Lockheed Corporation, 153-54, 260-61, 316, 373 
  CIA and, 318-19 
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 5, 213 
Logistics systems of CIA, 90-92, 161, 246-65, 303-12 
Lovett, Robert, 201


M-16 rifle, 263-64, 413 
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 56, 61-63, 71, 180, 232, 410-11 
Macmillan, Harold, 370, 372 
McCarthy, Joseph, 126, 229 
McCarthyism, 126, 229 
McClelland, Gen. Harold, 286 
McCone, John, 17, 241, 347 
McConnell, Murray, 231 
McCord, James, 336 
McCormick, Col. Alfred, 71, 122 
McElroy, Neil, 333, 350, 405 
McGoon, "Earthquake," 298 
McGrory, Mary, 410, 415 
McNamara, Robert S., 4, 17, 119-20, 198-99, 239, 389, 
    414 
  abolishes Defense Special Operations office, 405-406 
  Bay of Pigs and, 38-39 
  briefings of, 240, 347 
  Bundy and, 110, 135 
  McNamara-Taylor Vietnam report (1963), 5-7, 19, 416 
  McNamara Vietnam report (1963), 8-15 
  NSAM #55 and, 402 
  on "Steps to Change the Trend of the War" (1964), 
    19-20 
McNaughton, John T., 11 
Magsaysay, Ramon, 21, 34, 59-60, 84, 90 
  Lansdale, General and, 107 
Malinovsky, Marshal Rodion Y., 371
Manhattan Project, 64
Mansfield, Senator Mike, 6, 248, 407, 410, 415  
Marines, 35  
Marshall, Gen. George C., 203, 213
Marshall Plan (1947), 74, 203, 344
Massed rapid-fire weapons, 122
Matsu, 351
Medaris, Gen. John B., 107
Meo tribesmen (Laos), 256, 387, 404
Mexico, 22-26
Milbraith, Lester, 195
Military, the, 63, 204-205
  CIA and, 18, 175-76, 214-23, 268-70
  CIA and under CIA Act (1949), 275-78
  CIA use of military bases, 272-75
  postwar defensive posture of, 127
  See also Air Force, U.S.i Army, U.S.; Navy, U.S.
Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG), 246, 
    272, 274, 395
  CIA and, 356, 358, 361
  in Southeast Asia, 6-7
Military Airlift Command (MAC), 274
Military Air Transport Service, 274
Military Assistance Program (MAP), 43, 145, 171, 256,
    344, 394
  development of, 355-69
  P2V-7 aircraft and, 14-15
Military equipment, CIA stockpiling and obtaining, 
    249-53, 310-11
Minh, Gen. Duong Van "Big," 7
Missile gap," 156-57, 322
Mollet, Guy, 348-49
Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard Law, 304
Multi-nationals, 176
Munitions manufacture, Vietnam War and, 411-12
Mutual funds, 2, 52
Mutual Security Act (1951), 355
Mutual Security Program, CIA
  and, 353, 355-71
  article on leadership training under, 445-80
My Lai, 404


Nasser, Gamel Abdul, 348, 351
Nasution, Gen. Abdul Haris, 324-25
Nation building, 394-95
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
    28-29, 310, 352, 377
National Economy Act (1932), 187, 264-65, 382
"National Intelligence," 158
National Intelligence Authority (1946), 65, 122, 128-29
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), 190-92, 195-201
National Security Act of 1947, 10, 71
  establishment of CIA and, 98-104, 122-39
  functions of CIA as prescribed by 140-58
  1947 political climate and, 201, 203-204, 224-28
  quoted, 427-34, 438-41
  See also Central Intelligence Act (1949)
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)
  #54 (1961) 119
  #55 (1961j, 16, 114-16, 119, 120-21, 401, 415
  #56 (1961), 119
  #57 (1961), 116-19, 121, 401, 402-403, 414-15
National Security Agency (NSA), 2, 141, 281, 286
National Security Council (NSC), 3, 10, 37, 73, 163
  CIA circumvention of authority of, 98-100, 102, 108, 
    128-38, 141, 188-89
  CIA functions as prescribed by law and, 141, 147, 
    148, 158, 175
  Diem and, 59 
  establishment of (1947), 127-28
  Kennedy and, 132, 136-37, 179, 183-84 
  Nixon and, 45, 46
  NSC/2 (1948) and, 98-9
  NSC/ 10 (1948) and, 26-27, 185-86, 208-209, 231, 310 
  OCB and, 127-28, 131, 133, 291-92
  See also Special Groups (NSC)
National sovereignty, 101-102, 137
Navarre, Gen. Henri, 193
Navy, U. S., 111-12, 127, 140-41, 180, 247-48
  intelligence operations of, 56, 61-63, 141
  P2V-7 aircraft and, 314-16, 319
  SEAL-team, 33, 138
"New National Military Program of Flexible Response" 
    (Taylor), 362, 369, 380, 384,
News media, 2, 238-39, 240
New York Times The, 4, 10-11, 26, 44, 65, 70
  Halberstam transfer and, 237-38
  Pentagon Papers of, 58-60
Nhu, Ngo Dinh, 2, 4-5, 7, 60, 198
  death of, 416
Nicaragua, 29, 41-42, 92, 102, 388, 389
Nixon, Richard M., 45-46, 191, 196, 370, 378, 419
  CIA and, 327
  Cuba stand of, 389
  Kitchen Debate (1959), 351
  Vietnam War and, 421-23
Non-nationals, 176
Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 119
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 168-69, 221, 
    355
North Vietnam, 27, 35
Norway, 102, 166-69, 221
Nosavan, Gen. Phoumi
NSA, see National Security Agency
NSC, see National Security Council
Nuclear warfare, 64-65, 124, 202, 224-26 
  CIA, military and effects on 
  strategy and tactics of, 214-23
    
  
O'Donnell, Kenny, 410, 415
Office of Emergency Planning, 127
Office of National Estimates, 191, 193-94
Office of Naval Intelligence, 70
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC; CIA), 186, 209, 
    231-32
Office of President, see President
Office of Psychological Warfare, 152, 217, 2220
Office of Secretary of Defense, 11, 14, 44
Office of Special Operations, 163, 273
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 2, 56, 61-63, 180
  abolished, 98, 128, 202 CIA and, 268
Okinawa, 232, 382
Operation Brotherhood, 361
Operational procedures of CIA, 76-94  
  See also Secret operations
Operations Coordinating Board (NSC), 128, 131, 133, 
    291-92 
  Kennedy and, 392
OPLAN-34 (Southeast Asia), 27, 35
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 202
Organization of America States, 48
OSS, see Office of Strategic Services
Oswald, Lee Harvey, 416


P2V-7 aircraft, CIA use of, 314-20, 323, 328
Pacification, 360-61, 366, 395, 405 
Pakistan, 92, 100, 102, 221
  U-2 affair and, 169
Panama, 29, 41, 382, 387, 388
Paramilitary organizations of CIA, 88
Pathet Lao, 172, 366, 387 
Patton, Gen. George S., 304
"Peacetime" operations of CIA, 57, 142-44, 146
Peers, Gen. William R., 19, 412
Pentagon Papers (1971), 4-21, 54, 117, 135, 147, 407
  CIA clandestine intelligence vs. intelligence 
    operations and, 5741
  military and CIA in, 269
  on overthrow of Diem, 289
  use of "sheep-dipped" by, 172-73
  whitewash of CIA by, 189, 191-201
  Personnel of CIA, 261, 266-80
  See also Governmental agencies, CIA infiltration of
Philippines, 93, 232, 355, 382
  Magsaysay and, 21, 34, 594Q 84, 90
Phillips, Rufus, 196
"Phone-drop" organizations, 256-57
Photography, aerial, 307-308
Polaris missile, 350
Police wars, 394-95
Political-economic-social role of Army, 15, 87, 355-69,
    394
Ponchardier, Adm. Pierre, 348
Pope, Allen, 324-26, 373
Post-war theories of intelligence, 65-76
  Cold War and, 74-76
Powers, Francis Gary, 150, 323, 325, 371, 373, 375-76
President, 29, 103, 127, 130
  CIA under Office of, 63, 69, 98, 130
  Current Intelligence Office and, 234-41
President's Committee to study Training under the 
    Mutual Security Program (1959), 363-68
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 435-36
President's Special Committee on Indochina (1954), 193
Pseudo-military business organizations of CIA, 88
PT boats, 413
Publishing houses, 2
Puerifoy, John, 213, 232n
Puerto Cabezas, 41-42, 49-50
Puerto Rico, 29


Quang Ngai province, 360
Quemoy, 351


Rabom, Adm. William F., Jr., 99100, 193
Radford, Adm. Arthur, 60, 107, 411
Radio networks, use of in coup d'etat, 87
Radio Free Europe, 54
Rand Corporation, 86, 156, 270
Ransom, Harry Howe, 131-32, 136
Real CIA, The (Kirkpatrick), 128, 180-81, 234
Reconnaissance 
  aerial, 151-58, 307-308 
  satellite, 150-51, 157, 308-10
Refugees, 216
Research and development by CIA, 261-64
Retirement policies of CIA, 278-79
RF-105 (reconnaissance plane), 473
Richardson, John, 213
Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin, 304
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 54-55, 61, 128
Ross, Thomas B., 21, 30, 38
Rosson, Gen. William, 19, 196, 347, 412
Rostow, Walt, 8n, 35, 197, 200, 389
Roumania, 213, 230
Rusk, Dean, 14, 17, 199, 402 
  Bundy and, 110, 135
Russell, Senator Richard, 248


Saigon Military Mission (SMM), 194-95
Saltonstall, Senator Leverett, 248
"Salvage," 253-55
Sarit, Marshal Dhanarajta, 174, 269
Satellite reconnaissance, 150-51, 157, 308-10
SEAL-team (Navy), 33, 138
Secret Intelligence, 57
Secret Intelligence Branch (OSS), 64
Secret Intelligence Operations, 57
Secret Operations, 57
  intelligence vs. secret operations in CIA, 54-64, 
    94-97, 98-104 
  nature of CIA, 34-37, 159-79
Secret War, The (Gramont), 98
Secretary of Defense, 106, 115, 127, 133, 137, 140, 163
  OPC and, 186, 209, 231
  Special Forces and, 385-86
  See also Defense Department
Secretary of Navy, 65, 69
Secretary of State, 65, 69, 115
  in NSC, 127, 133
  OPC and, 186, 209, 231
  peacetime planning powers of, 143-44
  See also State Department
Secretary of War, 65, 69
Services of common concern, 158
Sevareid, Eric, 423
"Sheep-dipped," 172-73
Shoup, Gen. David M., 258
Six Crises (Nixon), 45
Smith, Howard K., 423
Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell, 99, 194, 214, 234, 240
  as DCI of CIA, 228-33, 241
Snow, C. P., 424
Sorenson, Theodore, 403n
Souers, Adm. Sidney, 70-71, 99, 122
South Vietnam, 21, 93-94, 101
  See also Vietnam
Souvanna Phouma (Prince of Laos), 269
Sovereignty, national, 101-102, 137
Soviet Union, 64, 124-25, 127
  1959 downing of C-118 by, 328-37
  post-war fears of, 125-27
  See also Communism; U-2 affair
Special Air Warfare squadrons (Air Force), 77, 138
Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special 
    Activities (SACSA; JCS), 11, 12, 119-20, 199, 290, 
    388
  CIA and, 410
  creation of, 406-407
  Krulak and, 135, 401, 407-408 
Special Forces (Green Berets), 35, 111, 113-14, 138, 
    409-10
  CIA and, 67, 120, 206, 248, 311, 314, 384-88
  Civil Affairs school of, 363, 369 
  in coup d'etat, 87
  development of, 220-21
Special Forces of Vietnam, 60, 198
Special Groups (NSC), 33, 35, 291-92
  CIA infiltration of, 134
  CI, 119, 137, 409
  5412/2, 42, 109, 119, 133-34, 175
Special Operations, 57
Special personnel of CIA, 261
Special Services, 56-57
Spellman, Francis Cardinal, 60, 107, 411
Spy-in-the-Sky orbital laboratories, 308-10
Stalin, Joseph, 56
State Department, 60, 63-64, 71
  ambassadors communications and, 285
  CIA infiltration of, 109, 134
  degradation of role of, 67-68
  IDA and, 106, 137
  intelligence operations of 122, 141
  Military Aid Program and, 145 
Stevenson, Adlai, 44, 218, 232, 393
Stilwell, Gen. Richard G., 11, 19, 412, 443
Stimson, Henry L., 55, 68
Stockpiling of military equipment by CIA, 249-50, 310-11
Strategic Air Command (SAC), 162, 219-20
"Subversive insurgency," 138, 364, 384
Suez Crisis (1956), 348-49
Sukarno (President of Indonesia), 140, 323
Sumatra, 140


T-28 (trainer craft), 413
T-33 (trainer craft), 49, 51, 154   
Tactical Air Command, 220, 275
Tactics in CIA coup d'etat, 76-94
Taipan, 299
Taiwan, 232, 299-300, 382
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 14, 15-16, 19, 347, 353
  aftermath of Bay of Pigs and, 105, 107-11, 113
  as Focal Point man for Dulles, 131, 134, 407-409
  as head of JCS, 119-20, 410, 414-15
  IRBM, 349-50
  Kennedy, Vietnam involvement and, 197, 198-99, 408, 
    411
  McNamara-Taylor Vietnam report (1963), 5-7, 19, 416
  "New National Program of Flexible Response," 362, 
    369, 380, 384, 396
Thailand, 15, 213, 269, 299, 328
Thieu, Nguyen Van, 174, 269
Thor missile, 322, 349
Tibet, 21, 34, 54, 67, 102
  arming by CIA of, 378-79
  Eisenhower curtailing of CIA flights and, 8, 382
  escape of Dalai Lama from, 13, 351
Timberlake, Clare H., 100
Tolson, Gen., 395, 412
Tonkin Gulf incident (1963), 20-21, 35
Toynbee, Arnold, 28-29, 37, 54
"Training Under the Mutual Security Program" (1959), 
    363-68
Transportation networks of CIA, 294-303
Trujillo, Rafael, 2, 34, 289, 353-54
Truman, Harry S
  appointment of Smith to CIA of, 228-30
  on CIA, 9-10, 37-38, 54, 184-85, 419-20    
  Dulles-Jackson-Correa report (1947), 147, 182, 207-209 
  initial post-war policies of, 123-25, 201
  National Intelligence Authority and, 65; 69-70
  National Security Act (1947) and, 127, 205
  NSC uses of, 131-33, 291
  OSS and, 98
Truman Doctrine (1947), 125-26, 203, 344
Tshombe, Moshe, 117
"TSS" (CIA research division), 306-10, 314, 317
Turkey, 125, 203, 221, 355
Twining, Gen. Nathan, 414


U-2 affair (1960), 25, 103, 169
  development of border flights by CIA and, 152-57, 
    260-61, 318-19, 320
  Eisenhower and, 13, 28-29, 38, 197, 371-80
  Eisenhower, 1960 Summit meeting and, 351-55, 369-71
  photography techniques of, 307-308
Uncertain Trumpet, The (Taylor), 108, 110, 120, 362, 
    369, 384
United Nations, 72
Universities, 2
U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), 162


Vandenberg, Gen. Hoyt S., 220-21, 222
Vanished (Knebel), 116
Varona, Manuel Antonio de, 45
Vice President, 197
Viet Cong, 8
Vietnam, 67, 103, 213
  CIA involvement in, 232, 271, 400-16
  1945-64 CIA control of, 59-61, 117-18
  Pentagon Papers history of U.S. involvement in, 4-21


War Department, 63-64, 127
Warfare, evolution of, 122-23
  CIA, military, nuclear weapons and, 214-23
Warren Commission report, 419-20
Washington Post, 26 
Weisner, Jerry, 389 
Wheeler, Gen. Earle, 119-20, 347, 406 
White, Col. L. K., 246 
White, Lincoln, 377 
White, Gen. Thomas D., 220, 330, 333 
"White Star" teams, 173-74 
Whitehead, Gen. Ennis C., 219 
Whitewash of CIA, 180-201 
Wiener, Norbert, 97, 224, 226, 227 
  on communications, 282
Willkie, Wendell, 56, 123
Wilson, Charles, 350, 405
Windchy, Eugene, 21
Wire tapping, 281
Wise, David, 21, 30, 38
Wisner, Frank, 161, 163, 209, 326-27
World War I, 122-23
World War II, 123


Ydigoras Fuentes, Miguel, 26, 41
Yugoslavia, 213, 230




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